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ABSTRACT
The political career of Amos Pinchot spanned from
1909 to 1942.

As a self-professed reformer, Pinchot

involved himself in a wide variety of causes.

At the same

time, a few fundamental principles dominated his commitment
to reform.

Throughout his long political life, Pinchot

maintained a remarkably consistent ideological perspective.
Pinchot began his public career as a participant in
the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy, and he ended it as a
virulent critic of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

In the

intervening years, he immersed himself in reform politics.
Along with his older brother Gifford, he helped found the
Progressive party in 1912.

Two years later, the younger

Pinchot left the Bull Moose fold.

In 1916, he campaigned

for the re-election of President Woodrow Wilson.
opposed American entry into World War I.

Pinchot

Once the United

States had intervened, however, he struggled to make the war
a crusade for democracy.

He argued for democratic war aims

abroad and the protection of civil liberties at home.

With

the return of peacetime politics, Pinchot looked forward to
a revival of the prewar reform movement.

In 1920, as a

member of the Committee of Forty Right, he played a major
role in efforts to establish a new political party devoted

Lo reform.

When the third party coalition failed to

materialize, Pinchot moved on to other projects.

In 1924,

he supported Senator Robert M. LaFollette for President.
Later in the 1920's, he began work on a history of the
Progressive party.

He also stayed active as a magazine

writer and newspaper columnist,

in 1932, Pinchot welcomed

the election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and he
later supported the early steps in the New Deal.
soon came to distrust the Chief Executive.

Yet he

By 1935, Pinchot

counted himself among the foes of the Roosevelt regime,

in

the closing years of his public life, he repeatedly spoke
out in opposition to the President and the New Dealers.
Despite the diversity of his endeavors, Pinchot
maintained a fixed ideological perspective for most of his
long career.

In 1913, he established close ties with New

Jersey insurgent George L. Record.

Under Record’s tutelage,

Pinchot learned to regard competitive capitalism as a reform
ideology.

The two men subsequently devoted themselves to

the advancement of a reform program intended to equalize
entrepreneurial opportunities,

in 1914, an effort to impose

the narrow program on the Progressive party ended in failure.
After World War I, Pinchot and Record joined the committee
of Forty Eight in another attempt to promote their shared
ideals.

After breaking with the committee late in 1920, the

two men continued to fight for their political and economic
beliefs.

During the 1930's, Pinchot held tenaciously to his
v

lony established views cm reform.

Hu clashed with the New

Dealers because he questioned their devotion to democracy
and to free enterprise.
Pinchot*s ideological proclivities dictated his
political fate.

While the American ruling class accepted

mass production industries and the beginnings of the welfare
state, Pinchot espoused an increasingly anachronistic
ideology based on economic competition and individualism.
As a result, he remained a quixotic figure on the periphery
of American politics.

Chaptor 1
THE HERITAGE OF A GENTLEMAN
At his birth in Paris on February 3, 1873, Amos
Richards Eno Pinchot entered a secure and cultured world.
The wealth and social status of his parents assured him a
comfortable upbringing.

As a matter of course, he received

the benefits of travel and education.

America's genteel

society, appreciative of his background, granted him
immediate acceptance.

Among his contemporaries, young

Pinchot enjoyed an inordinately privileged existence.
The Pinchots owed their affluence to the skills of
two successful capitalists.

James W. Pinchot in 1850 left

rural Pennsylvania for New York City where he soon prospered
as a dry goods merchant.

An opportune marriage further

improved his financial standing.

In 1864, he married Mary

P. Eno, a daughter of Amos R. Eno, the owner of New York's
opulent Fifth Avenue Hotel and other real eBtate throughout
Manhattan.*'

Just eleven years later, while still in his

^At the time of his death, Amos Eno held real estate
valued at approximately twenty million dollars. See New
fork Times, Feb. 22, 1898, 1. On the lavishness of the
Fifth Avenue Hotel, see Ivan D. Steen, "Palaces For Travelers
New York City's Hotels in the 1850's as Viewed by British
Visitors," New York History. LI, No. 3 (April, 1970), 282-84.
Amos Pinchot once confided to a friend that the family
1

forties, James Pinchot abandoned the realm of commerce for a
leisurely retirement with his wife and their children
Gifford, Antoinette, and

Amos.^

The closely knit family of five lived in a manner
appropriate to its station.
extensively in Europe.

As a group, they traveled

A long stay in France accounted for

Amos's exotic birthplace."*

At home in New York, the quintet

established residence in exclusive Gramercy Park.**

In 1886,

James Pinchot completed "Gray Towers," a baronial country
house near Milford, Pennsylvania.5

The secluded mansion and

adjacent land served as a family retreat for years to come.5

fortune stemmed from the "unearned increment" on New York
City land. See Amos Pinchot to James R. Garfield, Feb. 13,
1913, Box 14, Amos Pinchot Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress.
For material on James W. Pinchot, see the biographi
cal sketch in Box 1, Pinchot MSS.
^Martin Fausold, Gifford Pinchot; Bull Moose Progres
sive (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1961), 6-7?
hereinafter cited as Fausold, Gifford Pinchot.
4On Gramercy Park see Moses King, K i n g 1s Handbook of
New York City (Boston: Moses King, 1893)" 170.
^Designed by the celebrated architect Richard Morris
Hunt, the house features three large stone towers with
conical roofs. The interior contains twenty-three fire
places. See the description in Pennsylvania; A Guide to
the Keystone state compiled by Workers of the Writers' Pro
gram of the Works Projects Administration in the state o£
Pennsylvania fijew York: Oxford university Press, 1940), 356.
6For additional family background, see Helene Maxwell
Hooker, "Biographical Introduction" in Amos R. E. Pinchot,
History of the Progressive Party. 1912-1916. ed. by Helene
Maxwell Hooker (Washington Square: New York University
Press, 1958), 8-14; the biographical essay hereinafter cited
as Hooker, "introduction"; while the main text appears as

A private school education came naturally to the
scions of such a well-endowed household.

By the age of

sixteen, Amos Pinchot had enrolled at Westminster School in
Dobbs Ferry, New York.

7

Later, like uncles, cousins, and

his brother before him, he went on to Yale.®

A member of

the Class of 1897, he matriculated during the height of
William Graham Sumner's intellectual influence.9

Sports,

eating clubs, and campus society dominated Pinchot's under
graduate years, but long after his departure from New Haven
he retained a strong Sumnerian faith in the efficacy of
capitalistic c o m p e t i t i o n . B r i e f service in the Spanish-

Pinchot, History. See also M. Nelson McGeary,
Gifford
Pinchot; Porester-Politician (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1960), 3-7? hereinafter cited as McGeary,
Gifford Pinchot.
7W. L. Cushing to James W. Pinchot, Dec. 10, 1889,
Box 1, Pinchot MSS. In honor of its distinguished alumnus,
the school subsequently awarded an annual Pinchot Cup for
athletic excellence. See W. L. Cushing to Amos Pinchot,
March 1, 1917, Box 28, Pinchot MSS; and W. L. Cushing to
Amos Pinchot, June 2, 1920, Box 41, Pinchot MSS.
®See the entries for Eno and Pinchot in Directory
of Living Graduates of Yale University, 1910 (New Haven;
Tuttle, Morehouse, and Taylor Company, 1910).
^William Lyon Phelps, "When Yale Was Given to
Sumnerology," Literary Digest International Book Review,
III (1925), 661-63;
and Harris E. Starr, William Graham
Sumner (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1925), 373-407.
100n the extracurricular side of Pinchot's university
education, see Amos Pinchot to James W. Pinchot, Nov. 26,
1893, Box 1, Pinchot MSS; and Hooker, "Introduction," 11.
See also Henry E. Howland, "Undergraduate Life at Yale,"
Scribner's Magazine. XXII, No. 1 (July, 1897), 3-29; and
Lewis Sheldon Welch and Walter Camp, Yale; Her campus.
Class-Rooms, and Athletics (Boston: L. C. Page and Company
1898), passim.

American War followed graduation.

upon his return home, the

cavalry veteran capped his formal studies with preparations
for the bar at New York Law School.11
Yet Pinchot showed no sustained interest in a legal
career.

He accepted a minor post in the office of the

1O
District Attorney for New York County but soon resigned it. ^
Social life held far greater attractions.

Within a few

years, he could list memberships in the university, Boone
and Crockett, Yale, and Racquet c l u b s . ^

pinchot also

engaged in what he later termed "mild civic dissipations."
As a manager or trustee, he dutifully served as a patron of
the university Settlement, the Association for Improving the
Condition of the Poor, the Manhattan State Hospital for the
insane, and the Orthopedic Hospital.1^
Along with his social ties, the young aristocrat had
connections among the politically powerful.

His older

brother Clifford won renown as chief Forester of the United
States and as an adviser to President Theodore Roosevelt.1®

11Hooker,

"introduction," 13.

^ A m o s Pinchot to Frank Harris, Oct. 18, 1917, Box 29,
Pinchot MSS; and Hooker, "Introduction," 13.
^ T y p e s c r i p t dated 1912 in Box 2, Pinchot MSS.
l^Both the quote and the list of positions appear in
an autobiographical article for the Paterson Sunday
Chronicle, Jan. 14, 1917. Copy in Box 152, ibid.
^-5See McGeary,
Gifford Pinchot, 45-112; and Gifford
Pinchot, Breaking New Ground (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
and Company, 1947), 188-390; the latter title hereinafter
cited as Pinchot, New Ground.

Thf' junior Pinchot, as a result, had access to the White
House,

on one occasion he attended a wrestling match between

the Chief Executive and a visiting Japanese jujitsu expert.
At another time and in a more serious vein, the President
offered him a sinecure in the Federal bureaucracy.

After

conducting a brief investigation, young Pinchot declined the
position.1®
Well before middle age, Amos Pinchot had accumulated
all of the credentials proper to a gentleman of his day.
His wealth, family ties, and education entitled him to a
place among the socially elite.

As befitted a man of his

rank, he compiled a record of involvement in community
affairs.
levels.

His political connections extended to the highest
Graced with intelligence, wit, and a strong sense

of noblesse oblige, Pinchot seemed destined for a career
in the upper reaches of the American ruling class.

i6gee the fragmentary and undated reminiscence of
Roosevelt in Box 76 , Pinchot MSS.

chapter 2
LESSONS IN NATIONAL POLITICS
Entry into national politics came easily to Pinchot.
In 1908, he went to the aid of his embattled brother and
wound up in the midst of a major political controversy.

An

insurgent from the start, the younger Pinchot adapted
quickly to the ambiance of reform then at work in the
country,

in making the adjustment, he learned to relish

life near the center of power.

Amos Pinchot, between 1909

and 1912, completed a political apprenticeship and dis
covered an avocation of enduring interest.
A zealot by temperament, Gifford Pinchot gave
unstinted devotion to the cause of natural resource preser
vation.

He regarded the Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt as

a high point in government supervision of the public domain.
Accordingly, he had reservations about the change of adminis
trations in March, 1909.

He feared that incoming President

William Howard Taft would fail to safeguard natural resources
with Rooseveltian vigor.

More important, the Forester

distrusted Taft's Secretary of Interior Richard A. Ballinger.
Pinchot deemed the cabinet officer an enemy of conservation,
and he was soon listening sympathetically to reports that
6

implicated Ballinger in a plot to defraud the government of
coal lands in Alaska.

The alleged conspiracy linked the

Secretary directly with the Morgan-Guggenheim syndicate, one
of the most powerful monopoly groups in the Far West.
Differences between Pinchot and Ballinger surfaced repeatedly
during the latter half of 1909.

A legislative investigation,

once Congress met in December, seemed inevitable.

Faced

with the likelihood of an inquiry, Pinchot sought help rear
at hand,

in a later review of the situation, he wrote:

". . . I would need counsel, and counsel of the very best.
The man to whom I naturally turned first was my brother
Amos.1,2
The younger Pinchot responded to the call with
alacrity.

When Congress authorized an investigation, he
3
busied himself with problems of legal strategy.
He wanted
to make certain that his brother remained in the best
possible light while Ballinger appeared as a tool of

■*-For Pinchot's side of the controversy, see McGeary,
Gifford Pinchot. 113-89? and Pinchot, New Ground. 391-510.
The more general aspects of the conflict receive balanced
treatment in Elmo R. Richardson, The Politics of Conserva
tion; Crusades and Controversies, 1897-1913 (Berkeley;
University of California Press, 1962), 1-85; and James
Penick, Jr., Progressive Politics and Conservation; The
Ballinger-Pinchot Affair (Chicago: university of Chicago
Press, 1968), passim.
2Pinchot, New Ground. 442.
3For the material compiled by the inquiry, sec IT. S.,
Investigation of the Department of interior and rf the
Bureau of Forestry, Senate Doc. 719, 6i Cong., 3~Sess.,
1910-1911.

rapacious monopolists.^

The goal, he explained to Gifford,
c
was "to win without a scratch and hands down."
To
guarantee victory, Amos carried his partisanship beyond the
hearing room.

In an article published anonymously, he

charged the Secretary of interior with corruption and sub
servience to the trusts.6

He also helped prepare an

elaborate summary of the evidence against Ballinger for
submission to President Taft.7
His involvement in the controversy had a profound
impact on the political neophyte.

He observed in retrospect

It is easy to write of America— but hard to write
of it discerningly. . . . I came a little into the
light, or perhaps we should call it the darkness,
when, in the winter of 1909 and 1910, in a groat
congressional investigation, I saw the inside of
the American cup.8
The fundamental conflict, as Pinchot perceived it, matched

^See Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 20, 1910;
Amos Pinchot to Louis D. Brandeis, March 15, 1910; Amos
Pinchot to George W. Pepper, May 3, 1910; and Amos Pinchot
to Louis D. Brandeis, May 23, 1910, all in Box 8, Pinchot
MSS.
^Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Feb. 15, 1910,
Box 22, Gifford Pinchot Papers, Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress.
6Amos Pinchot to Livy Richard, June 11, 1910, Box 8,
Pinchot MSS; and [Amos Pinchot], "The Case Against Bal
linger," Boston Common: A Weekly Newspaper. June 18, 1910,
15-18.
7See Nathan A. Symth and Amos Pinchot, Brief on the
Cunningham Coal Entries in Alaska Submitted to the President
in Beha'l’f of Mr. Gifford Pinchot. Copy in b o x 116, Pinchot
MSS.
8See Words and Phrases notebook in Box 171, ibid.

reformers against corruptionists, selfless men like his
brother Eigainst agents of corporate greed like Ballinger.
In such an alignment, Pinchot counted himself an insurgent.

Q

The return of Theodore Roosevelt to the United States
front an international tour made the reform cause all the
more attractive.

On June 17, 1910, when the Colonel sailed

into New York harbor after fifteen months abroad, Gifford
Pinchot met him at the shoreline.^-0

Both Pinchots soon

enlisted as Roosevelt speech writers, and their efforts
produced a quick harvest.11

At Osawatomie, Kansas, on

August 31, the ex-President, in words supplied by his
onetime chief Forester, called for a sweeping new program of
national change.

12

The address delighted the junior Pinchot.

9See especially the summary of the Ballinger case in
Amos Pinchot to John callan O'Laughlin, Aug. 15, 1912,
Box 12, ibid.
10New York Times, June 18, 1910, 2.
i;LSee Gifford Pinchot to Louis D. Brandeis, June 29,
1910, Box 126, Gifford Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to
Gifford Pinchot, Aug. 16, 1910, Box 8, Pinchot MSS. With
pardonable myopia, Amos Pinchot saw his brother as the
driving force behind the Rough Rider's progressivism. After
a day spent with the former Chief Executive, he noted in his
diary:
"I feel TR is in a very unsatisfactory frame of
mind. Gifford is his political conscience & when Gifford's
influence is absent TR slumps." See entry for Aug. 19,
Diary. 1910, Box 171, Pinchot MSS.
iZpor the text of the speech, see Theodore Roosevelt,
Social Justice and Popular Rule: Essays, Addresses, and
Public Statements relating to the Progressive Movement.
1910—1916, ed. Hermann H a g e d o m (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1926), 5-22; hereinafter cited as Roosevelt,
Social Justice. On Gifford's role as draftsman, see Amos
Pinchot to Mrs. James W. Pinchot, Sept. 1, 1910, Box 8,
Pinchot MSS.

10
Ho immediately sent congratulations to his brother.'*'3

In

another letter, he described the political scene as "vitally
and almost thrillingly interesting."*-^
Pinchot channeled much of his excitement into intel
lectual pursuits,

in September, 1910, he published an

essay on the contemporary reform movement and one of its
antecedents.

After comparing modern insurgents with

antebellum abolitionists, he concluded that both deserved
praise as opponents of incumbent oligarchies.*^

An

enlivened concern for reading went with the burdens of
authorship.

Seeking guidance from an old friend, Pinchot

asked William Kents

"Will you tell me where I can get the

complete works of Miss Jane Adams [sic] ?
ideas into my brain as fast as I can."
explanation, he added:

I want to get her

By way of further

"I have just begun to think about

the situation in this country.

. . ."

16

Although a Republican by upbringing, Pinchot, full of
enthusiasm for reform, now gave his primary allegiance to
insurgency.

He disapproved heartily when Roosevelt tried

to reunite the G.O.P. for Congressional elections in

13Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Sept. 1, 1910,
Box 8, Pinchot MSS.
^ A m o s Pinchot to W. Kirkpatrick Brice, ibid.
15Amos pinchot, "Two Revolts Against Oligarchy: The
Insurgent Movements of the Fifties and of Today, " McClure *s
Magazine. XXXV, No. 5 (Sept., 1910), 581-90.
16Amos Pinchot to William Kent, Oct. 10, 1910, Box 8,
Pinchot MSS.

1910.17

The Colonel, he fretted, might speak for Old Guard

regulars such as Warren G. Harding in Ohio.18

In an acrid

letter to his brother, he warned, that the ex-President
would shift from reformer to reactionary in order to emerge
a winner.

1Q

Widespread Republican losses in November

further convinced Pinchot of the futility of attempts at
reconciliation.
lesson.

Roosevelt, he hoped, had learned the same

With regard to the Rough Rider's future, he told

Henry L. Stimson:

"The role of a great moral teacher is

. . . inconsistent with the compromises and maneuvers of a
great politician.

It seems to me that the colonel has got

to make a definite choise fsicl."2®
Early in 1911, the Pinchots temporarily parted
company with Roosevelt and joined a more militant reform
circle.

On January 21, they helped establish the National

Progressive Republican L eague .

Fathered by Wisconsin's

Senator Robert M. LaFollette, the new organization sought tc

170n Roosevelt's campaign strategy, see George E.
Mowry, Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement
(Madison* university of Wisconsin Press, 1946), 147-56;
hereinafter cited as Mowry, Roosevelt.
18See Amos Pinchot to James R. Garfield, Oct. 27,
1910, Box 8, Pinchot MSS.
19Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, ibid.
20
ibid.

Amos Pinchot to Henry L. Stimson, Nov. 11, 1910,

12
democrat! '.e American politics.

21

its declaration of

principles included demands for popular election of United
States Senators, direct primary nominations for all elective
offices,

and State constitutional amendments to foster

initiative, referendum, and recall.

As founding members,

both Pinchots signed the statement of principles.

Gifford

accepted a position on the newly formed Executive Com
mittee.^
Amos, on the other hand, concentrated on the unit's
financial problems.

He sent League Secretary Frederic C.

Howe a list of prospective contributors from New York.

As

an alternative means of fund raising, he favored a
LaFollette rally in Manhattan and offered to rent Carnegie
Hall for the occasion.

23

He subsequently donated ten

2^-On the League's democratic aspirations, see Jonathan
Bourne, Jr., to Amos Pinchot, Feb. 14, 1911, Box 9, ibid.
The movement began with a series of letters sent out by
LaFollette late in 1910. See Robert M. LaFollette to E.
Clarence Jones, Dec. 28, 1910; Robert M. LaFollette to
Ben B. Lindsey, Dec. 29, 1910; and Robert M. LaFollette to
Louis D. Brandeis, Dec. 30, 1910, all in Series B, Box 105,
LaFollette Family Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
congress,
22

For the declaration of principles, a list of the
founders, and the first slate of officers, see Robert M.
LaFollette, "The Beginning of a Great Movements Address
Before the Wisconsin Legislature Announcing the Formation
of the National Progressive Republican League," LaFollette's
Weekly Magazine, III, No. 5 (Feb. 4, 1911), 7-8, 12.
23

See Frederic c. Howe to Amos Pinchot, Jan. 31,
1911; and Amos Pinchot to Frederic C. Howe, March 3, 1911,
both in Box 9, Pinchot MSS.

13
thousand dollars to the Senator's cause.

24

For Pinchot, work on behalf oi the League evolved
into support for LaFollette's Presidential aspirations.

in

March, 1911, he conferred with the Senator about plans to
make the 1912 Republican nominee a
strategy meetings followed . ^

p r o g r e s s i v e . 2^

other

Finally, on May 26, 1911, the

New Yorker jotted in his diary:

"I believe that Taft can be

defeated for renomination.

The people do not trust him.
I
77
believe LaFollette can be nominated,'
The euphoric spell
lasted through the summer months,

in a late September note

to his brother, Pinchot rated LaFollette as "gaining
steadily" while Taft was "failing— failing pathet
ically. . . ,"28
The autumn brought a special opportunity to promote
the Senator's candidacy.

On October 16, Pinchot attended a

gathering of two hundred progressive Republicans in Chicago.

2^Amos Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, March 29,
1911, ibid.; Amos Pinchot to John J. Hannan, undated, Box
13, ibid.; and John J. Hannan to Amos pinchot, July 15,
1911, ibid.
25Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, March 21 , 1911,
Box 9, ibid.
26Entries for March 24, and May 19, Diary, 1911,
Box 171, ibid.
27Entry for May 26, ibid.
28Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Sept. 29, .191 i ,
Box 146, Gifford Pinchot MSS. See also Amos Pinchot to
Mrs. James W. Pinchot, July 31, 1911; and Amos Pinchot t)
Norman Hapgood, Aug. 4, 1911, both in Box 9, ibid.

As a member of the Resolutions Committee for the session, he
helped write a forceful endorsement of LaFollette for
President.2^
gates.

air Qf optimism prevailed among the dele

Pinchot emerged from talks with George L. Record of

New Jersey and other insurgents in high spirits.30
skeptical friend, he declared:
a tremendous success.

To a

"The meeting at Chicago was

It is my very distinct opinion that

we are going to win out."3^
In the afterglow of the conference, Pinchot seemed to
oe the perfect LaFollette loyalist.

He joined a finance

committee set up at Chicago to aid the Senator.
ties with Roosevelt showed signs of atrophy.

32

Even his

When Walter

Hines Page of World *s Work asked for the name of someone to
do a story favoring the colonel's renomination, Pinchot
replied that he knew no one well suited for the job.

33

Still, the Rough Rider's popularity could not be
denied.

James R. Garfield, Roosevelt's former Secretary of

Interior, assured Gifford Pinchot that in the key state of

29New York Times, Oct. 17, 1911, 1. Gifford Pinchot
announced his support for LaFollette by wire from Seattle.
See Gifford Pinchot to Medill McCormick, Oct. 17, 1911,
Box 144, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
30See Amos Pinchot to William Kent, Oct. 19, 191 I?
and Amos Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, Oct. 20, 1911,
both in Box 10, Pinchot MSS.
3^Amos Pinchot to Thomas R. Shipp, Oct. 18, 1911, ibid.
32Amos Pinchot to Gilbert E. Roe, Nov. 3, 1911, ibid.
33Walter Hines Page to Amos Pinchot, Dec. 19, 1911;
and Amos Pinchot to Walter Hines Page, Dec. 23, 1911, both
in ibid.
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Ohio Roosevelt far surpassed LaFollette in voter appeal.
Garfield further claimed that Ohio insurgent Republicans
would never unite behind the Wisconsin Senator. Accordingly,
he urged a bipartisan reform coalition of anti-Taft
forces.34

When G.O.P. progressives met in Columbus on

January 1 # 1912, Garfield, the older Pinchot, and even
LaFollette's manager Walter L . Houser were on hand to plead
OC
for unity.
The assemblage responded positively with a
vote "to work in harmony and unison to nominate a Progres
sive Republican for President.

..."

The declaration went

on to mention both Roosevelt and LaFollette, but neither man
won a clear endorsement.3®
The portents of a full-scale Roosevelt drive placed
Amos Pinchot in awkward straits.

At a meeting of LaFol

lette advisers on January 19, he voted with the majority
against his brother to disavow fusion tactics such as those

34See James R. Garfield to Gifford Pinchot, Nov. 23,
1911; James R. Garfield to Gifford Pinchot, Nov. 28, 1911;
and James R. Garfield to Gifford Pinchot, Dec. 2, 1911, all
in Box 142, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
35Houser had evidently decided that LaFollette would
have to give way to Roosevelt as the progressive standardbearer. See the entry for Dec. 26, Diary, 1911. Box 3315,
ibid.
3®For the declaration and a general account of the;
Columbus meeting, see Belle Case LaFollette and Fola
LaFollette, Robert M. LaFollette. June 14, 1855— June 18,
1925 {New York: Macmillan Company, 1953*5", I, 372-75;
hereinafter cited as Belle and Fola LaFollette, LaFollob ;e.
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used in Ohio.37

Just three days later, however, he

encountered Roosevelt, Gifford, and a small coterie at the
University club in New York.

The colonel invited him into

the conversation, and he soon learned of the ex-President's
■S o

amenability to a draft for the Republican nomination.''0
Pinchot resolved his dilemma with small qualms.

Scheduled

to consult with Roosevelt again on January 24, he wrote in
his diary on the previous day:

"See TR in morning.

Must

stick up for LaFollette & make TR see that if he . . .

is

to take the flag RML must be honorably treated & must have
good excuse for quitting race."39
LaFollette came shortly thereafter.

The inevitable break with
During a stormy con

frontation on January 29, Gifford reminded the Senator of an
earlier warning to count him out if it reached the point of
a fight with Roosevelt.

The brothers stood on coirmon ground.

In recounting the episode. Giffort noted laconically:

"hmos

strong with me this time."^9

37Entry for Jan. 19, Diary. 1912. Box 171, Pinchot
MSS? and Robert M. LaFollette, LaFollette1s Autobiography:
A Personal Narrative of Political Experience (Madison:
Robert M. LaFollette Company, 1911, 1913), 589-93.
38Entry for Jem. 22, Diary. 1912. Box 171, Pinchot
MSS; and entry for Jan. 22, Diary. 1912, Box 3315, Gifford
Pinchot MSS.
39Entry for Jan. 23, Diary. 1912. Box 171, Pinchot
MSS.
40For the quotation and an account of the meeting,
see entry for Jan. 29, Diary. 1912. Box 3315, Gifford
Pinchot MSS.
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A dramatic turn of events furnished the Pinchots with
a pretext for their exit from the LaJ-'oJ lette camp.

Speaking

at Philadelphia on the night of February 2, the Senator
faltered badly during his address and appeared to be
seriously ill.41

He left for Washington immediately after

the speech, and on February 5, Walter Houser announced that
the candidate planned to rest for a few weeks.42

in the

furor that ensued, both Pinchots made haste to desert the
Wisconsinite.

On February 6, Amos told the press:

"With

LaFollette out of the race, his followers are free to get
behind Roosevelt and continue the fight with a new leader."
He cited growing popular demand for the Colonel and the
state of the Senator's health as reasons for his shift.42

A

few days later, Gifford informed progressives in Minnesota
that in his judgment LaFollette was too sick to go on with
the campaign.44

41New York Tribune. Feb. 4, 1912, 1-2.
42The New York Times carried the announcement under
the headline "LaFollette Now Out of the Race." The Senator,
on the other hand, never, considered his candidacy terminated
by the statement. See New York Times, Feb. 6, 1912, 1; and
Belle and Fola LaFollette, LaFollette, I, 405-21.
43New York Tribune, Feb. 7, 1912, 9. Gilbert E. Roe,
a long time LaFollette associate, met Pinchot together with
George L. Record on February 7. Reporting back to the
Senator, Roe affirmed that both men "had gone over," and
that he "saw no use of talking with them." See Gilbert B.
Roe to Robert M. LaFollette, Feb. 7, 1912, Series B, Box 72,
LaFollette Family MSS.
44New York Times. Feb. 12, 1912, 2. See also Gifford
Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, Feb. 17, 1912, Box 154,
Gifford Pinchot MSS.
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Soon after their apostasy, the brothers made contact
with Roosevelt.

On February 14, the three men met at the

Rough Rider's office to discuss drafts of a speech that he
intended to give a week later in Columbus, Ohio.4 -*

The

conference produced an exchange of letters reflecting strong
differences of opinion.

The younger Pinchot, distressed by

the conservative tenor of the proposed address, wanted a
statement more sharply critical of big business,

in

rebuttal, the former President declared his preference for
complex "whole truths" over "a string of easy we11-sounding,
AC

and rather cheap, half truths."^0

The speech, as finally

delivered, contained a full measure of calculated ambi
guity.^

Even so, Pinchot knew his duty.

campaign hyperbole, he told reporters:

In a burst of
. . M r . Roosevelt

has struck a great blow for the people of this country.

He

had thrown down the glove to the whole reactionary
army.

. . .1,48
Once securely tied to the Colonel's staff, the new

aide undertook a variety of political tasks.

When the New

^ E n t r y for Feb. 14, Diary. 1912. Box 171, Pinchot
MSS; and entry for Feb. 14, Diary, 1912, Box 3315, Gifford
Pinchot MSS.
4®See Amos Pinchot to Theodore Roosevelt, Fob. 14,
1912, Series 1, Microfilm Reel 129, Theodore Roosfvell
papers. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress; and
Theodore Roosevelt to Amos Pinchot, Feb. 15, 1912, box li,
Pinchot MSS.
47por the text, see Roosevelt, Social Justice, 119-48.
48New York Tribune, Feb. 23. 1912, 3.

19
York Evening Post launched an editorial attack on both
Roosevelt and himself, Pinchot responded with a lengthy note
of p r o t e s t . M o r e ambitiously, he sought election as a
delegate to the Republican national convention but lost when
Taft swept the New York primary.^0

Later in the intraparty

battle, he published a magazine article that rebashed the
Ballinger affair and openly questioned the integrity of the
President.
The bitter fight over the nomination strained
Pinchot*s Republican loyalties to the breaking point.

Two

weeks before the G.O.P. convention, he confided to another
Roosevelt partisan:

"I can not look forward to a new party

with dread, for it will perhaps mean a tremendous step in
advance. . . ."52

The last strands of his fealty were

subsequently snapped by the heavy-handedness of tbe Old
Guard.

Using their control of the National Committee and

the convention hierarchy, the regulars brushed aside charges
of improperly seated delegations and pushed Taft through to

4 9 (New York) Evening Post. March 16, 1912, 6; and
Amos pinchot to Editor, New York Evening Post, March 20,
1912, Box 11, Pinchot MSS.
50See Amos Pinchot to Gilson Gardner, Feb. 24, 1912,
Box 11, Pinchot MSS; and New York Tribune, March 27, 1912,
2

.

51See Amos Pinchot, "President Taft— candidate For
Re-election," Pearson's Magazine. XXVII, No. 5 (May, 1912),
533-44.
52Amos Pinchot to Mrs. James R. Garfield, June 6,
1912, Box 12, Pinchot MSS.
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renomination.53

Roosevelt, stung by defeat, took the only

course that allowed him to remain in the race.

On the night

of June 22, 1912, he announced his intention to seek the
Presidency on an independent reform ticket.5^
lican breakup caused Pinchot no grief.

The Repub

In the aftermath of

the debacle, he described his brother and himself as
"greatly pleased," even "elated" over the prospect of a new
party.55
Zealously committed to a reform crusade, Pinchot
wanted an insurgent coalition free of conservative taint.
He complained forcefully when Progressive party ranks grew
to include trust executive George W. Perkins, wealthy
publisher Frank A. Munsey, and a host of veteran political
bosses.55

Half of the Bull Moose recruits in New York, he

53See Mowry, Roosevelt. 237-255; Victor Rosewater,
Back Stage in 1912 s The Inside Story of the Split Republic an
Convention (Philadelphia* Dorrance and Company, 1932), 80120, and 160-85;
and Norman Wilensky, Conservatives in the
Progressive Bra; The Taft Republicans of 1912 (Gainesville:
University of Florida Press, 1965), 53-69.
5^New York Times, June 23, 1912, 1, 7.
55Amos Pinchot to Albert B. Kerr, June 25, 1912; and
Amos Pinchot to W. J. McGee, June 25, 1912, both in Box 12,
Pinchot MSS.
55See Amos Pinchot to James R. Garfield, July 8, 1912,
Box 117, James R. Garfield Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of congress* and Amos Pinchot to Hiram W. Johnson,
July 12, 1912, ibid. Both Perkins and Munsey were heavy
financial contributors to Roosevelt's drive for the Republi
can nomination. When that goal proved unattainable, they
promised to underwrite the third party effort. See Pinchot,
History, 165; George Britt, Forty Years— Forty Millions: The
Career of Frank A. Munsey (New York* Farrar and Rinehart,
1935) , 158-84;
and John A. Garraty, Right-Hand Man: The
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grumbled, were "band wagon reactionaries."^

In hopes of

reversing the trend toward political eclecticism, he urged
California's Hiram W. Johnson to rally militant reformers
and force Roosevelt "to see the necessity of making the
progressive fight on progressive lines.

. . ^ «58

influx

of the unanointed left Pinchot gloomy.

After less than a

month of new party watching, he confessed to Norman Hapgood:
"Confidentially, I do not feel so good over the Bull Moose
movement as I did. . . .“59
Much of Pinchot's disillusionment stemmed from the
prominence of George Perkins in the Progressive high command.
A former partner of J. P. Morgan and a director of both the
United states steel Corporation and the International
Harvester Company, Perkins articulated a corporate approach
to reform.

He particularly favored the regulation of

Life of George W. Perkins (New York: Harper and Brothers,
1960), 256; the last title hereinafter cited as Garraty,
Perkins.
57Amos Pinchot to Thomas R. Shipp, July 12, 1912,
Box 12, Pinchot MSS. For some perceptive comments on the
party's mixed following in New York, see Herbert Hillel
Rosenthal, "The Progressive Movement in New York, 1906-1914"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard university, 1955),
411-13.
58Among the militants, Pinchot specified his brother,
James R. Garfield, George L. Record, Francis J. Heney, and
William Allen White. See Amos Pinchot to Hiram W. Johnson,
July 18, 1912, Box 12, Pinchot MSS.
59Amos Pinchot to Norman Hapgood, July 20, 1912,
ibid.
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industry through close business-government

cooperation.

Conversely, pinchot believed that such an intimate relation
ship led to corruption as evidenced by the Ballinger
embroglio.

He regarded Perkins's position as the very

antithesis of reform.
When the Progressives convened at Chicago in August,
1912, the two men quickly clashed.

First, Pinchot tried
Cl

unsuccessfully to keep Perkins off the National Committee.
A conflict of opinions over the platform widened the rift.
Working with the Resolutions Committee, Pinchot helped draft
a plank that called for a stronger version of the 1890
Sherman Anti-Trust Act.

Perkins and Roosevelt, as members

of an informal review board, later refashioned the draft
into a declaration that accepted the trusts as inevitable
and proposed their regulation by a government

commission.

An error in convention procedure brought the contrasting
views of economic concentration to light.

On the final day

60

For a survey of Perkins's business career, see
Garraty, Perkins, 15-240. The financier's notions of
political economy are insightfully treated in Gabriel Kolko,
The Triumph of Conservatisms A Reinterpretation of American
History, 1900-1916 ^Glencoes Free Press of Glencoe, 1963),
113-32, and 173-81.
6^See Garraty, Perkins. 267.
62

° For the text of the Committee's plank, see Pinchot,
History. 173. On the process of revision, see Pinchot,
History. 174; and Mowry, Roosevelt, 270-71.
The PerkinsRoosevelt declaration appears in A Contract with the People;
Platform of the Progressive Party Adopted at Its First
National Convention? August 7th, 1912 (New York: Progressive
National Committee, n.d.), 6-7.
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of tho party mooting,

the anti-trust plant prepared by the

Resolutions committee was read by mistake to the assembled
delegates.

Perkins, realizing the blunder immediately, had

the errant words struck from the record and replaced in the
press accounts by the proposal that he had co-authored.®**
Despite the troubles at Chicago, Pinchot took an
active part in the autumn campaign.

In the role of

pamphleteer, he attempted to trace the historical roots of
the Progressive party.

His sweeping survey included the

Renaissance, John Calvin, William Shakespeare, the American
Revolution, and the Civil War.

Significantly, the tract

ended with a blast at contemporary monopolies in general and
United states steel in particular.®^

in a less cerebral

vein, Pinchot tried his luck as a candidate.

He ran for

Congress in New York City's heavily Democratic Eighteenth
District.

Although he collected an endorsement from

Roosevelt and waged an aggressive canvass, the effort proved

63oscar King Davis, Secretary of the Progressive
National Committee, witnessed the mistake in presentation of
the platform and negotiated the alteration of the press
reports. See Oscar King Davis, Released For Publications
Some Inside Political History of Theodore Roosevelt and His
Times. 1898-1918 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1925),
331-34.
See also Pinchot, History, 177.
®^See Amos Pinchot, What's the Matter with America;
The Meaning of the Progressive Movement and the Rise of the
New Party (’fNew York?], 1912), passim.- Pinchot admitted
that his essay might be "too highbrow for the average
public," but he insisted that "it could be used effectively
among independent thinkers." See Amos Pinchot to George L •
Record, Oct. 8, 1912, Box 113, Pinchot MSS.

24
futile.65

in the final voting, he outpol.led the Republican

but finished well behind the Democrat.66
Meanwhile, the pre-eminence of Perkins and other
malefactors within the Bull Moose camp continued to bother
Pinchot.

With the financier serving as chairman of the

National Executive Committee and campaign chief of staff,
Pinchot found abundant reason to complain.67

Halfway

through the race, he lamented to Democratic braint.ruster
Louis D. Brandeis;
I regret more than I can tell you that George Perkins
and Frank Munsey are taking so prominent a place in
our party. Munsey is painting us . . . as the party
of protection, while Perkins is giving people an
opportunity to assume that we help the defenders of
the trusts.68
Only Roosevelt, Pinchot finally decided, could avert an
election disaster.

In letters to his brother and Hiram

65See Theodore Roosevelt to Stanley Isaacs, Oct. 12,
1912, Box 121, Pinchot MSS? and Amos Pinchot to Hiram W.
Johnson, Oct. 5, 1912, Box 13, Pinchot MSS.
66The vote among major candidates was: Thomas G.
Patten (Democrat), 13,704; Amos Pinchot (National Progres
sive), 6,644; S. Walter Kaufman (Republican), 4,943; and
Algernon Lee (Socialist), 2,085. See State of New York,
Manual For the use of the Legislature of the State of New
Y o r k , 1913 (Albany: J. B. Lyon Company Printers, 1913),
698.
67on Perkins's campaign activities, see Garraty,
Perkins, 273-284. Chicago lawyer Harold L. Ickes later told
Pinchot that the party organization in New York had "con
sisted of George W. Perkins and a push button.11 See Harold
L. Ickes to Amos Pinchot, Dec. 2, 1912, Box 13, Pinchot MSS.
68Amos Pinchot to Louis D. Brandeis, Oct. f , 1912,
Box 13, Pinchot MSS.
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Johnson, he outlined a plan to have tiho Colonel take over
direction of the campaign from Perkins, summon an elite
guard of reformers to his side, and lead a last minute
charge to victory.^9

convinced of the merit of his scheme,

Pinchot even revealed it to Perkins.

The chairman, however,

dismissed it as impractical.
When the election ended in defeat, both Pinchots
vented their wrath on Perkins,

in separate screeds to

Roosevelt, they insisted on the need to minimize the
financier's future political activities.

Gifford wanted

Progressive National Headquarters moved from New York to
Washington and Perkins assigned to non-controversial
71

duties.*

iimos, along the same line, argued that the party

would never gain credibility as a vehicle for reform so long
as a trust magnate remained at its head.

Perkins, he con

cluded, needed to "identify himself with progressive social
and industrial work, " so that his name would bring to mind
"other organizations than . . . J. P. Morgan & Co., the
united States Steel Corporation, and the international

Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Oct. 15, 1912; and
Amospinchot to Hiram
W. Johnson, Oct. 14, 1912, both in
ibid.
70

Amos
and George W.
in ibid.

Pinchot to George W. Perkins, Oct. 17, 1912;
Perkins to Amos Pinchot, Oct. 19, 1912, both

71Gifford Pinchot to Theodore Roosevelt, Nov. 9,
1912, Box 157, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
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Harvester

c o m p a n y . " ^

Roosevelt responded with a stout defense of his chief
lieutenant.

Writing to Gifford, he expressed doubt that any

other man had done as much as Perkins in the campaign.

He

also cautioned that any move to unseat the Chairman would be
interpreted as an attack on the forces of "sane radicalism"
within the party.73
the younger Pinchot.
Perkins.

The Colonel followed the same tack with
He refused to consider dropping

The trust issue, he added, was far more complicated

than Amos thought,

in closing, the ex-President recalled

that the Pinchots had already broken with Taft and haFollette.

involvement in another quarrel, he warned, might

permanently impair the brothers' usefulness to the reform
cause. 74
If Perkins needed additional support, he soon
received it.

On December 10, 1912, Bull Moose leaders

returned to Chicago for a post-election conference.

Roose

velt, in his remarks to the first session, paid special
tribute to Perkins and other major financial backers of the
party.
said:

Speaking directly to a few heavy contributors, he
"I not only want to thank you but to say that I have

72

Amos Pinchot to Theodore Roosevelt, Dec. 3, 1912,
Box 13, Pinchot M S S .
73Roosevelt supplied the emphasis. See Theodore
Roosevelt to Gifford Pinchot, Nov. 13, 1912, Box 157,
Gifford Pinchot MSS.
^ T h e o d o r e Roosevelt to Amos Pinchot, Dec. 5, 1912,
Box 13, Pinchot MSS.
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beon happy to be associated with you . . .

there have been

no morn disinterested Progressives than yourselves."75

The

chairman won still another vote of confidence from the
National Committee.

When presented with a proposal to move

headquarters from New York to Washington, the unit vetoed
the transfer by a vote of thirty-two to twelve.7®

According

to one authority, Perkins emerged from the Chicago meeting
"second only to Roosevelt in command of the party."77
The conference marked the end of Amos Pinchot's
political apprenticeship.

Drawn into the Ballinger affair

by family ties, the young socialite becanie a committed
insurgent.

He immersed himself in the actions and assump

tions of the reform movement.

In practical terms, his

experiences as a speech writer, polemicist, fund raiser, and
candidate constituted an excellent introduction to the
mechanics of national politics,

in the realm of reform

ideas, pinchot adopted a simple anti-monopoly point of view.

75

Roosevelt singled out Perkins, Munsey, William
Flinn of Pennsylvania, and Charles Sumner Bird of Massa
chusetts. See New York Times. Dec. 11, 1912, 1. According
to the financial statement filed by the party in Albany,
New York, Perkins donated one hundred and thirty thousand
dollars to the Progressive National Committee and ten
thousand dollars more to the local unit in the Bnpire State.
See New York Tribune, Nov. 26, 1912, 6 .
76in an effort to placate the Pinchots and other
dissidents, Roosevelt had the original Resolutions Com
mittee anti-trust plank restored to the platform. On that
action and for the vote in the National committee, see
Garraty, Perkins. 288.
77Mowry, Roosevelt. 296.

Tlv fight with Ballinger aroused his suspicions about the
political machinations of the trusts.

His encounters with

George Perkins suggested far more sinister possibilities.
From his contacts with the financier, Pinchot learned that
an agent of the trusts could infiltrate and even decisively
influence a movement ostensibly devoted to reform.

Chapter 3
THE REFORMER AS IDEOLOGUE
With George Perkins securely lodged near the top of
the Bull Moose hierarchy, Amos Pinchot faced a clcudy
political future.

His opposition to the trusts conflicted

sharply with the assumptions of Progressive leaders such as
Perkins and Theodore Roosevelt.

Yet Pinchot neither

retreated from politics nor compromised his beliefs, instead,
he merged his anti-monopoly views with a more systematic
critique of economic concentration.

His reform endeavors,

as a result, took on a narrow and dogmatic quality.
Early in 1913, Pinchot established regular contact
with long time New jersey insurgent George L. Record.

The

two men had worked together in the LaFollette and Roosevelt
campaigns, but now they became close friends.^

Pinchot

^Record's reform activities extended back into the
1890's. He first rose to prominence as Jersey City's cor
poration counsel in the administration of Mayor Mark Fagan
between 1901 and 1905. For biographical information on
Record, see New York Times, Sept. 28, 1933, 24; "Obituary of
George L. Record," New Jersey Law Journal. LVI, No. 10 (Oct.,
1933), 264-66;
and William M. Barr, "George L. Record"
(unpublished M.A. thesis, Columbia University, 1936), 1-64;
the last title hereinafter cited as Barr, "Record." On
Record's political career through 1912, see Ransome E. Noble,
jr., New Jersey Proqressivism Before Wilson (Princeton:
29
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particularly admired the Jerseyman's taste for heated debate
and clear presentation of ideas.^

He quickly concluded that

Keenrd deserved a greater voice in Progressive afiairs.
Accordingly, he invited party luminaries such as George
Perkins and Jane Addams to join him for evenings of discus
sion with the loquacious New Jersey reformer.^
Record, by 1913, had reduced his notions of political
economy to a concise formula.

An ardent believer in

capitalism and a disciple of Henry George, he envisioned an
economic order based on widespread competition among com
mercial equals.

The vital prerequisite for such a system.

Record maintained, was equality of opportunity.

Therefore,

he advocated a five-point program designed to strip away the
special privileges already enjoyed by the giants of American
industry.

His master plan called for:

government ownership

of railroads, other utilities, and natural resources;
prohibitive taxation on large landholdings; an end to patent
restrictions; abolition of the tariff; and decentralization
of banking.

These steps, according to Record, would open up

Princeton university Press, 1946), 15-18; and James Kernoy,
The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson (New Y o r k :
Century Company, 1926), 68-76, 94-95, and 100-105; the
latter work hereinafter cited as Kerney, Wilson.
2See Amos Pinchot, "George Record," New Republic.
LXXVI, No. 987 (Nov. 1, 1933), 329-31; hereinafter cited
as Pinchot, "Record."
3Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 23, 1913; and
Amos Pinchot to Jane Addams, Jan. 28, 1913, both in Box 14,
Pinchot MSS.
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now possibilities in the economy and allow all business
competitors to begin from an equal start.^

By attacking

monopolistic capitalism, the wily reformer hoped to save
free enterprise.

He fervently believed that only atomistic

competition could provide the foundation for economic justice
and ward off the threat of socialism to America.^

A small

band of New Jersey Progressives shared his staunchly pro
capitalist point of view.^
Pinchot soon gave evidence of Record1s impact on his
political thinking.

In a speech at Yonkers, New York, on

January 20, 1913, he urged Progressives to wage war on the
trusts.

His specific recommendations included government

ownership of railroads and other "natural monopolies" along

^Record first formulated his program as a newspaper
columnist for the Jersey journal in 1910-1911. For an
excellent discussion of the position developed in that
column, see Ransome E. Noble, Jr., "Henry George and the
Progressive Movement," American journal of Economics and
Sociology. VIII, No. 3 (April, 1949), 259-69.
For addi
tional material on Record's ideas, see Ransome E. Noble,
j r ., "George L . Record *s Struggle For Economic Democracy,"
American journal of Economics and Sociology, X, No. 1
(Oct., 1950), 71-83; and George L. Record, How to Abolish
Poverty (Jersey City: George L. Record Memorial Associa
tion, 1936), passim.
5See especially, George L. Record, A Complete Program
of Fundamental Reform. The Only Answer to Socialism, memo
randum attached to George L. Record to Robert M. LaFollette,
May 5, 1911, Series B, Box 69, LaFollette Family MSS.
6On the Record faction in the Garden State, see
Joseph Francis Mahoney, "New Jersey Politics After Wilson:
Progressivism in Decline" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Columbia University, 1964), 50-56; hereinafter cited as
Mahoney, "New Jersey Politics."
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with passage of a stronger version of the Sherman Anti-Trust
Act.

At the close of his remarks, he also endorsed pro

hibitive taxes on landed estates.7
In the months that followed, Pinchot continued to
assimilate the Record credo.

Writing to William Kent in

April, 1913, he praised the anti-trust policy of President
Woodrow Wilson.

At the same time, he declared:

What I am working for here in New York is to get a
little bunch to stand for some of the big things
. . . for municipal ownership, for Wilson's trust
ideas, and above all for the gradual breaking down
of the land monopoly.
The brief list reflected the new concerns that increasingly
g
came to dominate Pinchot's outlook on reform.
From his newly attained perspective, Pinchot saw the
economic aims of Progressive leaders in an even more
critical light.

He particularly opposed the concept of

trust regulation by a government commission, an idea favored
Q
by both Theodore Roosevelt and George Perkins.
in a paper
for the American Academy of Political and Social Science,
Pinchot argued that no Federal bureau could successfully
control the industrial giants.

He pointed to competition as

7 (Yonkers) Sunday Record, Jan. 26, 1913. clipping in
Box 225, Pinchot MSS. A typescript of the speech appears in
Box 1985, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
®Amos Pinchot to William Kent, April 21, 1913, Box 14,
Pinchot MSS.
Q
For insight into Roosevelt's economic views, see the
report of his remarks on competition and regulation in New
York Times, July 3, 1913, 9.
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thn onJy definitivo solution to the trust problem.1®

In a

subsequent letter to Hiram Johnson, the New Yorker labeled
the commission method of regulation "legalized monopoly."11
He insisted that big business would ultimately gain control
of any regulatory agency.12
With help from George Record, Pinchot soon devised a
plan to make the trust issue central to a realignment of
Progressive forces.

The scheme called for Gifford Pinchot

to lead an attack on the Perkins wing of the party and win
Roosevelt back to the side of reform.

In a series of

magazine articles, the Forester was to expose the failure of
the party's platform to deal effectively with the monopoly
menace.

At the same time, he would offer a program designed

to break up the trusts and establish the preconditions for
economic competition.

Naturally, Record and the junior

Pinchot expected to draft the essays intended for magazine
publication.
Gifford.13

On July 23, Record sketched the scenario for
in a follow-up letter written on the next day,

10Amos Pinchot, "The Cost of Private Monopoly to
Public and Wage-Earner," Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science. XLVIII (July, 1913), 164-88.
11Anos Pinchot to Hiram W. Johnson, July 8 , 1913,
Box 15, Pinchot MSS.
12

See Amos Pinchot to Francis w. Bird, July 15, 1913,

ibid.
1 ^Record explained that he and Amos had hit upon the
plan during a conversation on the previous day. He went on
to outline the plot in detail. See George L. Record to
Gifford Pinchot, July 23, 1913, Box 167, Gifford Pinchot
MSS.
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Amos Pinchot urged his brother to comply with the plan.14
The older Pinchot responded in a cautious but
receptive manner.
of articles.

He concurred on the need for the series

He suggested to his brother that the circle of

draftsmen be enlarged to include George W. Woodruff, one of
his closest friends.

Woodruff, he told Amos, was "far less

apt to run wild than Record.

. . ."15

still, Gifford

appeared willing to cooperate with the Jerseyman.
2, he confided to Record:

On August

"I think you and Amos are more

radical than I am, but I also think that X am plenty radical
enough for the present purpose."1®
Despite the semblance of unity, work on the project
lagged from the start.

Record hoped to have the articles

drafted and approved within a few weeks.17

Yet November

found him still instructing Gifford in the intricacies of
land value taxation and associated reforms.1®

As Christmas

neared, Amos tried his hand at doctrinal exegesis.

He told

his brother:

14Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, July 24, 1913,
Box 166, ibid.
15Gifford Pinchot to Amos Pinchot, July 30, 1913,
ibid. On the ties between Gifford Pinchot and Woodruff, see
McGeary, Gifford Pinchot. 46.
l6Gifford Pinchot to George L. Record, Aug. 2, 1913,
Box 167, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
17See George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Aug. 11,
1913; and George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Sept. 19,
1913, both in ibid.
I
;

18See George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Nov. 14,

1913, ibid.
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Now what I propose is this. That the Progressive
Party, through means which we have already discussed,
shall be dedicated to the destruction of private
monopoly in the United States; that it shall divide
all monopolies into natural and unnatural monopolies;
that it shall advocate government ownership of the
former and destruction, not regulation of the latter.
He closed by reminding Gifford that the breakup of the
trusts would mean increased competition and greater effi1Q

ciency for industry. ^
In the early weeks of 1914, Record and Amos kept the
pressure on their reluctant colleague.

Record bombarded

Gifford with requests for conferences and epistolary lessons
in political economy. 20

When the Forester reached a

decision to run for the United States Senate in Pennsylvania,
his two single-minded allies tried to fit the move into
their own political design.

PI

Record noted that the anti-

monopoly credo could be written up as a Pinchot campaign
document and restated later for the magazine s e r i e s22. A m o s
Pinchot argued along the same lines.

He called upon his

brother to make the Senate race as a champion of government

l^Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Dec. 8 , 1913, Box
15, Pinchot MSS.
20

See George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 7,
.1.914? George L . Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 19, 1914;
George L . Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 21, 1914; George
L.. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 27, 1914; and C4eorge L.
Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 28, 1914, all ir> Box 180,
Gifford Pinchot MSS.
2^On Gifford's Senatorial bid, see McGeary, Gifford
Pinchot. 242-59;
and Fausold, Gifford Pinchot. 151-93.
22George L. Record to Gifford Pinchot, Jan. 12, 1914,
Box 180, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
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ownership oi the railroads and equal commercial opportuni
ties ±or all.22
The Senatorial candidate, however, chose to back away
from the anti-monopoly dogma.

He counted heavily on campaign

help from Theodore Roosevelt and could ill-afford to take a
stand that might alienate the Colonel.2^

Moreover, some of

Gifford's friends and advisers considered Record a political
liability.

Overton Price, a long time Pinchot associate,

recommended that the Jerseyman be silenced with chloro
form.25
Unable to control Gifford, Record and Amos finally
had to abandon their original scheme.

Yet an alternate

possibility appeared almost immediately.

On March 13, 1914,

Norman Hapgood, editor of Harper's Weekly, asked the younger
Pinchot for an article on George Perkins and divisions with
in the Progressive party.25
words,

The New Yorker, in his own

"seized the opportunity with fear and trembling."

He

envisioned an essay on the political machinations of the
trusts with the link between Perkins and United States Steel

^ A m o s Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Feb. 3, 1914,
Box 16, Pinchot MSS.
^ S e e especially Gifford pinchot to Theodore Roosc
velt, Dec. 10, 1913, Box 167, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
^Fausold, Gifford Pinchot. 154.
26Norman Hapgood to Amos pinchot, March 13. 1914,
Box 16, Pinchot MSS.
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as his prime example.

97

The proposed article, even in preliminary form,
created a small furor.

Gifford Pinchot feared that an
2ft

attack on Perkins and big business would anger Roosevelt. °
He preferred to delay any confrontation with Perkins until
after the November e l e c t i o n s . S i m i l a r pleas for caution
came from Gifford's supporters and campaign intimates. 30
w
Amos, at least initially, tried to override the wave
of criticism.

He insisted that a public disclosure of

Perkins's activities would force Roosevelt to drop the trust
magnate . ^

On advice from Record, the younger Pinchot even

considered entering the Bull Moose primary for united States
Senator in New York.

A Senatorial bid of his own, he con

tended, would gain publicity for his article and allow him

^7Amos pinchot to Louis D. Brandeis, March 18, 1914,
ibid.
^®See Amos Pinchot to Gilson Gardner, March 29, 1914,
ibid.
29Entry for March 30, Diary, 1914. Box 3315, Gifford
Pinchot MSS; and Gifford Pinchot to Amos Pinchot, April 4,
1914, Box 179, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
-^Gilson Gardner to Amos Pinchot, March 30, 1914;
Overton Price to Amos Pinchot, April 4, 1914, Gifford
Pinchot to Amos Pinchot, April 6 , 1914; and Edwin A. Van
Valkenburg to Amos Pinchot, April 9, 1914, all in Box 16,
Pinchot MSS. See also entry for April 1, Diary, 1914, Box
3315, ibid.
Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, March 3 0 , 1914,
Box 179, Gifford Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to Gifford
Pinchot, April 7, 1914, Box 16, Pinchot MSS.
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to extend his attack on Perkins. 32
materialized.

No such opportunities

A letter from his ailing mother convinced

Amos not to make the Senate race. J
Faced with strong objections to any public arraignment
of Perkins, the junior pinchot finally decided to present
his case in private.

On May 23, 1914, he summarized his

arguments against the trust magnate in a long letter to the
members of the Progressive National committee.

After

reviewing the former Morgan partner's involvement in the Bull
Moose crusade, Pinchot charged:
. . . Mr. Perkins has conducted an extensive pro
trust propaganda calculated to convince the party
and the public that the trusts are useful and
sacred institutions; that those who attack them are
bent upon the destruction of all healthy industry
on a large scale, and finally, that the Progressive
Party fully agrees with him in these views. The
result is that we have been placed in a false and
fatal position. . . . Mr. Perkins' pro-trust
activity within the Progressive Party began soon
after the party's formation. It has continued to
the present time.
The letter closed with a demand that Perkins resign as

32Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, April 20, 1914;
and Amos Pinchot to A. Nevin Detrich, April 24, 1914, both
in Box 16, Pinchot MSS.
330n the decision to forego the primary battle, see
Amos Pinchot to Gilson Gardner, April 24, 1914, ibid.; Amos
Pinchot to Mrs. James w. Pinchot, April 24, 1914, Box 23,
Gifford Pinchot MSS; and entry for April 26, Diary. 1914.
Box 3315, Gifford Pinchot MSS. Amos also scuttled the pro
posed article for Harper'a Weekly. Even so, Hapgood, under
his own name, subsequently published an attack on Perkins
that bore clear marks of Pinchot's influence. See Norman
Hapgood, "Roosevelt, Perkins and Wilson," Harper's Weekly,
LVIII, No. 3000 (June 20, 1914), 11-12.

<’h.lirman ul tho Hull Moose National Hxecutive Committee.34
His ringing indictment brought results that Pinchot
did not anticipate.

Reporting to his brother, he described

the early replies to his letter as "rather guarded in
tone."35

Later correspondents showed less reticence.

Most

of those who wrote expressed agreement with Perkins on the
need for consolidation in industry.35

Two prominent Bull

Moose supporters bluntly told Pinchot that his penchant for
competitive capitalism was anachronistic.3^

Theodore Roose

velt, meanwhile, moved to reassure his chief lieutenant.
Writing Perkins on June 2, the Colonel took note of
Pinchot's letter and dismissed it as inconsequential.3®
The negative responses to his views did not dissuade
Pinchot.

He simply shifted his anti-monopoly endeavors to a

34Amos Pinchot to Senator Joseph M. Dixon and the
Members of the Progressive National Committee, May 23, 1914,
Box 122, Pinchot MSS.
35Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, May 28, 1914,
Box 179, Gifford Pinchot MSS.
35See Amos Pinchot to Henry N. Rickey, June 4, 1914,
Questionable Materials Box, Pinchot MSS.
37See Inez Milholland Boissevain to Amos Pinchot,
May 29, 1914? and Charles Sumner Bird to Amos Pinchot, June
1 , 1914, both in ibid.
3®Theodore Roosevelt to George W. Perkins, June 2,
1914, Series 3A, Microfilm Reel 383, Roosevelt MSS. The
text of Pinchot*s letter to the National Committee later
appeared in the press. A mild furor resulted, but Perkins
remained clearly ascendant within the Progressive party.
See New York Times, June 11, 1914, 1-2; New York Times,
June 12, 1914, 6 ? and "Pinchot*s War on Perkins, 11 Literary
Digest. XLVIII, No. 25 (June 20, 1914), 1473-74.

different front.

As a new target, he selected the Rocko-

feller-owned Colorado Fuel and Iron Company.

Long a domi

nant force in the coal fields of the Rockies, the Company,
throughout 1913 and 1914, waged a small war with striking
miners.Pinchot,

at a rally in New York on July 17, 1914,

focused his attention on the struggle in Colorado.

Lashing

out at the Rockefellers, he blamed them for "a system of
absentee landlordism . . .
as anything . . .

as ruthless, and as coldly cruel

in Russia or Mexico."

in order to break

the grip of the trusts in Colorado and elsewhere, he urged
government ownership of coal deposits and other natural
resources.

These essential raw materials, he asserted,

should be made available to all competitors on an equal
basis.40
Political developments related to the Colorado situa
tion served to re-enforce Pinchot's hostility toward the
Bull Moose national leadership.

As an observer of Rocky

mountain politics, the New Yorker favored the election of
Edward P. Costigan, a Rockefeller foe and the Progressive

39See George S. McGovern and Leonard F. Guttridge,
The Great coalfield War (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1972), passim? and Graham Adams, Jr., The Age of industrial
Violence. 1910-15; The Activities and Findings of the
United States Commission on Industrial Relations (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1966), 146-75.
40FOr the text of the speech in pamphlet form, sec
Speech of Amos Pinchot At a Mass Meeting Held at Webster
Hall, in New York City, on Friday Evening. July 17. 1914,
to Discuss the Colorado Strike. Copy in Box 95, Pinchot M S S .
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candidate Jor tiovornor of Colorado.^

During the 1914

gubernatorial race, he provided Costigan with a one thousand
dollar campaign contribution.

He also sought additional

help for the candidate from influential friends.4 ^

Mean

while, the Progressive National Committee, according to
Pinchot, did not make commensurate efforts on the Coloradan's
behalf.43

Predictably, Pinchot interpreted the supposed

lack of support for his favorite as proof that the trusts
controlled the Bull Moose high command.
Francis j. Heney, he fumed:

"...

In a letter to

Costigan is fighting the

Rockefellers and all they stand for, and the crowd in charge
of headquarters is backing up what the Rockefellers stand
for."44
When the elections ended in defeat for costigan and
most other Bull Moose hopefuls, Pinchot publicly castigated

410n the political situation in Colorado, see Colin
B. Goodykoontz (ed.), Papers of Edward £. Costigan Relating
to the Progressive Movement in Colorado, 1902-1917 (Boulder:
university of Colorado, 194177 247-317; and Fred Greenbaum,
Fighting Progressives A Biography of Edward P. Costigan
(Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1971), 55-74.
42See Amos Pinchot to Edward P. Costigan, Sept. 25,
1914; Amos Pinchot to
Franklin K. Lane, Sept. 11, 1914; and
Amos pinchot to E. W.
Scripps, Sept. 11,1914, all in Box
18, Pinchot MSS.
43See Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, Sept. 11,
1914, Box 179, Gifford Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to
Alice Carpenter, Oct.
5, 1914, ibid.
44Amos Pinchot to Francis J. Heney, Nov. 2, 1914,
Box 18, Pinchot MSS.
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Lh<; leaders of his party.4 -* Writing for the sociolist
journal The Masses, he noted that the Progressive platform
contained "something of everything . . . from the care of
babies to the building of a birch bark canoe."4**

As a

result, he said, the document never went beyond generalities
and offered no solutions to major national problems.
Pinchot placed the blame for the dearth of serious reform
proposals squarely on the shoulders of George Perkins.
Progressive policymakers, he concluded, were too much
entwined with big business to mount a real challenge to the
status q u o .47

4 ^The Progressives suffered a string of disastrous
losses in 1914. Among the defeated Bull Moose candidates
were Costigan, Gifford Pinchot, Francis J. Heney, Albert J.
Beveridge, and James R. Garfield. On the election results,
see New York Tribune, Nov. 5, 1914, 1, 6 ; and Mowry,
Roosevelt, 302-303.
4 ®Pinchot contributed both articles and money to The
Masses, but he showed no inclination to embrace socialism as
an ideology. On one occasion, he wrote Max Eastman, editor
of-The Masses, a letter filled with praise for the antimonopoly capitalism of Henry George. Eastman, in turn,
stated a preference for the works of Karl Marx. For Pinchot,
at least, the views expressed represented a permanent ideolo
gical commitment. His friendships with Eastman and other
socialists did not alter the fact that he remained a stead
fast believer in the ethics and institutions of competitive
capitalism. For the exchange of letters, see Amos Pinchot
to Max Eastman, Nov. 11, 1913; and Max Eastman to Amos
Pinchot, Dec. 1, 1913, both in Box 15, Pinchot MSS. On
Pinchot's financial contributions to The Masses, see Max
Eastman, Enjoyment of Living (New Yorks Harper and Brothers,
1948), 455-56.
47Amos pinchot, "The Failure of the Progressive
Party," The Masses, VI, No. 3 (Dec., 1914), 9-10. Pinchot's
verbal assault enraged Theodore Roosevelt. Reacting in part
to publication of the essay, the Colonel told an ally:
Amos has not enough capacity for coherent thought to

43
Among blueprints for reform, pinehnt had complete
<*f>ni j«li'ni!•* only in Ihc? anti—nmnopoLy creed that he shared
with boorgo Record.

He drew heavily on that body of ideas

in testimony before the United States industrial Relations
i.
i

Commission early in 1915.

Speaking as a proponent of

atomistic competition, he assured Commission members that
free enterprise, where a condition of equality of entre
preneurial opportunity prevailed, could outproduce either
socialism or private monopoly.

As the first steps toward

equal competitive opportunities, he urged government owner
ship of railroads and natural resources.
Pinchot, in the months that followed, sought a wider
audience for his views,

in May, 1915, he accused the

editors of the New Republic of timidity in their presenta
tion of reform ideas.

He wanted to see the magazine con

front questions like nationalization of railroads and
taxation on landed estates.

These were the issues where he

saw "economic privilege and democracy . . . lining up for a

make him a Socialist; he is a kind of parlor anarchist
or amateur I.W.W. follower. . . . He is utterly impotent
as a foe and the only damage he can do is as a
treacherous friend and he should never be allowed
inside the ranks again.
See Theodore Roosevelt to Henry Frederick Cochems, Nov. 28,
1914, in Biting E. Morison (ed.). The Letters of Theodore
Roosevelt (Cambridge: Harvard university Press, 1954),
VIII, 850.
48For the complete testimony, see U. S., Industrial
Relations: Final Report and Testimony Submitted to congress
by the Commission on industrial Relations created by the
A c t 6 £ August 23. 1912. Senate Doc. 415, 64 Cong., 1 Sess.,
1916, IX, 8041-52.
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real and not a sham fight."^

A few weeks later, Pinchot

carried a similar message into the bailiwick of the Colorado
Fuel and Iron Company.

Addressing a labor rally in Denver

on July 31, he implored his listeners to work for government
ownership of railroads and natural resources.^

Finally, in

the September issue of Pearson1s Magazine, the anti-monopoly
crusader summarized his objections to the trusts.

Unfair

advantages in access to raw materials and availability of
transportation, he explained, allowed the industrial giants
to dominate their respective markets with no regard for
greater efficiency or lower prices.

His article closed with

the now familiar demands for government control ol rail
facilities and natural resources.51While he preached the anti-monopoly creed, Pinchot
maintained close ties with George Record.

He backed the

Jerseyman when the latter broke with the Progressive party
and returned to the Republican fold.52

49Amos
New Republic.

Pinchot, "Criticism
Ill, No. 3 (May 29,

Record's devotion to

From Mr. AmosPinchot,"
1915), 95-97.

50See Amos Pinchot, Labor and the Future: An Address
by Amos pinchot Before the Justice League at the l.awson
Protest Meeting Denver, Colorado, July 31, 1915 (Denver:
Smith-Brooks Press, n.d.), 3.
^ A m o s Pinchot, "The Biggest Thing Between You and
Prosperity," Pearson's Magazine. XXXIV, No. 13 (Sept., 1915),
225-40.
52Record and his
the G.O.P. at the state
series of victories in
Record slate,
however,

New jersey followers hoped to capture
level. Their strategy called for a
Republican
primary elections. The
suffered an overwhelming defeat in the

change, lie explained, make the question of party labels
immaterial.December,

1915, Pinchot was invited to

move across the Hudson River and work directly with the
Record faction in New Jersey.

He declined the offer due to

family obligations, but his loyalties remained with the
small band of Garden State insurgents.^

in the last days

of 1915, an editorial gibe from the New York World led
Pinchot to enumerate his reform goals.
the Record credo.

He endorsed;

His list duplicated

government ownership of

railroads and natural resources, heavy taxation oi idle
land, abolition of the tariff, and other steps to foster
ec

equal competition within the economy.
National politics offered no precise analogue to the
anti-monopoly program, but Pinchot looked with sympathy on
the accomplishments of President Woodrow Wilson.

Writing to

E. W. Scripps in November, 1915, the New Yorker dv.scribed

intraparty balloting in 1915. Record himself lost a bid for
the G.O.P. gubernatorial nomination in 1916. Even so, the
anti-monopolist and his sympathizers held fast to their
narrow program. See Mahoney, "New Jersey Politics," 250-321
and Barr, "Record," 78.
53See Amos Pinchot to Herbert M. Bailey, Aug. 14,
1915, Box 21, Pinchot MSS.
5^Edmund Osborne, a close associate of Record's in
New jersey, tendered the invitation. For the exchange of
letters, see Edmund Osborne to Amos Pinchot, Dec. 1, 1915;
and Amos Pinchot to Edmund Osborne, Dec. 3, 1915, both in
Box 23, ibid.
55in a derisive tone, the editorial linked Pinchot
with a group of self-proclaimed Social Revolutionaries in
New York. See New York World. Dec. 14, 1915, 10; and Amos
Pinchot to Editor, New York World, undated. Box 13, ibid.
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h im^vll: fi« "pnM ty strong for Wilson."

Hvon so, he weiiL on

to complain about the president's failure to make "anybody
think or talk about economics, the distribution of wealth,
government ownership, etc."^®

A dramatic White House

appointment soon convinced Pinchot to put aside his criti
cisms.

On January 28, 1916, the Chief Executive nominated

lawyer and anti-trust expert Louis D. Brandeis for a seat on
the united States Supreme C o u r t . P i n c h o t rejoiced at the
news of the nomination.

In a statement to reporters, he

termed the selection the best thing to happen to America in
the scope of his memory.
The partisan opposition that subsequently challenged
President Wilson's bid for re-election only strengthened
Pinchot in his resolve to vote for the incumbent.

Theodore

Roosevelt, in June, 1916, rejected a second Bull Moose
Presidential nomination and threw his support to republican
standard-bearer Charles Evans H u g h e s . ^

Pinchot viewed the

56Amos Pinchot to E. W. Scripps, Nov. 3, 1<>15, Box
22, Pinchot MSS.
^7See New York Times, Jan. 29, 1916, 1, 3. Brandeis,
like Pinchot, favored atomistic competition over corporate
hegemony. On the lawyer's anti-trust views, see Melvin I.
Urofsky, "Wilson, Brandeis, and the Trust issue, 1912-1914,"
Mid-America. XLIX, No. 1 (Jan., 1967), 3-28.
58Typescript dated Jan. 29, 1916, Box 224, Pinchot
MSS. See also Amos Pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, Jar. 27,
1916, Box 25, Pinchot MSS.
59See Mowry, Roosevelt. 345-366; and Garraty, Perkins,
327-372. See also Harold L. Ickes, "Who Killed the Progres
sive Party?" American Historical Review. XLVI, No. 2 (Jan.,
1941), 306-37.
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colonel's actions with disdain.

Referring to the patriarch

of Oyster Bay, he wrote William Kent:
He is now just where he has . . . wanted to be all
along— back in the stronghold of respectable, benevo
lent plutocracy. Nothing could be more desirable for
the oyster man. Having eaten his oysters, he is now
resting comfortably with a full belly.60
Hughes, a former Governor of New York and more recently an
Associate Justice of the United States Supreme Court, stood
only slightly higher in Pinchot's estimation.

The reformer

judged the Republican nominee "quite crystalized in his
views and impossible to educate.

..."

He came away from a

July meeting with the aloof and magisterial Hughes convinced
that a midwinter suit should have been worn for the
occasion.^
During the autumn campaign, Pinchot worked to insure
Wilson a second term.

He headed a group of volunteers that

toured throughout New York State on behalf of the President.

62

In order to reach a more distant audience, Pinchot

60flraos Pinchot to William Kent, July 6 , 1916, Box 25,
Pinchot M S S .
6lPor Pinchot's comments on Hughes, see Amos Pinchot
to W. S. Rainsford, July 20, 1915, ibid. Gifford Pinchot
subsequently decided to support the former New York Governor,
and he strongly urged Amos not to vote for Wilson. See
Gifford Pinchot to Amos Pinchot, Sept. 4, 1916, ibid.
62The volunteers included Walter Lippmann, Frederic
c. Howe, Alexander j. McKelway, and Rabbi Stephen S. Wise.
With Pinchot in the forefront, the aggregation crisscrossed
New York State by automobile. According to one report,
Pinchot's storehouse of stump invective included a crowdpleasing reference to Theodore Roosevelt as "'the bell hop
of Wall Street.'" See Dante Barton, The Wilson Volunteers
in New York State, undated typescript. Box 24, ibid. See
aTso New York Times. Oct. 30, 1916, 4.

fell back rm his journalistic skills,

writing for the

Chicago Daily Tribune, he detailed for Midwestern readers
the fate of the anti-trust plank at the 1912 Bull Moose
convention.

Suppression of the plank, he contended, was the

price that Roosevelt had "paid for the support of those
captains of finance who . . .

became i:he monitors of the

[Progressive] party's policies.H^ 3

On the eve of the

election, Pinchot dared to challenge the Rough Rider
directly.

In an open letter addressed to the Colonel and

released by the Democratic National Committee, he charged
that Roosevelt, in 1912, had conspired with Perkins to kill
the anti-trust plank in the Bull Moose platform.®4
ex-President replied in kind.

The

He wrote his former aide:

"When I spoke of the Progressive party as having a lunatic
fringe, I specifically had you in mind.
The Presidential race embroiled Pinchot in contro
versy, but it did not sway him from more important goals.
Shortly after the election, Matthew Hale, a Bull Moose
diehard from Massachusetts, contacted Pinchot about a pos
sible revival of the Progressive party.6**

in response, the

63Chicago Daily Tribune. Oct. 22, 1916, 10. Two days
earlier, the same newspaper had published a critique of
Wilson's conservation policies authored by Gifford Pinchot.
See Chicago Daily Tribune, Oct. 20, 1916, 10.
64Amos Pinchot to Theodore Roosevelt, Nov. 1, 1916,
Box 24, PinchotMSS. See also New York Times, Nov. 2, 1916, 6 .
65Theodore Roosevelt to Amos Pinchot, Nov. 3, 1916,
Series 3A, Microfilm Reel 386, Roosevelt MSS.
66{4atthew Hale to Amos Pinchot, Nov. 24, 1916, Box
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Now Yorker disclaimed any desire to rebuild on the old
foundations, hut lie hastened to advise Hale on the best site
lor a new structure.

He explained in brief compass the

relationship between monopoly power and special transporta
tion advantages.

Government ownership of the railroads, he

contended, offered the only hope for destruction of the
trusts and the beginning of an economy based on competition.
He urged Hale to work for a reform coalition devoted to
nationalization of the rail network.

Such a movement, he

said in conclusion, would command his own deepest interest ,Cj 1
The letter to Hale provided added proof of the meta
morphosis that had occurred in Amos Pinchot*s reform
commitment.

Beginning in 1913, Pinchot, under the tutelage

of George Record, mastered a new perspective on questions
of domestic political economy.

His inchoate opposition to

the trusts fused with a more systematic anti-monopoly creed.
As a result, he became an ardent exponent of atomistic
competitive capitalism.

Along with Record, he tried to rally

support for that body of ideas within the Progressive party.
When those efforts failed, Pinchot drifted away from the
Bull Moose camp and worked at freelance exposition of his
views.

His devotion to dogma proved costly.

He lost the

24, Pinchot MSS. Hale stayed on with the Progressive party
until its amalgamation with the Prohibitionists in 1917.
See Mowry, Roosevelt, 367n.
67Amos Pinchot to Matthew Hale, Nov. 28, 1916, Box
24, Pinchot M S S .

friendship of Theodore Roosevelt, arid relations with his
brother Gifford grew strained.

In 1)16, Amos Pinchot

severed his last ties with the Progressive party and sup
ported the Democratic national ticket.

Yet the decisive

shift in his political allegiance came earlier and at a
different level.

Long before 1916, Pinchot, under George

Record's spell, had become a political sectarian, an
ideologue with a narrow and unchanging message.

Chapter 4
PEACE, WAR, AND WOODROW WILSON
Amos Pinchot did not pursue the study of political
economy in a vacuum.

While he mastered George Record's anti-

monopoly creed, the nations of Europe, beginning in August,
1914, engaged in a genocidal civil war.

For the United

States, the European holocaust meant three years of troubled
neutrality followed by active involvement in the conflict.
Pinchot, once caught in the flow of events, increasingly
turned his own attention to problems of international
significance.

From 1916 through 1919, he tried repeatedly

to shape American policies with regard to peace and war.
Soon after the outbreak of fighting in Europe,
military preparedness emerged as a major issue in the united
States.1

Such apostles of strenuous living as Theodore

Roosevelt and General Leonard Wood stepped forward as
advocates of a more militaristic national posture.

Roose

velt threw himself into the preparedness movement with

1
For an overview of the preparedness controversy, see
William Henry Harbaugh, "Wilson, Roosevelt and Intervention
ism, 1914-1917: A Study of Domestic Influences on the
Formulation of American Foreign Policy" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Northwestern University, 1954), 14-51 and
111-51.
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General Wood, meanwhile, arranged a

.ser ies of training camps to acquaint civilians with the
rudiments of military life.^

Initially, President Wilson

eyed the upsurge of martial spirit with misgivings, but as
the international crisis deepened, he too joined the parade.
In July, 1915, the President asked his advisers for recom
mendations on an American arms buildup.4

Four months later,

he unveiled plans for a rapid expansion of the armed
services.5

m

December, 1915, Wilson presented Congress

with an annual message that bristled with references to
military hardware and defense spending.^
Pinchot took up the preparedness issue in the

^Hermann Hagedorn, The Bugle That Woke America; The
Saga of T heodore Roosevelt's Last Battle For His Country
(New York: John Day Company, 1940), 25-119. See also
Theodore Roosevelt, Fear God and Take Your Own Part (New
York; George H. Doran company, 19l6), passim.
^See John Garry Clifford, The Citizen Soldiers; The
Plattsburg Training Camp Movement, 1913-1920 (Lexington:
University Press of Kentucky, 1971), 1— 91.
40n Wilson's changing view of preparedness, see
Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Movement.
1910-1917 (New York; Harper and Row, 1954), 174-88.
5Wilson revealed his plans in an address before the
Manhattan Club of New York City on November 4, 1915. For
the text of his speech, see Woodrow Wilson, The New
Democracy: Presidential Messages. Addresses, and Other
Papers. 1913-1917. eds. Ray Stannard Baker and william E.
Dodd (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1926), I, 384-92;
hereinafter cited as Wilson, New Democracy.
6U . S . , Address of the President of the united states
Delivered at a joint Session of the Two Houses of Congress
December £, i9l5. House Doc. 1, 64 Cong., 1 Sess., 1915,
4-7.
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aftermath ot Llic Presidential message.

His first pronounce

ments clearly reflected his attachment to anti-monopoly
r

capitalism.

Before a New York audience on January 22, 1916,

he condemned as half measures proposals that called for
nothing more than a stronger military establishment.

Full-

scale readiness, he said, would require economic mobiliza
tion including government ownership of railroads and
natural resources.?

a

few weeks later, he again tried to

link preparedness with his own reform aspirations.

American

patriotism, he told the Washington Irving Labor Forum, would
flourish only if the nation's people could "free themselves
from grinding economic privilege, and gain an economic
democracy.

. . ."8

Despite his allusions to maximum readiness and
patriotism, Pinchot distrusted the preparedness movement,
and he quickly came out against it.
the Anti-Preparedness Committee.

Early in 1916, he joined

Soon to be renamed the

American union Against Militarism, the unit, under the
leadership of social worker Lillian D. Wald, had established
a long record of opposition to aggrandizement of the

^Amos Pinchot, "Preparedness: An Address cf Amos
Pinchot at Dinner of the Society of the Genesee, Hotel
Knickerbocker, New York, January 22," The Public, XIX
(Feb. 4, 1916), 110-13.
^Typescript dated March 5, 1916, Box 24, Pinchot MSS.
For the speech in article form, see Amos Pinchot, "Upon
Panicky Patriots," War, I, No. 1 (May, 1916), 11-12.

/
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military.9

Just after Pinchot entered its ranks, the Union

embarked upon a "Truth About Preparedness" campaign.

With

Pinchot in the forefront, a team of A.U.A.M. speakers toured
1A
A ^
eleven cities over a ten-day span. u A papier-mache
dinosaur christened "jingo" accompanied the troupe and helped
draw large crowds.^

While the dinosaur offered a silent

reminder of the limits of brute force, the A.U.A.M. orators
sermonized on the dangers of overreliance on armed might.
The round of speech making opened the doors to the
White House.

On May 8, 1916, Lillian Wald, Pinchot, and

three other A.U.A.M. spokesmen conferred with President
Wilson.

The anti-militarists presented a strongly worded

90n the origins and background of the American union
Against Militarism, see R. L. Duffus, Lillian Wald: Neighbor
and Crusader (New York: Macmillan Company, 1938), 151-60?
and Blanche Wiesen Cook, "Woodrow Wilson and the Anti-Mili
tarists, 1914-1917" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The
Johns Hopkins University, 1970), 1-20? the latter title
hereinafter cited as cook, "Wilson and the Anti-Militarists."
*°For an itinerary, see Crystal Eastman to Amos
Pinchot, March 16, 1917 [sic]. Box 30, Pinchot MSS.
■^See "The Latest Publicity Feature of the Anti-'Pre
paredness* Committee," Survey. XXXVI, No. 1 (April 1, 1916),
37; and "An Animal of Extinction," Survey. XXXVI, No. 6
(May 6, 1916), 165.
12For accounts of the speaking tour, see Cook,
"Wilson and the Anti-Militarists," 56-60? and "Swinging
Around the Circle Against Militarism,” Survey, XXXVI, No. 4
(April 22, 1916), 95-96. See also Lillian D. Wald to
Woodrow Wilson, April 21, 1916, Series 4, Box 377, File
1935, Woodrow Wilson Papers, Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress.
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memorial against the preparedness movement.13

Wilson, in

reply, made a distinction between necessary precautions and
bellicose militarism.

He endorsed the former and promised

to oppose the latter v i g o r o u s l y v i s i t o r s
mixed emotions.

left with

Although appreciative of an opportunity to

express their views, they went away convinced that Wilson
seriously underestimated the malevolent forces at work
behind the preparedness movement.
Pinchot had very definite ideas about who controlled
the militaristic agitation.

Writing to newspaperman Roy

Howard on May 23, he declared:
I think there is going to be hell to pay with this
military question. Already the preparedness crows
who are by and large . . . the big employers and
monopolists . . . have succeeded in getting what
they want most . . . a big National Guard to take
care of industrial troubles when the war is over and
times become hard again.16
When Howard, in rebuttal, argued that tighter discipline
might lift the nation out of its "sordid, pot-bellied, fatjoweled state," Pinchot repeated his gloomy prophecy.

The

13Por a copy of the memorial, see Cabinet 1, Drawer
1, Lillian D. Wald papers. Manuscript Division, New York
Public Library, New York, New York.
14A printed version of the President's remarks
appears in Box 189, Pinchot MSS.
15See the undated memorandum in Cabinet 1, Drawer 1,
Wald MSS. For printed accounts of the meeting between
Wilson and the anti—milltarists, see Kerney, Wilson, 36367? and "The President on Militarism," Survey. XXXVI, No. 8
(May 20, 1916), 198-99.
lfi
Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, May 23, 1916, Box 24,
Pinchot M S S .
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"exploiting class," he insisted, wanted a strong military
ready to quell postwar industrial strife.

17

In terms of immediate realities, however, Pinchot and
his anti-preparedness colleagues faced a challenge from a
different quarter.

On June 21, 1916, a United States

Cavalry detachment on patrol in Mexico clashed with Mexican
troops near the village of carrizal.^®

The skirmish pro

voked a war scare and brought the American Union Against
Militarism into action.

Within a few days of the fighting,

the A.U.A.M. made public a letter written from the battle
field by captain Lewis S. Morey, one of the men wounded in
the fray.

In a report intended for his military superiors,

Morey blamed the violence at Carrizal on the recklessness of
a fellow American officer.^-9

Along with its reprint of the

Morey letter, the A.U.A.M. raised the question:

"Is There A

l^See Roy Howard to Amos Pinchot, May 24, 1916;, and
Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, May 25, 1916, both in ibid.
IQ

The American soldiers were part of an expedition
sent into Mexico in pursuit of the Mexican revolutionary
leader Francisco Villa. For an authoritative discussion of
the military aspects of the Carrizal incident, see Robert
S. Thomas and Inez V. Allen, The Mexican Punitive Expedition
under Brigadier General John J . Pershing United States A m y
1916-1917 (Washington: Department of the Army, War
Histories Division, 1954), Part IV, 18-29.
19For the letter as a government document, see u. S.,
Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the united
States, 1916 (Washington: Government Printing office,
1925), 596.
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ryn
Just Caiisi; tor War?" '

resounding "No!"

Pinchot, on June 30, answered with a

in an open letter carried by the New York

Times, he argued that no legitimate cause for war with
Mexico existed,

pressure for intervention, he claimed, came

primarily from Americans with business interests south of
the Rio Grande.21
fast results.

The A.U.A.M. peace offensive produced

President Wilson, flooded with letters and

telegrams inspired by the anti-war group, quickly announced
that no retaliatory steps would be taken against the
Mexicans, 22
The President's announcement heartened the anti
militarists.

Accordingly, when A.U.A.M. leaders discovered

a clause that authorized a military draft in the 1916
National Defense Act, they contacted the White House.

In

a letter to Wilson on August 9, Pinchot pointed out the

20For the text of the letter and the editorial com
ments by the A.U.A.M., see New York Times. June 27, 1916, 7.
21Ibid., June 30, 1916, 7.
22Wilson's biographer Arthur S. Link attributes the
upsurge of anti-war sentiment to the A.U.A.M. See Arthur S.
Link, Wilson; Confusions and crises. 1915-1916 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1964), 315. For the text of the
President's statement on Mexico, see Wilson, New Democracy,
II, 217-21.
Authored by Arizona's Democratic Congressman Carl
T. Hayden, the draft provision became known among the anti
militarists as the "Hayden Joker." For the authorization as
it appears in the National Defense Act, see U. S., Statutes
at Large, XXXIX, Part 1, 202-203. See also "A Federal Con
scription Act?" Survey. XXXVI, No. 25 (Sept. 16, 1916),
596-97.

obscure* provision and urged its immediate repeal.2^

Wilson,

in reply, offered the view that the draft authorization
would go into effect only if the United States entered a
war.25

The Chief Executive's interpretation failed to

mollify Pinchot.

In a telegram to Wilson on August 18, the

New Yorker reiterated the case for repeal.2®

On the same

day, Charles T. Hallinan, Editorial Director of the A.U.A.M.,
fired off a brief against the conscription measure to Presi
dential Secretary Joseph P. Tumulty.2^

When these efforts

proved fruitless, Lillian Wald tried to reach Wilson through
a different channel.

in September, 1916, United States

Ambassador to Turkey Henry Morgenthau forwarded the Presi
dent a letter in which Wald addressed herself to the draft
issue,2®

The indirect approach appeared to be successful.

In an answer to Morgenthau on September 22, Wilson expressed
complete sympathy with Wald's objections to conscription.
The draft provision, he promised, would "be altered upon the

2^Amos Pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, Aug. 9, 1916,
Series 4, Box 419, File 3016, Wilson MSS.
25

Woodrow Wilson to Amos Pinchot, Aug. 11, 1916,
Box 24, Pinchot MSS.
26

Amos Pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, August 18, 1916,
Series 4, Box 419, File 3016, Wilson MSS.
27Charles T. Hallinan to Joseph P. Tumulty, ibid.
2ft

Henry Morgenthau to Woodrow Wilson, Sept. 20, 1916,

ibid.

50
i

OQ

first suitable occasion by action of Congress,"*7
The letter from Wilson to Morgenthau served as a
temporary opiate.

Wald, Pinchot, and other key figures in

the A.U.A.M. worked actively to re-elect the President in
1916.3°

Almost as soon as the votes were counted, however,

Lillian Wald refocused on the draft issue.

On November 23,

she reminded Wilson of his pre-election pledge with regard
to c o n s c r i p t i o n . i n response to Wald's letter, Wilson
reaffirmed his vow to oversee repeal of the draft

p r o v i s o . 32

Yet the President, with a second term won, found it easy to
renege on his promise.

When next contacted by Wald about

conscription, the Chief Executive admitted that he had taken
no action toward repeal.

"Just at present," he said,

"I am

caught in a drift which carries me very rapidly in other
directions."33
Despite the President's equivocation on the draft
question, the anti-militarists continued to find reasons to

29Woodrow Wilson to Henry Morgenthau, Sept. 22, 1916,
ibid. For further detail on the A.U.A.M. campaign against
the "Hayden Joker," see Cook, "Wilson and the Anti-Mili
tarists, " 76-83.
3°see Cook,

"Wilson and the Anti-Militarists,"

140-71.
■^Lillian D. Wald to Woodrow Wilson, Nov. 23, 1916,
Series 4, Box 419, File 3016, Wilson MSS.
32w0odrow Wilson to Lillian D. Wald, Nov. 27, 1916,
ibid.
33woodrow Wilson to Lillian D. Wald, Dec. 5, 1916,
ibid.
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.support him.

On January 24, 1917, just two days after

Wilson had issued an appeal for peace in Europe, an A.U.A.M.
delegation arrived at the White House.34

by pinchot and

Wald, the group assured the President that his plea for
amity would be remembered proudly by "Liberals of every
faith and clime . . .
these times.

. . ."35

as long as men speak and write of
A few aayS later, the anti-mili

tarists again rallied to the Wilsonian banner.

When the

German government announced its resumption of unrestricted
submarine warfare, the anti-war group publicly expressed the
belief that Wilson would keep the United States "clear of
any ignominious eleventh-hour participation"

in the

European conflict.
Even so, fear of the international maelstrom soon led
Pinchot to re-emphasize his opposition to any form of
American belligerency.

In February, 1917, along with Max

3^The President made his appeal for peace in an
address to the United States Senate. For the text of his
speech, see Gong. Rec., 64 Cong., 2 Sess. (Jan. 22, 1917),
1741-48.
35See Lillian D. Wald, Oswald Garrison villard, Owen
R. Lovejoy, Paul U. Kellogg, and Amos Pinchot to Woodrow
Wilson, Jan. 24, 1917, Cabinet 1, Drawer 1, Wald MSS.
3®See John Lovejoy Elliott, Agnes Brown Leach, Joseph
Cannon, Harold Hatch, Sidney Gulick, L. Hollingworth Wood,
Oswald Garrison villard, Mary K. Simkhovitch, Henry Wads
worth Longfellow Dana, Robert Hale, Carlton J. H. Hayes,
Emily Green Balch, William I. Hull, George Foster Peabody,
Amos Pinchot, Lillian D. Wald, Frederick Lynch, Crystal
Kastman, Paul U. Kellogg, John Haynes Holmes, George W.
Kirchwey, Alice Lewisohn, Owen R. Lovejoy, Henry R. Mussey,
Max Eastman, and Margaret Lane to Woodrow Wilson, Feb. 1,
1917, Box 30, Pinchot MSS. See also New York Times. Feb. 2,
1917, 7, 8.

SI
Eastman and Randolph S. Bourne, he formed the Committee For
Democratic C o n t r o l . w i t h Pinchot as Chairman, the new
organization advanced armed neutrality as the best way to
keep the United States out of war.

In articles and adver

tisements, the Committee developed a parallel between
conditions in 1917 and the diplomatic situation in the
1790's.

Armed neutrality, according to the group's argument,

had saved the United States from war in the earlier instance,
and a similar stand, the Committeemen declared, would yield
the- same results in the current crisis.3®
Pinchot, meanwhile, opened fire on domestic proponents
of compulsory military training.
a friend:

On February 19, he warned

"Make a machine of a man for one purpose and you

have a machine for all purposes.

The man who unthinkingly

obeys the epaulet, will unthinkingly obey the employer."39
Shortly thereafter, Pinchot tried to convey the same message
to Samuel Gompers, President of the American Federation of
Labor.

In an open letter, the Mew Yorker called upon

3?see New York World, March 4, 1917, II, 5; and
Mew York Times, March 4, 1917, I, 10.
38see Amos Pinchot to Editor, Springfield (Mass.)
Union, Feb. 16, 1917, Box 30, Pinchot MSS; Amos Pinchot,
"Armed Neutrality," The Public. XX (Feb. 16, 1917), 154;
"1917— American Rights— 1798," New Republic, X, No. 121
(Feb. 17, 1917), 82. See also Charles Downer Hazen, "Demo
cratic Control of History," New Republic, X, No. 121 (Feb.
24, 1917), 105; and Amos Pinchot, "In Defense of Armed
Neutrality," New Republic. X, No. 123 (March 10, 1917),
163-64.
39Amos Pinchot to J. A. H. Hopkins, Feb. 19, 1917,
Box 28, Pinchot MSS.
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Goinpors to throw the weight of organized labor into the
light against schemes for mandatory service.4®
pi tin foLl on deaf ears.

pinchot's

Early in March, 1917, Gompers

compelled the A. F. of L. Executive Council to adopt a
declaration that pledged "to defend, safeguard and preserve
the Republic of the United States of America against its
enemies.

. . .

Pinchot, along with some of his anti-war colleagues,
regarded Gompers and like-minded men as dupes of Wall Street
propaganda.

On March 3, 1917, the Committee For Democratic

Control warned readers of the New Republic that only big
business favored American involvement in the war.4^

Pinchot

maintained the same point of view in his private corre
spondence.

Writing to financial expert John Moody on March

12, he asserted that "Nine-tenths of the Wall Street men" in
his circle of acquaintances wanted war.4** A few days later,
he ruefully predicted that "the old war horses of Wall
Street" would ultimately drag the united States into armed
combat.44

4 ®Amos pinchot to Samuel Gompers, March 10, 1917,
Box 30, ibid. See also New York Times, March 13, 1917, 4.
41Quoted in New York Times. March 13, 1917, 4. See
also Lewis L . Lorwin, The American Federation of Labor;
History, Policies, and Prospects (Washington: Brookings
Institution, 1933), 142-45.
4.2

No. 122

See "Do the People Want War?" New Republic. X,
(March 3, 1917), 145.

43Amos Pinchot to John Moody, March 12, 1917, Box 30,
Pinchot MSS.
44Amos pinchot to William P. Harvey, March 21, 1917,
Box 32, jbid.
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Ay yon bimen t for intervention continued to build,
I'incliot and other A.U.A.M, leaders again turned to President
Wilson.

On March 16, Lillian Wald urged the Chief Executive

to stand by his policy of neutrality.45

Four days later,

Wald, Pinchot, and other A.U.A.M. members sent Wilson
assurances that his neutral stance had broad popular
support.46

Finally, on March 27, Pinchot wired the Presi

dent:
The war excitement is an upper-class hysteria.
It
is at its height,
it will pass, and there will be
a strong reaction. The people themselves are calm
and do not want war. They will bless you if you
ask for a vigorous policy without a war declaration.47
The telegram went unheeded.

On April 2, Wilson called upon

Congress for a declaration of war against Imperial Germany
and her

a l l i e s . 48

within a few days, the United States

officially entered £he Great War.49
Even before the President's address to Congress,
Pinchot had turned to the problem of financing the war

45Lillian D. Wald to Woodrow Wilson, March 16, 1917,
Cabinet 1, Drawer 1, Wald MSS.
46Lillian D. Wald, Amos Pinchot, Paul U. Kellogg, and
John Haynes Holmes to Woodrow Wilson, March 20, 1917, Box
90, Pinchot MSS.
47Amos pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, March 27, 1917,
Box 30, ibid.
4®For the President's request, see Cong. Rec.. 65
Cong., 1 Sess. (April 2, 1917), 118-20.
49por the respective votes of the Senate and House on
the war resolution, see Cong. R e c .. 65 Cong., 1 Sess.
(April 3, 1917), 261; and Cong. R e c .. 65 Cong., 1 Sess.
(April 5, 1917), 412-13.
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effort.

On March 30, he helped found the American Committee

on War Finance, a New York based group with definite ideas
about taxation in wartime.50

The Committee, with Pinchot as

Chairman, moved quickly to publicize its views,

in news

paper advertisements across the country, the unit urged a
pay-as-you-go war with heavy taxes on large incomes.51- The
public, Pinchot told reporters on April 1, needed to know
that pro-war business elements would not profit unduely from
intervent ion.5^
The Committee's tax proposals attracted broad popular
support, and the group soon carried its arguments to
Washington.55

The unit provided members of Congress with

For background material on the committee, see the
memorandum entitled Statement of the Activities of the
American committee on War Finance and the Results Obtained
Thereby in b o x 204, Pinchot MSS.
51

An example of the Committee's literature appears in
New York Times, April 1, 1917, 17.
5^See ibid., April 2, 1917, 3.
53

Pledges of support came to the Committee from
across the nation. For an indication of the popular
response, see Amos Pinchot to E. W. Scripps, April 9, 1917,
Box 27, Pinchot MSS; Amos Pinchot to Stephen S. Wise, April
10, 1917, Box 32, Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to Roy
Howard, April 19, 1917, Box 34, Pinchot MSS.
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npm:iJ:.i.c recommendations on proposed income tax rates.

rA

Pinchot, on May 15, appeared before the Senate Finance Committee to outline his ideas on revenue policy.

A day

later, Representative Edward Keating, a Democrat from Colo
rado, introduced legislation that emboided Pinchot1s
views.56
Although the proposal by Keating failed to pass,
Pinchot could later look with pleasure on the revenue
measure finally enacted into law.^7

Led by North Carolina

^ i n a memorandum prepared for distribution among
Congressmen, the committee recommended the following
schedule of income tax rates:
10% per annum on income from $10,000-$ 20,000
15% per annum on income from $20,000-$ 40,000
20% per annum on income from $40,000-$ 60,000
30% per annum on income from $60,000-$ 80,000
40% per annum on income from $80,000-$100,000
50% per annum on income from 100,000-$150,000
98% per annum on income from 150,000+
For a copy of the memorandum, see Box 31, ibid.
55See Amos pinchot, Statement of Amos Pinchot Before
Senate Finance Committee on May 15, 1917, Representing
American Committee on War Finance. Printed copy in Box 196,
ibid.
Due to his public activities, Pinchot achieved a
special kind of notoriety,
in the midst of the revenue
debate, the Douglas Fairbanks Film Corporation released In
Again, Out Again, a cinematic melodrama of sabotage on the
homefront. Fairbanks, as the film's protagonist "Theodore
Rutherford," uncovers the villainy of "Pinchit," a German
spy disguised as a mincing pacifist. On the motion picture
and its characters, see Owen R. Lovejoy to Amos Pinchot, May
17, 1917, Box 29, ibid.; and Alistair Cooke, Douglas Fair
banks ; The Making of a Screen Character (New York: Museum
of Modern Art, 1940T7 17.
56ln offering the measure, Keating made specific
reference to Pinchot and his views on taxation. See Cong.
Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess. (May 16, 1917), 2403-2404.
5 'Keating's proposal never got beyond the House. For
the vote, see Cong. Rec., 65 Cong., 1 Sess. (May 17, 1917),
2483.
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,'iL Claude Ki tchin, Congressional proponents of heavy

LajioH on high incomes kept a tight reign on the 1917 Revenue
bill.®®

in its final form, the legislation called for a

sharp increase in levies on incomes in the higher brackets.
The tax rates did not match those favored by the American
Committee on War Finance, but Pinchot viewed the Revenue Act
as an acceptable compromise.®9

Even before the money bill

had cleared the Senate, the New Yorker pronounced the work
of his lobbying group successfully done.®0

By July, 1917,

the Committee had disbanded.®-*Pinchot's sense of accomplishment proved ephemeral.
Wartime restrictions on civil liberties soon propelled him
into another fight.

In June, 1917, during a Flag Day

Address, President Wilson lashed out at domestic critics of

®^See Alex Matthews Arnett, Claude Kitchin and the
Wilson War Policies (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company,
1937) , 249-66;
and Sidney Ratner, Taxation and Democracy in
America (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967), 372-86.
®'The maximum rate imposed by the Revenue Act was a
tax of 67% on the portion of annual income in excess of two
million dollars. For the text of the Act, see U. S.,
Statutes at Large. XL, Part 1, 300-38.
For the schedule of
rates in tabular form, see Ernest Ludlow Bogart, War Costs
and Their Financing: A Study of the Financing of the War
and the After-War Problems of Debt and Taxation (New York:
D. Appleton and Company, 1921), 476.
fiO
Amos Pinchot to John E. Lander, June 7, 1917, Box
29, Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to James F. Minturn,
June 15, 1917, Box 28, Pinchot MSS.
®iAmos Pinchot to Charles j. Rhoads, July 9, 1917,
Box 29, ibid.

the war effort.
angrily.

fto

Stung by the attack, Pinchot reacted

The chief Executive, he told a friend, had

"flourished the knout" over all those who opposed "the
temporary little fatherhood" that Wilson was fast estab
lishing.63

Shortly thereafter, Pinchot joined with Max

Eastman and John Reed to protest another manifestation of
the martial spirit.

Acting as spokesmen for The Masses and

other radical journals, the trio sent Wilson a list of
socialist periodicals recently banned from the mails by the
United States Post Office Department.

After makirg an

appeal to the President's devotion to the "Anglo-raxon
tradition of intellectual freedom," the petitioners asked
for a reversal of Post Office policy.

64

The entreaty to Wilson produced minimal results.

The

President forwarded the incoming letter to Postmaster
General Albert S. Burleson.
authors, he told Burleson:

With reference to the three
"These are very sincere men and

62For the text of the Flag Day speech, see Woodrow
Wilson, War and Peace: presidential Messages. Addresses,
and Public Papers, 1917-1924, eds. Ray Stannard Baker and
William E. Dodd (New Yorks Harper and Brothers, 1927), I,
60-67.
63Amos Pinchot to Crystal Eastman, June 15, 1917,
Box 30, Pinchot MSS.
64Max Eastman, John Reed, and Amos Pinchot to Woodrow
Wilson, July 12, 1917, Series 4, Box 465, File 4122, Wilson
M S S . For additional material on the exclusion of The Masses
from the mails, see Max Eastman, Love and Revolution: My
Journey Through an Epoch (New York: Random House, 1964),
58-63; hereinafter cited as Eastman, Love and Revolution.

I should like to please t h e m . T h e
had a mind of his own.

Postmaster, however,

He bluntly informed the President

that the periodicals in question had been banned due to clear
violations of the Espionage Act.®®

Wilson made no effort to

challenge his acerbic cabinet officer.
Pinchot a copy of Burleson's letter,

On July 17, he sent
in terms of supple

mentary comment, Wilson limited himself to a request that
the letter receive Pinchot*s "most friendly consideration."
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Burleson subsequently continued his crusade against litera
ture that failed to meet Post Office standards for
patriotism.®®
Although he battled against infringement oJ civil
liberties, Pinchot accepted united States involvement in the
Great Wax as an irreversible reality,

in fact his criticisms

of Burleson stemmed partly from a belief that the Post
master 's activities compromised the idealism that needed to
be made paramount in waging the war.

In a letter to Wilson

®-’Woodrow Wilson to Albert S. Burleson, July 13,
1917, Series 4, Box 465, File 4122, Wilson MSS.
®®Albert S. Burleson to Woodrow Wilson, July 16,
1917, ibid.

®’
Voodrow Wilson to Amos Pinchot, July 17, 1917,
Box 29, Pinchot MSS.
®®See Donald Johnson, The Challenge to American
Freedoms: World War l and the Rise of the American Civil
Liberties union (Lexington: university of Kentucky Press,
1963), 57-63; and Harry N. Scheiber, The Wilson Administra
tion and civil Liberties. 1917-1921 (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1960), 29-41. See also William H. Lamar,
"The Government's Attitude Toward the Press," Forum. LIX
(Feb., 1918), 29-41.
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on July 25, Pinchot attempted to explain his point of view.
American intervention in Europe, he contended, could be
justified only if it contributed to the spread of democracy
throughout the world.

Accordingly, he argued that the

Wilson administration ought to commit itself to the advance
ment of democratic institutions both at home and abroad.

In

conclusion, he urged the President to adopt policy goals
that would make the American war effort a clear-cut fight
for international democracy.®^
Annng allies of the United States, pinchot regarded
Great Britain as the archenemy of democratic war aims.7®
Writing to a former Bull Moose colleague on July 26, he
lamented "British insistence upon a land grabbing pro
gram."71

The subsequent growth of interallied cooperation

did nothing to allay Pinchot1s suspicions.

In October, 1917,

he wrote pessimistically:
It will be a terrible thing for our people to have
to make the sacrifices of war not for justice, not
for democracy, not for permanent peace, but for the

®®Amos Pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, July 25, 1917, Box
27, Pinchot MSS.
70For a panoramic, multinational view of the problem
of war aims in World War I, see Arno J. Mayer, Political
Origins of the New Diplomacy, 1917-1918 (New Haven: Yale
university Press, 1959), passim. For additional material,
see Charles Seymour, American Diplomacy During the World War
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1942), 253-98;
and
Lawrence W. Martin, Peace Without Victory: Woodrow Wilson
and the B ritish Liberals (New Haven: Yale university Press,
195877” B7-195.
71Amos Pinchot to Bainbridge Colby, July 26, 1917,
Box 30, Pinchot MSS.
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exploitation of the world by Anglo-American banking
and business interests— an exploitation which should
logically result in another conflict.72
The specter of an aggressive alliance between big business
forces in Great Britain and the United States continued to
haunt Pinchot as the war dragged on.
The protection of civil liberties provided another
focus for the New Yorker's concern.

In October, 1917, after

the dismissal of two Columbia University professors for
anti-war endeavors, pinchot sent letters of condolence to
both men.7^

"The first thing that a nation at war attacks,"

he told one of the academicians,
honesty."74

"is its own intellectual

Naturally, Pinchot saw the activities of

Postal authorities as a pre-eminent threat to freedom of
thought.

He took vindictive delight in an expose of Post

master Burleson authored by journalist George P. West.75
Writing to congratulate West on October 15, he exclaimed:
"Good Lord!

How can Woodrow Wilson keep that elderly

72Amos pinchot to Arthur LeSueur, Oct. 2, 1917, Box
34, ibid.
7^The faculty members in question were James McKeen
Cattell and Henry Wadsworth Longfellow Dana. On their
difficulties with Columbia, see "Columbia's Dismissed Pro
fessors," Literary Digest, LV, No. 16 (Oct. 20, 1917), 24;
and Horace" C. Peterson and Gilbert c. Fite, Opponents of
War, 1917-1918 (Madison: university of Wisconsin Press,
1957), 103-104.
74Amos Pinchot to James McKeen Cattell, October 4,
1917, Box 30, Pinchot MSS. See also Amos pinchot to Henry
Wadsworth Longfellow Dana, Oct. 4, 1917, Box 27 Pinchot MSS.
75See George P. West, "A Talk with Mr. Burleson," The
Public. XX (Oct. 12, 1917, 985-87.
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village-idiot in his cabinet?"78
Late in 1917, Pinchot found a forum for expression of
his discontent over conduct of the war.

The race for Mayor

of New York city pitted pro-war nationalists against
advocates of peace abroad and restored civil liberties at
home.

As spokesman for the former group, incumbent Mayor

John Purroy Mitchel offered himself to the voters as the
embodiment of militant patriotism.

His campaign posters

pictured him in a doughboy uniform with bayonet at the
ready.77

The youthful Mayor's chief opposition came from

judge John F. Hylan, a Tammany Hall Democrat, and Morris
Hillquit, a veteran Socialist party functionary.
proved to be the surprise of the campaign.

Hillquit

While Hylan

stood discreetly aside, the Socialist called for an end to
the European war and for the complete restoration of
domestic civil rights.

Hillquit's platform stirred the

popular imagination, and the third party candidate soon
found himself with a large and vocal following.78

78Amos Pinchot to George P. West, Oct. 15, 1917,
Box 29, Pinchot MSS.
770n Mitchel and his bid for re-election, see Edwin
R. Lewinson, John Purroy Mitchel; The Boy Mayor of New
York (New Yorks Astra Books, 1965), 230-45.
78For material on the Hillquit campaign, see Morris
Hillquit, Loose Leaves From a Busy Life (New York: Macmillan
Company, 1934), 180-210; and James Weinstein, The Decline oi
Socialism in America. 1912-1925 (New York: Monthly Review
Press, 1967), 149-54.

Pinchot threw himself into the Hillquit campaign.

In

an open letter of endorsement, he praised the Socialist
candidate's stand on civil liberties.

He went on to place

Hillquit on the side of a European peace that would be
"American in spirit, democratic in terms . . .

and at one

with the aspirations of liberal elements in all coun
tries."^9

Pinchot subsequently presided over a Hillquit

rally at Madison Square Garden.®9

Late in the campaign, he

joined a "flying squadron" of pro-Hillquit speakers that
canvassed New York by automobile.®*-

The expenditure of time

and energy led to welcomed results.

Hillquit finished third

in the race, but he won enough votes to ensure Hylan's
victory over Mitchel.82

In a post-election statement,

Pinchot termed the outcome "a slam at the wave of Prussianism" that had swept the country since American intervention
in Europe.®-*
With the election decided, pinchot shifted his atten
tion to the problem of war aims.

His primary concern was

79Amos Pinchot to Morris Hillquit, undated, Box 102,
Pinchot MSS. See also New York Times. Oct. 29, 1917, 1.
89New York Times. Nov. 1, 1917, ly and New York Call.
Nov. 1, 1917, 1.
Q1
New York American, Nov, 4, 1917, 12y and New York
Call. Nov. 6, 1917, 3.
82See New York Times, Nov. 7, 1917, 1.
83New York Call. Nov. 8, 1917, 2.

"the danger of having to fight for British imperial ism.
on November 14,

Ll
Jl7, in a long letter to Presidential

adviser George Creel, Pinchot gave vent to some of his
anxieties about the diplomatic situation.

His involvement

in the Hillquit campaign, he explained, had stemmed from the
belief "that a big Socialist vote would . . .

off-set . . .

British . . . propaganda for war aims that the [American]
people would not stand behind."

With an eye to more

inspiring goals, Pinchot urged Creel to keep the President
ever mindful of the need to make the war a crusade for
democracy.®-*

In the weeks that followed, Pinchot continued

to worry that reactionaries at home and abroad would out—
maneuver Wilson and convert the war into a struggle for
economic advantages.®®
Pinchot soon saw documentary evidence that confirmed
his worst suspicions about international politics.

By means

of an extraordinary chain of events, he became aware of the
secret agreements that tied the Entente coalition together.
In November, 1917, the Russian Bolsheviks revealed the
confidential treaties found in the Tsarist archives.

The

84Amos pinchot to A. M. Todd, Nov. 0, 1917, Box 32,
Pinchot MSS.
®^Amos pinchot to George Creel, Nov. 14, 1917, Box
34, ibid.
86See Amos Pinchot to Arthur Brisbane, Nov. 20, 1917;
and Amos Pinchot to Joseph D. Cannon, Nov. 20, 1917, both in
Box 30, ibid. See also Amos pinchot, "War Aims," Forward:
Orqan of the Leaque For Democratic Control, I, No. 6 (Dec.,
lllfT,"65^66.--- ------------------------------
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documents, with their provisions for crippling indemnities
and territorial adjustments, appeared in the Soviet press.

07

Subsequently, a Russian seaman arrived in New York with a
Vladivostok newspaper that reprinted the texts of the
treaties.

The seaman and his valuable cargo passed quickly

from a Russian emigre doctor, to Pinchot's cousin, and on to
Pinchot himself.88

The latter sent the newspaper and its

bearer tc Oswald Garrison Villard, publisher of the New York
Evening Post.

A short time later, Villard*s paper carried

complete translations of the once secret documents.®9
Pinchot deplored the tenor of the confidential pacts,
and he assumed that President Wilson shared his point of
view.

Ir January, 1918, he raised the question of war aims

in a letter to colonel Edward M. House, the President's
closest ioreign policy adviser.

Pinchot called the

colonel*£ attention to a recent declaration in which members
of the Bi itish Labour party had endorsed a peace settlement

8*See Jane Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign
Policy (New York: Oxford university Press, 1951)” I, 8-9;
and George F . Kennan, Russia Leaves the War (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1^56), 92-93. For a discussion
of the contents of the treaties, see Ray Stannard Bakei,
Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement: Written From His
Unpublished and Personal Material (Garden City: Doubleday,
Page, and Company, 1923), I, 23-81; hereinafter cited as
Baker, Wilson and World Settlement.
88On Pinchot*s role in the episode, see the memo
randum dtited Nov. 25, 1941, in Box 140, Pinchot M S ; 88See Oswald Garrison Villard, Fighting Ye. ta :
Memoirs of a Liberal Editor (New York: Harcourt, Brace,
and Company, 1939), 340-42.
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with no annexations or indemnities.9®

The time had come,

Pinchot asserted, for "liberal groups in the united States"
to take the same stand.

While he noted that the President

had so far failed to occupy such advanced ground, Pinchot
expressed confidence that the Chief Executive had a "no
annexations program . . .

at heart."9^

Reports from House and another Presidential intimate
re-enforced Pinchot's favorable view of Wilson.
1918, he told George Foster Peabody:

In February,

"Colonel House assures

me that the President is on to the imperialists and will
keep pressing them back . . . until he has them where they
belong."-'2

A later conversation with an unidentified friend

of the President left Pinchot even more confident.

In

recounting the talk to his wife, he explained:
Wilson’s idea is to call a halt to land-grabbing
and till its modifications. . . . Give everybody or
as many people as possible self-determination.
Build up a public opinion to the effect that war,
or rather conquest is simply larceny. Establish
free trade. . . . of course, all this . . . has not
been stated in so many words by the President, but
the man I spoke of believes he is working toward it.
At all events, I am going on the principle that he is.
Pinchot termed the program which he attributed to Wilson

9®For the text of the declaration,
Times, Jan. 16, 1918, 1, 3.

see New York

91 Amos Pinchot to Edward M. House, Jan. 28, 1918,
Box 37, Pinchot MSS.
9*>

"Amos Pinchot to George Foster Peabody, Feb. 19,
1918, Box 35, ibid.
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"the bigqost thing that any statesman" had ever attempted.9^
The stubborn problem of infringements on civil
liberties soon brought Pinchot back to the less exalted side
of the war effort.

In April 1918, Max Eastman, John Reed,

and other staff members of The Masses went to trial for
violations of the Espionage Act.

The charges stemmed from

the dispute with Postmaster Burleson nearly a year before.94
Pinchot, incensed by the prolonged harassment of his friends,
protested directly to the President.

In a letter to Wilson

on May 24, he vigorously defended the journalists and urged
AC
that the indictments against them be dropped.
The court
battle continued, however, and it ended only after two
juries had failed to reach a verdict.9** Meanwhile, Pinchot
waited in vain for word from the White House.

After almost

a month, he admitted that Wilson, for the first time, had
neglected to answer one of his letters.^
Following the trials of The Masses staff, Pinchot
continued to support Wilson, but his allegiance stopped short

^ A m o s pinchot to Gertrude M. Pinchot, March 4, 1918,
ibid.
94For an enumeration of the charges against the
journalists, see Louis Untermeyer, From Another World (New
York; Harcourt, Brace, and Company, 1939), 66-77.
95Amos pinchot to Woodrow Wilson, May 24, 1918,
Box 37, Pinchot MSS.
96On the two appearances in court, see Eastman, Love
and Revolution. 82-99, and 118-23.
9^Amos Pinchot to Owen R. Lovejoy, June 19, 1918,
Box 37, Pinchot MSS.
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of blind faith.

In October, 1918, the President asked for a

popular mandate in the form of Democratic victories in the
upcoming Congressional races.98

Pinchot, within a few days,

endorsed candidates on the Socialist party ticket as the
true proponents of "Wilson’s program for a just peace . . . " "
When the Republicans swept the subsequent elections, Pinchot
offered a quick analysis of the cause for the Democrats'
downfall.

The electorate, he argued, had registered its

opposition to repressive steps taken by the administration
on the hcmefront.

As for international affairs, Pinchot

remained certain that Wilson, if he could engineer a fair
peace, wculd be remembered as "a very great man."*88
For Pinchot, the end of the war in Europe set the
stage foi Wilson’s acid test.

On November 18, just a week

after an armistice had quieted the battlefronts, the
President announced that he would lead an American delega
tion to France in order to participate in the peace
negotiations.*-8*-

A few days later, Pinchot publicly assessed

the challenge that faced the chief Executive.

If the treaty

,8See New York Times. Oct. 26, 1918, 1.
(>9New York Call. Nov. 2, 1918, 7.
*-88See Amos Pinchot, Peace or Armed Peace? An Open
Letter From Amos pinchot to the American Representatives of
the Coming international Peace conference, pamphlet in Box
37, Pinchot MSS.
*-°*-The international conclave was scheduled to begin
in January, 1919. For the President’s announcement, see
New York Times, Nov. 19, 1918, 1-2.
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talks ended in a "burglar's peace" dictated by Britain and
Prance, Wilson, the New Yorker predicted, would "go down in
history as a pretty tragic failure."

On the other hand, if

the President won a just settlement, he might, according to
Pinchot, be recognized as "America's greatest raan."^^
In his own sphere, Pinchot worked to publicize the
secret treaties that already obligated the Entente powers.
Early in 1919, he composed a series of five short articles
on the orce confidential agreements.103

His accounts

emphasized the selfish balance of power motives that char
acterized the pacts.

At the same time, he pictured Wilson

as the harbinger of a new diplomacy based on open discussion
and democratic institutions.

In their final form, Pinchot's

essays went to the united Press news service.1,0^

They

subsequently appeared in newspapers throughout the West and
Midwest.105
With his writing chore done, Pinchot kept a close
watch on preparations for the peace conference at Versailles.
News from across the Atlantic soon took an ominous turn.

On

102see Pinchot's letter to the editor in (Baltimore)
Sun. Dec. 1, 1918, 10.
1-03See Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, Jan. 10, 1919,
Box 38, Pinchot MSS.
104por the complete set of five articles, see united
Press Red Letter, VII, No. 5 (Jan. 29-Feb. 4, 1919). Copy
in Box 140, ibid.
l ° ! » A m o s
pinchot to Mrs. Arthur Minturn Scott, Feb. 10,
1919, Box 39, Pinchot MSS.
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January 15, 1919, spokesmen for the victorious powers
announced that treaty negotiations would be conducted in
secret sessions.1®®
anger and dismay.

Pinchot greeted the announcement with
The peace, he concluded glumly, would now

"be arranged by a little bunch of old school profiteer
diplomats, closeted behind the closed doors of a palace."^07
A few days later, he wrote to Roy Howard:
I fear our friend Woodrow is going to have a worse
time than I expected. . . . He has gotten himself
into a position ffrom] which it is . . . utterly
impossible for him to make a real fight for open
diplomacy and a liberal peace. He is therefore not
going to make such a fight, but he is going to make
believe make it and make himself think he is making
it, and he [is] going to come home claiming that he
has made it, and more than that, that he has von
it.108
In Pinchot's estimation, the closed negotiating sessions
meant that Wilson had failed even before the peace* confer
ence began.
Predictably, Pinchot could see no merit in the
settlemert that finally emerged from the Versailles meetings.
He branded the finished compact "a rehash of the iecret

lO^See New York Times. Jan. 16, 1919, 1-2. On the
problems of publicity and newspaper coverage at the con
ference, see Baker, Wilson and World Settlement, 7., 136-60;
and James D. Startt, "The Uneasy partnership: WiJ son and the
Press at Paris," Mid-America. LII, N o . 1 (Jan., 1970),
55-69.
l ^ A m o s pinchot to W. Forbes Morgan, Jan. 16, 1919,
Box 39, Pinchot MSS.
l°8Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, Jan. 23, 1919, Box

38, ibid.
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Treaties . . .

a glorified Rivers and Harbors bill."

i no

Likewise, he dismissed the League of Nations Covenant as
"the last trump card of the governmental reactionaries and
the financial groups.

. . ."HO

He feared that the new

international organization would be used by conservatives
to suppress future democratic upheavals around the world.
Along with his opposition to the treaty, Pinchot
voiced his disillusionment with Wilson.
told Geoige Sylvester Viereck:

In June, 1919, he

"I am . . . utterly dis

gusted with Wilson's performances at Versailles.
out of tie episode dishonored and discredited.

He comes

. . ." H 2

Publicly, Pinchot argued that the chief Executive, through
either naivete or insufficient preparation, had Wcisted the
world's one chance for a durable p e a c e . A t

Versailles,

he later contended, Wilson had been "gulled, hoodwinked,
outwitted, outvoted, made ridiculous and finally sent home

1(iQ

See Amos Pinchot, "Amos Pinchot Calls For a
Separate Peace," The World Tomorrow. II, No. 6 (June, 1919),
172.
H ° A m o s pinchot to Albert Jay Nock, April 21, 1919,
Box 39, Pinchot MSS.

H l s e e Amos Pinchot to Peter Golden, June 9, 1919,
Box 38, ibid.; and Amos Pinchot, "League of Nations covenant
Analyzed By One Who Regards it As a Great Peril." Reconstruc
tion. I, No. 6 (June, 1919), 172-75.
■^■2Amos Pinchot to George Sylvester Viereck, June 10,
1919, Box 38, Pinchot MSS.
H 3 p o r the argument in pamphlet form, see Amos Pinchot,
Why America Was Beaten at the Peace conference. Copy in
Box 178, ibid.
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defeated <it ovory point.'*^^
In deriding the President, Pinchot gave evidence of
his own political frustration.

He had once regarded Wilson

as an ally in the fight to keep America out of the European
war.

When the United States entered the conflict, he looked

to the Whxte House for a clarion call that would make the
war a crusade for democracy.

Meanwhile, Pinchot maintained

a direct Line of communication with the President, and on a
few occasions he seemed to be in tune with Wilson and other
key policymakers.

At least while in league with the.

American Union Against Militarism and the American Committee
on War Finance, the New Yorker appeared to exert a modicum
of political influence.

Yet Pinchot, in the last analysis,

proved to be politically powerless.

On the crucial issues

of protection for civil liberties and advancement of
democratic war aims, his preachments had no discernible
impact on administration policies.

When faced with a peace

treaty that he deplored, Pinchot could only rail at a Presi
dent who had seldom listened to him even in better days.

^■^Amos pinchot, “Head Down in a Bootleg," The Free
m a n , II, No. 34 (Nov. 3, 1920), 178.

Chapter 5
THE COMMITTEE OF FORTY EIGHT
As World War I drew to a close, Amos pinchot renewed
his interest in American domestic politics.

He looked

forward to a revival of the reform spirit that had marked
the prewar years,

in particular, he hoped to see the enact

ment of the anti-monopoly creed that he shared with George
Record.

With an eye to that goal, pinchot joined forces

with other dissidents who dreamed of a new political party
devoted to reform.

Involvement in the third-party movement

kept the New Yorker hard at work throughout 1919 and 1920.
Within Pinchot's circle of friends talk about a new
party certered around retired insurance executive j. A. H.
Hopkins.^

A veteran of Bull Moose politics in New Jersey,

Hopkins, during World War I, had retained an interest in
third paity action.

Early xn 1919, he began to neet

*For biographical material on Hopkins, see W h o 's Who
in America. 1922-1923 (Chicago: A. N. Marquis and Company,
1922), 1565; and New York Times, June 16, 1960, 33.
2in the midst of the war effort, Hopkins had joined
John Spargo and others in an attempt to fuse liberals and
pro-war socialists into a new party. On the brief and abor
tive history of that coalition, see John Spargo, "The New
National Party, " National Municipal Review. VII, No. 3 (May,
1918), 284-87;
"The New 'National1 Party," Nation, CVI,
No. 2750 (March 14, 1918), 284-85;
and New York Times,
March 9, 1918, 9.
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regularly with Pinchot and a few other political indepen
dents.

Out of the meetings came the committee of forty

Eight, a reform minded group with Hopkins in the role of
chairman.

As its name indicated, the Committee hoped even

tually to build support in every State of the Union.

From

the beginning, however, a small clique of Eastern urbanites
controlled the organization.

The Committee served primarily

as a vehicle for the advancement of the political ideals of
gentlemen reformers such as Hopkins and Pinchot.3
Once banded together, the Committeemen moved to gain
public attention,

in March, 1919, spokesmen for t.he group

proposed that the leaders of American "liberal thought" meet
in a national conference and formulate a common program.

The

Committee's representatives, at the same time, clearly
registered their opposition to any form of political
extremism.

As an alternative to the polar forces of "Re

action and Revolution," they called for a moderate program
"Reconstruction."4

30n the early days of the Committee of Forty Eight,
see the interview with Hopkins in New York Times. July 4,
1920, VII, 1. See also J. A. H. Hopkins to Amos Pinchot,
Feb. 15, 1919, Box 39, Pinchot MSS; Will Durant, Transition:
A Sentiment Story of One Mind and One Era (New Yorkt Simon
and Schuster, 1927), 297? and Arthur Garfield Hays, city
Lawyer: The Autobiography of a Law Practice (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1942), 250-51”; the latter title herein
after cited as Hays, City Lawyer.
lution
No. 25
see "A
(March

4For the text of the conference proposal, see "Revo
or Reconstruction? A call to Americans," Survey, XL1,
(March 22, 1919), n.p. For an evaluation of the call,
New Political Alignment," Nation. CVIXI, No. 2804
29, 1919), 460-61.
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From the start, Pinchot saw the Committee of Forty
Eight as a tool that he and George Record could use. Writing
to the jerseyman in May, 1919, he noted that the Committee's
proposed national conference would make an excellent forum
for the presentation of the reform ideas that he and Record
held in common.5

Record, always ready to advance his

£
doctrinal cause, reacted favorably to the suggestion.0

The

two veteran activists soon emerged as the chief political
strategists in the Forty Eighter camp.7
The first major task before the Committeemen was the
recruitment of a constituency.

Potential members received

the organization's literature by mail, and they were

5Amos Pinchot to George L. Record, May 6 , 1919, Box
39, Pinchot MSS.
During and after the war, Record continued to
advocate government ownership of railroads, other public
utilities, and natural resources as a way to equalize
economic competition.
In 1918, when he campaigned for the
Republican nomination for United States Senator in New
jersey, his platform included demands for limited national
ization. See Barr, "Record," 84-86. Record, in March, 1919,
called for President Wilson to lead a reform crusade on
behalf of competitive capitalism.
In a long letter sent to
Wilson in Paris, the Jerseyman outlined an economic program
designed to equalize competitive opportunities. As a first
step. Record proposed government ownership of railroads and
natural resources. Wilson, after a long delay, answered in
polite but non-committal terms. The text of Record's
letter to Wilson appears in Kerney, Wilson. 437-46. For
the Chief Executive's reply, see Woodrow Wilson to George L.
Record, Aug. 15, 1919, Series 3, Letterbook 57, Wilson
MSS.
7See Hays, City Lawyer. 250-51.

oncouraged to hand it on to other possible enlistees.a

In a

special effort to stir public interest, the group sent out
thousands of copies of a questionnaire on key political
issues of the day.®

Finally, in September, 1919, a spokes

man for the Committee announced plans for a national con
ference to meet in St. Louis, December 9-12.^®
Even before it opened, the St. Louis meeting became
an object of controversy.

The trouble started when an

American Legion post in Kansas city complained about the
proposed gathering to St. Louis Mayor Henry W. Kiel.^^

In

St. Louis itself, local men, who also claimed to be Legion
naires, pushed the protest a step further.

They threatened

to break up the meeting if Federal officials allowed it to
open.

With tension at a peak, the manager of the head

quarters hotel for the conference cancelled the reservations

®0n the Committee1s recruiting tactics, see Committee
of Forty Eight, Bulletin Number One. August 15, 1919, copy
in Box 39, Pinchot MSS; and New York Times. June 15, 1920,
1.
®A printed copy of the questionnaire appears in the
papers of Mercer G. Johnston, a prominent Committee member
from Maryland. See Box 67, Mercer G. Johnston Papers, Manu
script Division, Library of Congress. The Forty Eighters
later claimed to have sent out ten thousand copies of the
questionnaire. See St. Louis Post-Dispatch. Dec. 7, 1919,
14B.
*°For
see The Call
Women by~the
See also New

the text of the announcement in pamphlet form,
to a National Conference of American Men and
committee of 4 8 . Copy in Box 67, Johnston MSS.
York Times, Sept. 22, 1919, 7.

^ S t . Louis Post-Dispatch. Dec. 3, 1919, 6 .
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held by the Forty Eighters.12

Only a court order reversed

the cancellation and allowed the sessions to begin on
schedule . ^

Once under way, the conference discussions were

carefully monitored by agents from the United States Depart
ment of Justice.14
As participants in the meeting, Pinchot and Record
played active and prominent roles.15

Both men sat on the

all important Platform Committee, the body charged with
1fk
drawing up a program that would unite the delegates. °
While Record presided over the platform sessions, Pinchot
worked to shape the contents of specific planks.

He

insisted that first priority go to a plank calling for
government ownership of natural resources and transportation
facilities.17

12Ibid., Dec. 8 , 1919, 1; S£. Louis Star, Dec. 8 ,
1919, 1; and St. Louis Globe-Democrat, Dec. 9, 1919, 1-2.
^ S t . Louis Star, Dec. 9, 1919, 1.
14See S t . Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 8 , 1919, 1; S t .
Louis Post-Dispatch. Dec. 10, 1919, 1? and St. Louis GlobeDemocr at, Dec. 11, 1919, 13.
15According to one estimate, the conference attracted
approximately two hundred and fifty delegates from thirtyeight States. See New York Times. Dec. 11, 1919, 2. For a
feature article on Pinchot, Record, and other major figuces
at the meeting, see St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Dec. 10, 1919,
1-2 .
^ T h e Forty Eighters acknowledged the import since of
the Platform Committee and its members in their own news
paper. See Facts, Dec. 10, 1919, 3. See also Sit. Louis
Star, Dec. 10, 1919, 1-2.
1 'Facts. Dec. 11, 1919, 1.
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the notions tliat Pinchot and Kecord held dear.

Tlie document

opened with a strong endorsement of government ownership of
natural resources, public utilities, and the means of
transportation.

It went on to condemn large landholdings,

and to urge taxes designed to break up the land monopoly.
In terms of civil liberties, the platform called for the
extension of full rights to all citizens.

The stcitement

closed with an expression of support for labor's offorts "to
share in the management of industry and . . .
and bargain collectively.

to organize

. . .

The sop to labor suggested the kind of coa.i ition
strategy that the Forty Eighters hoped to follow.

On the

eve of the St. Louis meeting, J. A. H. Hopkins had attended
the first national convention of the American Labor p a r t y . ^

■*-8For the text of the platform, see ibid., Dec. 12,
1919, 1-2. See also New York Times, Dec. 22, 1919, 5.
■^Founded in September, 1918, the American Labor
party brought together reform minded labor leaders who stood
to the left of Samuel Gampers. Much of the party's strength
stemmed from the Chicago Federation of Labor led by John
Fitzpatrick. For background material on the Labor party,
see George P. West, "Will Labor Lead?" Nation. CVII, No.
2807 (April, 1919), 600-601; Nathan Fine, Labor and Farmer
Parties in the united States. 1828-1928 (New York: Hand
School of Social Science, 1928), 377-97; Eugene Staley,
History of the Illinois State Federation of Labor (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1930), 361-90;
and Stanley
Shapiro, "Hand and Brain: The Farmer-Labor Party of 1920"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of California,
Berkeley, 1967), 69-145; the last title hereinafter cited
as Shapiro, "Hand and Brain." See also John Howard Keiser,
"John Fitzpatrick and Progressive Unionism, 1915-:925"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Northwestern University,
1965), passim.
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in an address to the Labor delegates, he had declared:
We members of the Committee of 48 look forward to
cooperating with you members of the Labor party,
. . . Your duty and ours is to frame such a program
that the workers, the farmers, and the liberals of
the country can work hand in hand at the next
election,20
The Laborites seemed amenable to Hopkins's offer of an
alliance.

By the close of the Forty Eighters' own national

conference, an eventual merger of the Committee and the
Labor party appeared to be a likely

p o s s i b i l i t y .2*

Early in 1920, the Committee's leaders took additional
steps toward building a coalition.

On January

19,

the Forty

Eighter Executive Committee created a Committee on Procedure
and authorized it to negotiate with other reform oriented
groups.22

Pinchot and Record promptly claimed two of the

seats on the five-man panel.23

in

February,

1920,

Hopkins,

Record, and Pinchot traveled to Chicago for nearly a week of
talks with officials from the Labor party and the Non-

20New York Call. Nov.

25,

1919,

2.

21m an address to the closing session of the con
ference, Duncan McDonald of the Labor party offered
assurances that an agreement "on some definite, common pro
gram" would allow Laborites and Forty Eighters to "unite
solidly together. . . . "
See Facts. Dec. 1 2 , 1 9 1 9 , 1 , 2 .
22Minutes of the committee of Forty Eight Executive
committee meeting, Jan. 1 9 , 1 9 2 0 .
Copy in Box 8 4 , Pinchot
MSS.
23

Pinchot and Record were named to the procedure
Committee on January 2 6 .
See Minutes of the Committee of
Forty Eight Executive Committee meeting, Jan. 2 6 , 1 9 2 0 .
Copy in ibid.

Partisan League.24

Pinchot emerged from the discussions in

an optimistic frame of mind.

Writing to a friend on February

17, he predicted that the Committee of Forty Eight and the
Labor party would soon hold simultaneous conventions in
Chicago and fuse into a single u n i t .25
Meanwhile, Pinchot used his talents as a polemicist
to advance the third party cause.

In an essay published in

January, 1920, he flayed both the Republican and Democratic
political machines.

The two major parties, he argued, were

equally subservient to an economic elite that controlled
America's natural resources and transportation system.26
In a later article, the New Yorker offered the St. Louis
platform of the Committee of Forty Eight as an answer to the
injustices of the established industrial order.

The Forty

Eighter program, he contended, would strip "the privileged
minority of its monopoly of economic power.

. . ."27

Pinchot, in private correspondence, was even more
insistent about the primacy of the St. Louis platform.

He

maintained that any divergence from that statement would

^Minutes of the Committee of Forty Eight Executive
Committee meeting, Feb. 16, 1920. Copy in ibid.
25Amos Pinchot to E. W. Scripps, Feb. 17, 1920, Box
41, ibid.
26See Amos Pinchot,
Facta, Jan., 1920, 1.

"The Old Order changeth Not,"

27Amos Pinchot, "Mr. Pinchot cites the Wrongs That
the *48-ers' Would Right," Reconstruction, II, No. 2
(Feb., 1920), 56.
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bring disunity and disaster.

2ft

On February 21, he told an

ally:
Now we only have one asset, just exactly one.
It is
a definite economic program.
If we get ahead it will
be because we have got other people to think the way
we do, adopt the same platform and unite with us for
the political carrying out of our economic purposes.
If we don't do this, we will be a flash in the pan
like the Progressive Party, and we will deservedly
cease to exist.
The Committee of Forty Eight, Pinchot concluded, needed to
keep its programmatic goals in the forefront "first, last
and all the time."^9
The New Yorker soon realized, however, that some Labor
party members did not share his enthusiasm for the Forty
Eighter's pro-capitalist program.

In March, 1920, he com

plained about Laborite "hotheads" who favored appeals to
blue-collar class consciousness.30

a few weeks le.ter, he

bemoaned the fact that labor wanted "to think as labor and
function as labor.

. . ."31

in a subsequent letter to

Edward Nockels of the Labor party, Pinchot called for
moderation on the part of the Laborites.

He reminded

Nockels that the reform movement would need suppox t from

2ft

See Amos Pinchot to James H. Maurer, Feb. 4, 1920;
Amos Pinchot to J. W. McConaughy, Feb. 5, 1920; and Amos
Pinchot to W. J. McDonald, Feb. 5, 1920, all in Box 41,
Pinchot MSS.
^9Amos Pinchot to A. W. Ricker, Feb. 21, 1920, ibid.
30Amos Pinchot to James H. Maurer, March 2.3, 1920,
ibid.
3*Amos Pinchot to Francis J. Heney, April 26, 1920,
Box 40, ibid.

01
I.armors and micUU e-class elements as well as from workPt's,^
Despite Pinchot's wariness, the Committee oL Forty
Eight appeared to be gaining ground.

On April 26, a spokes

man for the group announced plans for a national convention
to meet m

Chicago, July 10-13.

The Labor party, just

three days later, declared its intention to convene in
Chicago, July 11-13.34

With hopes for fusion running high,

the Forty Eighters talked excitedly about a name tor the
still unborn third party.3^

By the middle of June, Committee

leaders had sought and obtained assurances that Senator
Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin would consider a third
party Presidential nomination.3^
The Laborites, on the other hand, were far more
pessimistic about the chances for fusion.

On Jule 19, an

editorial in the Labor party's newspaper openly questioned
the wisdom of an alliance with the Committee of F; rty Eight.
Emissaries from the Committee, according to the journal, had

32

Amos pinchot to Edward Nockels, May 21, 1920, ibid.

33New York Times. April 27, 1920, 3.
34Ibid., April 30, 1920, 2.
33

The name "Lincoln party" was a favorite among
Committee leaders.
See the Minutes of the Committee of
Forty Eight Executive Committee meeting. May 27, 1920.
Copy
in Box 84, Pinchot MSS. See also Robert Anderson Pope to
Mercer G. Johnston, June 15, 1920, Box 45, Johnston MSS.
36

See Gilson Gardner to Amos Pinchot, June 15, 1920,
Box 40, Pinchot MSS.

92

already been told that the Labor party expected to retain
both its name and its working class orientation.37

in a

later issue, the Laborite editor suggested that the Forty
Eighters join the Labor party as white-collar auxiliaries.38
Meanwhile, Pinchot continued to insist that the St.
Louis platform offered the only solid foundation for a reform
coalition.

Writing to Senator LaFollette on June 25, he

cited the need for a crusade against the root causes of
economic privilege.

"We must," he told the Senator,

"de

prive the privileged class of its present control over
transportation and the great natural resources.

. . .1,38

Shortly thereafter, Pinchot presented the same argument in
the pages of The Freeman.

In a two-part essay, he explained

that the Committee of Forty Eight favored a program that
would end the economic reign of the privileged few and
initiate an era of genuine competition.

He contrasted the

Committee's belief in free enterprise with what he saw as a
Labor party commitment to European style socialism.
As the Forty Eighter and Laborite conventions drew
near, Pinchot remained in the forefront of political
activity.

Arriving in Chicago on July 7, he offered

37See New Majority, June 19, 1920, 4.
38Ibid.. June 26, 1920, 4.
3^Amos Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, June 25, 1920,
Box 41, Pinchot MSS.
40See Amos Pinchot, "The Case For a Third Party," The
Freeman. I, Nos. 16 and 17 (June 30, and July 7, 1920), 36465 and 394-96.

reporters an assessment of the recently closed major party
conventions.

He told the newsmen:

The Democratic convention, like the Republican
convention, was highly satisfactory to the men
and women of America who want a new party. . . .
Mr. Cox, like Mr. Harding . . . was chosen because
he is a mediocre man, who the financial world can
trust. . . .41
A few hours later, Pinchot, accompanied by Record, left for
Madison, Wisconsin, and a round of talks with Senator
LaFollette.42

Tlie two travelers soon returned to Chicago.

On the evening of July 9, Pinchot, Record, and other leaders
of the Committee of Forty Eight met with Labor party repre
sentatives to begin final discussions on the matter of
fusion.4^
For the founders of the Committee, the negotiations
brought unanticipated difficulties.

A night of wrangling

with the Laborites produced no signs of a unity agreement.
On the next morning, the Forty Eighter national convention
opened on a second discordant note.

When informed of the

deadlock in negotiations, rank and file members of the
Committee openly expressed their disappointment.

Delegates

from the Western States complained bitterly about the
predominance of Easterners within the Committee's hierarchy.

41Chicago Daily Tribune. July 8 , 1920, 2.
42LaFollette told his visitors that he would decide
about a third party nomination after ^he committee of Forty
Eight and the Labor party had proved their ability to work
together. See Belle and Fola LaFollette, LaFollette. II,
999-1000. See also New York Times, July 9, 1920, 3.
4 3New York Times, July 10, 1920, 1.
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Lii an effort to quiet the unrest, Committee leadex s quickly
agreed to double the size of the group responsible for talks
with the Laborites.

Ten Western delegates soon joined the

ten Eastern incumbents on the negotiating team.44
The increase in the number of negotiators did nothing
to break the deadlock.

When Forty Eighter and Laborite

conferees met on Saturday night, July 10, they agreed to
recommend fusion to their respective conventions only if
prior accords could be reached on a party name and a common
program.

The subsequent exchange of views produced no such

agreements.

in a move designed to keep the talks alive, the

negotiators finally decided to divide into subgroups on
platform and organizational problems.

Meetings of the two

smaller bodies were set for Monday, July 12.4 ^
Hopes for fusion hinged on the outcome of discussion
in the subgroup on platform.

The meeting, as a result,

attracted its full share of luminaries,

pinchot Eind Record

headed the Forty Eighter delegation, while Labor party
leaders John Fitzpatrick and Robert M. Buck led the rival
Laborite contingent.

Dudley Field Malone and Gilbert E. Roe

attended the session as spokesmen for Senator

44For accounts of the first day of the Forty Eighter
convention, see ibid.. July 11, 1920, 2; and Chicago Sunday
Tribune. July 11, 1920, 1-2.
45J. A. H. Hopkins later summarized the events of the
Saturday night conference in a printed letter sent to members
of the Committee of Forty Eight. See J. A. H. Hopkins,
Facts About the Chicago Convention. Copy in Box 86, Pinchot
MSS.
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LaFollette.4C*

The bargaining got under way shortly after

midnight on July 13, and it continued on well into the
daylight hours.

Despite efforts at compromise, the partici

pants could not resolve their differences.

The meeting

ended without producing an agreement on a common program.47
Failure at the negotiating table spelled disaster for
the founders of the committee of Forty Eight.

Restless rank

and file delegates listened impatiently to the report of
another night spent on fruitless talk.4®
soon flared into open rebellion.

Their discontent

Early in the afternoon on

July 13, Max Hayes of the Labor party appeared before the
Forty Eighter convention.

He assured the unhappy delegates

that they would be welcomed at the Labor ite convention with

46For a complete list of the participants, see
Shapiro, "Hand and Brain," 199, 199n.
47For a detailed account of the meeting, see Gilbert
E. Roe, The Third Party convention. Why Senator LaFollette
Declined the Nomination, undated typescript in Series B,
Box 86, LaFollette Family MSS.
See also the column by
William Hard in Chicago Daily News, July 13, 1920, 4.
4®New York delegate Swinburne Hale expressed the dis
satisfaction felt by many of his colleagues.
in a thinly
veiled attack on Pinchot and Record, Hale told reporters:
America’s people learned during the war that open
covenants of peace cannot be arrived at behind closed
doors. We 48ers have also learned that during 48
hours of turmoil.
I don't imply any dereliction of
duty, but a certain combination of forces has existed
to prevent getting together. . . . Certain persons
from New York and New Jersey haven’t enough faith in
the essential principles of democracy.
Hale specified that his accusation did not apply to j. A. H.
Hopkins. See New York Call, July 14, 1920, 2.
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or without their balky l e a d e r s . T h e
uproar.

invitation created an

A host of Forty Eighter delegates bolted their own

convention and marched on the Labor party's meeting place.
The jubilant Laborites greeted their guests with the strains
of "Hail! Haill The Gang's All Here."^®
In the midst of the tumult, Pinchot and Record con
tinued to argue for their point of view.

Just after the

spontaneous merger of the two conventions, pinchot appeared
before the mixed body of delegates.
he warned his audience:
for a purely labor party.

In an impassioned speech,

"There is no place in this country
. . . Don't make the mistake of

representing any one c l a s s . R e c o r d ,

meanwhile, tried to

rally delegate support for a platform that would be
acceptable to Senator LaFollette.52
The vote on the platform proved to be the decisive
test of strength.

Pinchot and Record made a last-minute

effort to clarify their position,

in a statement co-authored

with journalist Gilson Gardner, they told fellow members of
the committee of Forty Eight:
The negotiations between the platform subcommittee
of your Convention and a similar committee of the Labor
Party have reached a stage where we feel that the

4 9Shapiro,

"Hand and Brain," 201.

500n the bolt and the subsequent march, see New York
Times, July 14, 1920, 1-2; and Chicago Daily Tribune, July
14, 1920, 2.
^ C h i c a g o Daily Tribune, July 14, 1920, 2.
52New York Times. July 15, 1920, 3.

07
members of both conventions, and the public generally,
are entitled to a full and frank statement of the
inside facts.
After prolonged conferences, we are unable to agree.
The underlying cause of the difference is that the
Labor Party representatives think that the new party
should be a class conscious radical party, standing
upon the principles of British Guild socialism
expressed in Trade union language.
We believe that the new party should have a short
definite platform aimed at the destruction of economic
privileges, and the winning back of the historic
political liberties lost during the war.
We offered the substance of our St. Louis platform.
A form of platform drawn by friends of Senator
LaFollette . . . was also presented to the conference
Committee, with the assurance that the Senator would
be willing to accept our joint nomination of this
platform.
We agreed to accept this platform and the Labor
representatives refused flatly to accept them [sic].
Senator LaFollette's friends then informed us that
in their judgment the Senator would not be willing to
become the candidate of the new party.
The situation, therefore, now is this . . . if the
platform submitted by Senator LaFollette's friends is
adopted we can probably have him as our candidate.
If the Labor Party platform is adopted, the Senator
will not run as our candidate, and in our judgment no
other public man having any considerable following can
be induced to take the nomination.
In this event the new Party will enter the field
with a socialist platform, headed by a radical Labor
leader. Such a campaign, in our judgment, would be a
contest between the candidate of the new party and
Eugene Debs, for the negligible socialist vote of the
country.
We are unable to join a new party established upon
such lines.53
The declaration had no discernible impact.

Laborite and

Forty Eighter delegates routinely endorsed the platform

53

See Amos Pinchot, George L. Record, and Gxlson
Gardner, To the Convention of the Committee of Forty Eight,
undated typescript. Box 8 6 , Pinchot MSS. See also ibid.,
July 15, 1920, 3.

9R

plunks introduced by Labor party loaders.5^

Alter the vote.

Record, (Gardner, and Pinchot led a small group of seces
sionists out of the joint convention.55
The walkout caused no major shock waves among the
remaining delegates.55

The conventioneers adopted the name

"Farmer-Labor party" and turned to the selection of a
national ticket.57

The proceedings were disrupted only

momentarily when Robert M. LaFollette, jr., appeared on the
rostrum,

in a brief statement, the younger LaFollette

announced that his father had decided not to accept the
third party's still untendered Presidential nomination.5®
unshaken, the delegates went on to designate Parley Parker
Christensen, a Salt Lake City lawyer, as their choice for
P r e s i d e n t . A l t h o u g h a political unknown, Christensen had
credentials that suited the immediate situation.

He had

been an officer in the Forty Eighter convention, and as an

5<^On the platform vote, see New York Times, July 14,
1920, 1-2; and New Majority. July 24, 1920, 2. For the text
of the platform, see Kirk H. Porter and Donald Bruce Johnson
(comps.), National Party Platforms, 1840-1960 (Urbana:
University of Illinois Press, 1961), 223-27.
~*^New York Times. July 15, 1920, 1.
EC

According to subsequent reports in the FarmerLabor ite newspaper, nine-tenths of the Forty Eighter dele
gates stayed at the convention. See New Majority, July 24,
1920, 1, 2, and 4.
57On adoption of the party name, see New York Times,
July 15, 1920, 1.
58Belle and Fola LaFollette, LaFollette. II, 1007.
59See New York Times, July 15, 1920, 1.
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11 Lorni'y lu-» had shown strong sympathy for the cause oJ:
organi/.eii labor.

Max Hayes, a long time socialist from

Cleveland, joined Christensen on the ticket.®0
The Farmer-Laborites were more than satisfied with
the outcome of their Chicago meeting.

On July 18, Christen

sen publicly condemned Pinchot and other dissident Forty
Fighters as "coupon-clipping intellectuals . . . [who] got
lost in a convention of the plain people."®^

Two days

later, Frank P. Walsh, a lawyer with close ties to the
Farmer-Labor ite hierarchy, quietly praised the work of party
leaders John Fitzpatrick, Robert M. Buck, and Edward Nockels.
In a letter to Nockels, Walsh wrote;
Yourself, good old John, and Buck seem to have got
what you have been driving at for all these months
. . . a real third party movement inside of labor.
. . . Really and seriously, I think that you pulled
off a great thing in Chicago, which never could have
been accomplished . . . except for the clarity of
purpose and persistency of yourself, John and Buck.
Had you not hung on the way you did, the other side
would have swallowed you s u r e l y . 62
Buck soon added his own voice to the congratulatory chorus.
In a widely circulated article, he argued that the FarmerLabor party represented the real interests of ninety per

®°For biographical material on Christensen, see ibid.,
July 16, 1920, 17. For brief sketches of both Christensen
and Hays, see New Maiority, July 24, 1920, 2.
6lNew York

Times. July 19, 1920, 1.

®2Frank P. Walsh to Edward Nockels, July 20, 1920,
Box 35, Frank P. Walsh Papers, Manuscript Division, New York
Public Library, New York, New York.
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cent of the American p e o p l e . ^
Pinchot, on the other hand, looked back on the
happenings in Chicago with dismay.

Upon his return to New

York, he told reporters that the Committee of Forty Eight
had been "infiltrated by a lot of honest, well meaning
mushheads.

. . .

In a subsequent essay for The Freeman,

Pinchot explained the differences in economic philosophy
that kept the founders of the Committee of Forty Eight out
of the Farmer-Labor party.

The original Forty Eighters, he

contended, had favored a program of limited nationalization
in order to foster equality of opportunity among industrial
competitors.

On the opposite side, the Farmer-Laborites,

according to Pinchot, wanted to institute full-fledged
socialism in the United States.

g3see Robert M. Buck, "The Farmer-Labor Party,"
Nation. CXI, No. 2875 (Aug. 7, 1920), 156.
In the 1920 Presidential election, the FarmerLaborites finished a distant fourth behind the Republicans,
Democrats, and Socialists. Christensen's 265,229 votes
compared poorly with the 915,490 ballots cast for Socialist
candidate Eugene Victor Debs. See Richard M. Scammon (comp.),
America at the Polls: A Handbook of American Presidential
Election Statistics. 1920-1964 (Pittsburgh* university of
Pittsburgh Press, 1965), 2; hereinafter cited as Scammon,
America at the Polls.
64A copy of Pinchot's statement to the press, dated
July 16, 1920, appears in Series B, Box 180, LaFollette
Family MSS.
65See Amos Pinchot, "Government By Evasion," The
Freeman, I, No. 23 (Aug. 18, 1920), 539-41.
Gilson Gardner used another means to argue the merits
of competitive capitalism. After the Chicago battle, he
published in book form a new version of the adventures of
Daniel Defoe's hero Robinson Crusoe. With obvious didactic
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After the debacle in Chicago, Pinchot and oLher
charter members of the committee of Forty Eight tried to
regroup.

In August, 1920, the Forty Eighter Executive

Committee authorized a revision of the once sacroscant St.
Louis platform.6®

Record, in particular, wanted a new

statement that would cleanse the committee of any socialist
t i n g e . Y e t the task of revision proved to be too
difficult.

Weeks dragged by without any sign of an agree-

ment on a new platform.
The lack of a consensus within the Committee
ultimately led Pinchot and Record to break with the organi-

intent, Gardner traced Crusoe's rise from castaway, to
entrepreneur, to robber baron. The benefits of competition
and the dangers of economic concentration are pointed out
repeatedly throughout the book. See Gilson Gardner, A New
Robinson Crusoe : A New Version of His Life and Adventures
With an Explanatory Note (New York: Harcourt. Brace, and
Howe, 1920), passim.
Both Pinchot and Record greeted Gardner's slim volume
enthusiastically. Pinchot termed it "a perfect corker!" In
a letter to Pinchot, Record noted that Gardner had "very
cleverly set up our philosophy." See Amos Pinchot to Gilson
Gardner, Aug. 13, 1920, Box 41, Pinchot MSS? and George L.
Record to Amos Pinchot, Aug. 25, 1920, Box 40, Pinchot MSG.
For an insightful discussion of the economic argu
ments in the original Robinson Crusoe story, see Maximillian
E. Novak, Economics and the Fiction of Daniel Defoe (Berke
ley: University of California press, 1962), 1-66.
®®George L. Record to Amos Pinchot, Aug. 27, 1920,
Box 40, Pinchot MSS.
67See George L. Record to Amos Pinchot, Gilson
Gardner, Frank Pattison, Frank Stephens, j. A. H. Hopkins,
Allen McCurdy, and A. R. Ricker, Sept. 7, 1920, ibid.
68For complaints about the delay, see J. A. H. Hop
kins to Amos Pinchot, Sept. 24, 1920; and J. A. H. Hopkins
to Amos Pinchot, Oct. 19, 1920, both in ibid.
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zaLion.

On November 26, 1920, Pinchot submitted his formal

resignation from the group.^9

in a separate personal letter

to j. A. H. Hopkins, the New Yorker tried to justify his
action.

The majority of the Executive Committee, he argued,

no longer shared the principles that he and Record believed
should be paramount.

Most of the committeemen, he added,

had "neither the brains nor the capacity" to participate in
the kind of political and economic movement that he and
Record wanted to build.^0

Shortly thereafter, Record also

resigned from the Committee.^
in leaving the Committee, Pinchot remained loyal to
his own narrow political purposes.

From the start., he saw

the Committee as a vehicle for the advancement of the ideas
that he held in common with Record.

When the organization

incorporated those views into its St. Louis platform,
Pinchot responded enthusiastically.

In published articles

and in private correspondence, he insisted that the St. Louis
program offered the only feasible basis for a third party
coalition.

When a reform minded party was built on a dif

ferent foundation, Pinchot refused to join the movement.

He

condemned the Farmer-Laborites as socialistic enemies of

^ A m o s Pinchot to J. A. H. Hopkins, Nov. 26, 1920,
ibid.
^ A m o s pinchot to J. A. H. Hopkins, Nov. 26, 1920,
ibid.
See J. A. H. Hopkins to George L. Record, Nov. 20,
1920; and George L. Record to J. A. H. Hopkins, Dec. 2,
1920, both in ibid.

free enterprise.

Subsequently, Pinchot even questioned the

ideological soundness of the founding members of the Com
mittee of Forty Eight.

He broke with the Committee when it

became apparent to him that many of the members did not
subscribe to the politico-economic ideals that he and George
Record embraced.

Pinchot had no use for an organization

that did not share his unbending commitment to atomistic
competitive capitalism.

Chapter 6
KEEPING THE FAITH
After leaving the Committee of Forty Eight, Amos
Pinchot continued to cling to his political and economic
views.

He remained convinced that big business controlled

American industry and politics.

Periodically, he spoke out

against the power of the financial elite.

His intermittent

activities testified to the durability of his ideological
commitment.
George Record helped Pinchot stay alert to political
developments,

in March, 1922, Record announced his inten

tion to seek the Republican nomination for United States
Senator in New Jersey .^

During the summer months, he waged

a vigorous campaign in the G.O.P. primary.
statements had a familiar ring.

His platform

He castigated the trusts

and offered economic competition as the surest solution to
America's industrial problems.

As the first steps toward

equalizing the competitive race, he advocated government

^See Barr, "Record," 103-104.
O
Record used a large tent in order to conduct an
outdoor, evangelical style campaign. See Amos Pinchot to
fliram W. Johnson, Aug. 2, 1922, Box 78, Pinchot Mf'*S.
104

105
ownership of railroads and natural resources.

O

Pinchot took an active part in the primary campaign.
He urged Senator LaFollette and other friends to endorse
Record’s cause.^

in public, he served the Jerseyman as a

stump speaker and pamphleteer.6
to the campaign war chest.6

He also contributed heavily

The expenditure of time, energy,

and money brought meager results.

Record finished a distant

second at the polls.^
Undaunted, Pinchot and Record soon embarked on
another project.

Along with Oswald Garrison Villard, editor

of Nation, they drew up plans for a discussion group that
would meet regularly at Pinchot's house and exchange ideas
about reform.

The ultimate goal, according to Pinchot, was

R o r Record's arguments in pamphlet form, see George
L. Record, Break Up the Senate Millionaires * Club. Copy in
Box 77, ibi(H
^Amos Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, April 4, 1922;
Amos Pinchot to Frederic C. Howe, May 29, 1922; and Amos
Pinchot to Charles R. crane, June 10, 1922, all in Box 43,
ibid.
60n Pinchot's efforts as an orator, see the typed
reports of campaign speeches in Box 79, ibid. For two
samples of his work as a pamphleteer, see Amos Pinchot,
George Record:
1Servant of the People'? and Amos Pinchot,
The Man Who could Not Be Bought. Copies of both pamphlets
appear in Box 82, ibid.
6with a gift of four thousand dollars, Pinchot was a
major contributor to the campaign fund. For a report on
Record's financial backers, see Hudson Observer. Sept. 25,
1922. Clipping in Box 78, ibid.
Republican incumbent Joseph S. Frelinghuysen
received 191,903 votes to 93,693 for Record. See Barr,
"Record," 107.
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general agreement on a platform that could be offered Lo the
public.®

Early in 1923, Pinchot's secretary informed Record

that "the liberal group" would meet for the first time on
g
January 8.
From its start, the discussion group included talented
and well-connected individuals.

Pinchot, Record, and Villard

attended the sessions with strict regularity.

United States

Senator-elect Royal S. Copeland of New York also appeared
for most of the meetings.

Other regulars included

journalists Charles Merz, Gilson Gardner, Robert W. Brufere,
and Charles W. Ervin.’1'®
Talk within the circle centered on government owner
ship of railroads.

Proposals to nationalize the rail

network dominated conversation on the evening of January
25.11

Five days later, Pinchot argued for a return to the

system oi government operated railroads used during World
War I.

12

At a subsequent meeting, the group debated the

feasibility of calling a national conference on

®Amos Pinchot to P. H. Callahan, Dec. 23, 1922,
Box 43, Pinchot MSS.
^Eleanor Lash to George L. Record, Jan. 3, 1923,
Box 45, ibid.
list of the participants usually appears in the
minutes of each group meeting. For copies of the minutes
of several meetings held between Jan. 25, and May 21, 1923,
see Box 148, ibid.
^Discussion group minutes, Jan. 25, 1923, ibid.
^Discussion group minutes, Jan. 30, 1923, ibid.
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transportation problems.
The loquacious reformers were quick to seek the
company of established political figures,

in February,

1923, Villard invited United States Senators William E.
Borah of Idaho and Smith W. Brookhart of Iowa to a dinner
meeting of the discussion

g

r

o

u

p

.

On the night of March 9,

Borah and Brookhart joined the regular members for a
colloquy on government ownership of railroads.
Pinchot found the views expressed by the two Senators
entirely too conservative.

Reporting to a friend, he wrote

sarcastically:
We had a marvelous dinner . . . at which we enter
tained Senators Brookhart and Borah, and found to
our vast astonishment, that these statesmen (if that
is the right term) were not quite ready to throw
down the gauntlet to privilege, sound a clear clarion
note in favor of government ownership and rish [sic]
all on the issue. We discovered, to our amazement,
that they considered the issue premature . . . and
toward midnight these tribunes of the people left us
with the comforting assurance that they were ready to
fight to preserve the union, and were heartily in
favor of all things in the public interest, especially
their own candidacy fsicl for the presidency of the
United States, if Providence should stack the cards
that way.
From the encounter, Pinchot concluded that the discussion

13

Discussion group minutes, Feb. 21, 1923, ibid.

^ S e e Oswald Garrison Villard to William E. Borah,
Feb. 23, 1923, Folder 304, Oswald Garrison Villard papers,
Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massa
chusetts; and Oswald Garrison Villard to Smith w. BrooKhorl..
Feb. 23, 1923, Folder 376, Villard MSS.
l5Discussion group minutes, March 9, 1923, Box 14u,
Pinchot MSS.
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group could not look to men in office for decisive leader
ship. -*-6
The New Yorker and his friends soom formulated an
alternative course of political action.

At meetings in late

April and early May, 1923, they discussed sponsoring a
national conference on government ownership of railroads.
By May 14, a list of potential signers for a conference call
l8
had been drawn up. °

Members of the discussion group agreed

that a conclave on railroads, if properly publicized, would
"be an event of national importance.

During the summer

months, Charles Ervin and a small staff worked on arrange
ments for a gathering tentatively set for Chicago, November
21- 22.20
As the conference date neared, Pinchot spoke out in
support of government ownership of railroads.

On September

11, he told members of the Public Ownership League of

■^Amos Pinchot to P. H. Callahan, April 10, 1923,
Box 45, ibid.
17Discussion group minutes, April 23, 1923; and May 4,
1923, both in Box 148, ibid.
l®Discussion group minutes. May 14, 1923, ibid.
19Discussion group minutes. May 21, 1923, ibid.
20Pinchot spent the summer on vacation in Hawaii, but
he donated office space and secretarial help to the effort
to organize the conference.
See Amos Pinchot to Grenville
S. McFarland, June 8 , 1923, Box 45, ibid. On arrangements
for the conference, see Amos Pinchot to William Allen White,
June 16, 1923, Box 45, ibid.; Charles W. Ervin to Gilson
Gardner, July 18, 1923; Box 44, ibid.; and Oswald Garrison
Villard to Smith W. Brookhart, Aug. 30, 1923, Folder 376,
Villard MSS.
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America that nationalization of the rail system would help
equalize entrepreneurial opportunities in the United
States.2^

Three weeks later, he delivered a similar message

to the Civic club of Utica, New York.22

with help from

Villard, Pinchot was soon able to reach a far larger
audience.

Beginning on October 17, in the pages of Nation,

he published a three-part plea for government ownership of
rail facilities.23
Despite Pinchot's spadework, the Chicago conference
failed to materialize.

On October 11, the New Yorker

reminded a friend of the upcoming meeting.2^

Less than a

fortnight later, he told the same acquaintance that the
meeting had been rescheduled for January, 1924.23
proved to be of no avail.
dejectedly:

The delay

On January 17, Pinchot wrote

"We have put off our conference.

The general

concensus [sic] of opinion among the group around New York

21

For the text of the speech in typescript, see
Address by Amos pinchot to Public Ownership Conference,
Toronto, September 1 1 , 1923. Box 152, Pinchot MSS.
22See the typescript dated Oct. 4, 1923, in ibid.
23Amos Pinchot, "Railroads and the Mechanics of
Social Power," Nation, CXVII, Nos. 3041, 3042, and 3043
(Oct. 17, Oct. 24, and Oct. 31, 1923), 429-31, 458-60,
and 488-90.
2^Amos pinchot to carl D. Thompson, Oct. 11, 1923,
Box 44, Pinchot MSS.
23Amos Pinchot to Carl D. Thompson, Oct. 22, 1923,
ibid.
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is that nothing can be done at this t.ime."2^
Although disappointed, Pinchot continued to argue
publicly for his point of view.

in February, 1924, he

published another essay on government ownership of railroads.
With an air of confidence, he told readers of Forum that
nationalization of the rail network was imminent.

He went

on to explain:
The reason is that short of government ownership,
no way has been or can be found of preventing our
great industro-financial interests from using the
railroad system as an effective weapon with which
to destroy free competitive industry. . . .
Pinchot closed with a prediction that the railroad issue
would soon be the dominant question in American politics. 27
The Presidential race in 1924 gave Pinchot new
opportunities for political involvement.

Writing to Senator

LaFollette on June 28, he lauded the aging reformer's
decision to seek the Presidency on an independent ticket.^8
He urged LaFollette to show the voters "how we can take the
power-giving things away from plutocracy and restore power

26Amos Pinchot to Edwin J. Gross, Jan. 17, 1924,
Box 47, ibid.
^7For the quotation, see Amos Pinchot, "A Square Deal
For the Public," Forum. LXXI, No. 2 (Feb., 1924), 202-203.
2®For background material on LaFollette's presiden
tial bid, see Belle and Fola LaFollette, LaFollette. II,
1088-1114; Kenneth Campbell McKay, The Progressive Movement
of 1924 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), 9-109;
and James Henry Shideler, "The Neo-Progressives: Reform
Politics in the United States, 1920-1925" (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation. University of California, Berkeley, 1945),
passim.
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to tlio public.

. . .

oQ

As his own contribution to popular

political awareness, Pinchot authored still another set of
articles on government ownership of railroads.3®
20, he publicly endorsed LaFollette for President.

on July
qi

Many veterans of the prewar reform movement did not
share Pinchot's enthusiasm for LaFollette.32

in August,

1924, Raymond Robins, a onetime Progressive party stalwart,
initiated an anti-LaFollette drive among his former Bull
Moose colleagues.33

Edwin A. Van Valkenburg, publisher of

the Philadelphia North American, and Chester H. Rowell, a
California journalist, joined Robins in the effort..3^

The

2®Amos Pinchot to Robert M. LaFollette, June 28, 1924,
Box 46, Pinchot MSS.
^ S e e Amos Pinchot, "The Railroads: A People's
Problem," Railway Clerk. XXXIII, No. 7 (July, 1924), 245and Amos pinchot, "The Real Issue," Railway Clerk. XXXIII,
No. 9 (Sept., 1924), 326-27, 343..
*3 1

J Pinchot and a host of other reform minded New
Yorkers signed a telegram in support of LaFollette1s
candidacy. See Belle and Fola LaFollette, LaFollette. II,
1116-17, and 1224n-25n.
32For an overview of the activities of 1912 Progres
sives in the 1924 Presidential campaign, see Alan R. Havig,
"A Disputed Legacy: Roosevelt Progressives and the
LaFollette Campaign of 1924," Mid-America. LIII, No. 1
(Jan., 1971), 44-64.
33Raymond Robins to Edwin A. Van Valkenburg, Aug. 7,
1924, Folder 252, Edwin A. Van Valkenburg Papers, Houghton
Library, Harvard university, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
3^Like Robins, both Van Valkenburg and Rowell had
supported Theodore Roosevelt in 1912. With reference to the
two newspapermen and the anti-LaFollette drive, see Edwin A.
Van Valkenburg to Raymond Robins, Aug. 11, 1924, Folder 432,
ibid. and Raymond Robins to Edwin A. Van Valkenburg, Aug. 24,
1924, Folder 252, ibid.
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imik«nt attacking l.aKolli !to

signed by forty-eight former member:; of the Progressive
party.

The partisan declaration appeared in the press on

September 15.33
Pinchot atruck back at the anti-LaFollette contingent.
In an open letter to LaFollette's running mate, United States
Senator Burton K. Wheeler of Montana, he declared:
Only a small minority of the signers of this shabby
letter were on the firing line of the old Progressive
movement. Most of them came in after Roosevelt was
no longer active and the party had fallen under the
influence of George W. Perkins and become a sort of
asylum for well meaning . . . men and women who had
vague righteous aspirations for which they wanted a
label that would make them feel Progressive but not
get them in wrong at the bank.
Pinchot concluded that the declaration's signers had now
decided "to make peace with plutocracy and live comfortably
in its protecting shadow."36
Edwin A. Van Valkenburg replied to Pinchot in kind.
In an editorial for the North American, he attacked Pinchot
as "an amateur Socialist and radical agitator . . .

a follower

of the teachings of Marx and Lenine and Debs and LaFol
lette."

He warned his readers that Pinchot subscribed to

an economic and political philosophy that would destroy

JNew York Times, Sept. 15, 1924, 3.
36Amos Pinchot to Burton K. Wheeler, Sept. 27, i >24,
Box 79, pinchot MSS. See also ibid., Sept. 30, 1924, 2.
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capitalism, marriage, the family, and Christianity.-*7
Pinchot vehemently denied Van Valkenburg's charges.
In an open letter to the publisher, he asserted:
As to your statements about my believing in socialism,
my alleged desire to destroy . . . the capitalistic
system, marriage, the family and the Christian church—
these are the kind of things that your intelligence,
if not your conscience, should prevent you from putting
in type. For over ten years, I have constantly spoken
against socialism, whose [sic] basic doctrine— the
abolition of competitive effort in industry— I dis
believe in, disbelieve in as thoroughly as I believe
in maintaining the capitalistic system. . . .
Continuing his rebuttal, Pinchot argued that the reforms he
IQ
favored would stimulate competitive free enterprise.
Along with letter writing, Pinchot found time for
other campaign activities.

In September, 1924, George

Record entered the United States Senate race in New Jersey
as an independent candidate.^

pinchot subsequently stumped

the Garden State on behalf of Record and LaFolleLt e

lie

also joined Record and forty other former Bull Moose
partisans in an open declaration of support for l.aFollette.^*"

Neither of Pinchot's favorites fared well with the

37gee the editorial "A Pink Poses as a Progressive,"
(Philadelphia) North American, Oct. 10, 1924, 10.
38Amos Pinchot to Edwin A. Van Valkenburg, Oct. 25,
1924, Box 46, Pinchot MSS.
39New York Times, Sept. 22, 1924, 2.
4°see Amos pinchot to Arthur Garfield Hays, Oct. 4,
1924; and Gilbert E. Roe to Amos Pinchot, Oct. 22, 1924,
both in Box 46, Pinchot MSS. See also Amos Pinchot to
Gilson Gardner, Oct. 10, 1924, Box 79, Pinchot MSS.
^*New York Times, Oct. 24, 1924, 3.
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voters.

LaFollette finished a poor third in the nationwide

race, and Record did no better in New Jersey.4^
Pinchot blamed LaFollette for the disaster at the
polls.

In a post-election appraisal, he contended that the

Senator had failed to advance a clear and concise program of
economic reform.

Like Theodore Roosevelt in 1912, LaFol

lette, according to Pinchot, had offered the voters too many
vague generalities.43

jn a second assessment, the New

Yorker claimed that reformers would now have to renounce
expediency and begin serious study of "the American problem.
..."

As for the LaFollette movement, he pronounced it

smashed to pieces "on the rock of political ambition and
selfishness.

. . .1,44

Pinchot, after a lengthy respite, focused on his own
notion of "the American problem."

By June 1926, he was

collecting information on past ties between big business and
national politics in the United States.45

From his material,

Pinchot planned to write two books about recent American

42

For the Presidential vote, see Scammon, America at
the Polls, 4. For the Senate returns in New Jersey, see
Trenton Evening Times. Nov. 7, 1924, 1.
43Amos Pinchot to Gilson Gardner, Nov. 26, 1924, Box
46, Pinchot MSS.
44Amos Pinchot to Mrs. Laurence Todd, Jan. 13, 1925,
Box 48, ibid.
45See Amos Pinchot to Harry A. Slattery, June 3,
1926; Harry A. Slattery to Amos Pinchot, June 22, 1926; and
Amos Pinchot to Gilson Gardner, June 22, 1926, all in Box
49, ibid.
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first, work, he .inti-uded to survey the

influence of the business elite on politics since tlu*
administration of President William McKinley.

The second

volume would recount the history of the Progressive party
and discuss the ties between Theodore Roosevelt and George
W. Perkins.

Pinchot never managed to complete either book.

Still, he spent long hours with the projects, and the tasks
of research and writing kept his attention riveted on th<i
political machinations of the business community.
Meanwhile, George Record supplied Pinchot with an
opportunity for a foray into journalism. In September, 1926,
Record arranged for the publication of a daily column in the*
Hudson Dispatch, a county newspaper that circulated through
out northern New jersey.

Prom the start, the aging reformer

planned to share the workload with other writers who would
contribute on a rotating basis.47
become one of the columnists.48

pinchot readily agreed tc
James G. Blauvelt and

Herman B. Walker, two other long time Record associates,
also volunteered for

version
party.
torical
Hooker,

d u t y . 49

A fifth place went to Everett

^®ln 1958, Helene Maxwell Hooker published an edited
of Pinchot's manuscript history of the Progressive
For an insightful commentary on Pinchot's two his
projects and their ultimate fate, see Helene Maxwell
"Editorial Note," in Pinchot, History. 3-6.

47The newspaper was published daily except Sundays.
On Record's plans for the column, see George L. Record to
Amos Pinchot, Sept. 13, 1926, Box 49, Pinchot MSS.
AQ

Amos Pinchot to George L . Record, Sept. 30, 1926, ibid.

49For biographical material on Blauvelt and Walker,
respectively, see New York Times, May 11, 1946, 27; and New
York Times. Jan. ITT, 195$, 3^. On their ties with Recorct,
see Barr, "Record," 70.
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Colby, once the leader of Progressive party forces in New
j e r s e y . H e n r y T. Hunt, formerly the Mayor of Cincinnati
and more recently a New York attorney, rounded out the list
of regular contributors.51
Pinchot filled the column with his standard arguments.
He railed against the political and economic hegemony of big
business.52

The main task before reformers, he contended,

was to take away "the special unfair advantages" that gave
"the monopoly group its power."53

jn specific terms, he

called for government ownership of railroads and natural
resources as steps toward equalization of commercial
opportunities.54
Pinchot also attacked the financial elite xn his
comments on foreign policy.

After Everett Colby had

endorsed American participation in the League of Nations and
the World court, Pinchot spoke out against membership in

500n Colby's career, see New York Times, June 20,
1943, 35.
5:1For background material on Hunt, see Zane L.
Miller, Boss C o x 's Cincinnati; urban Politics in the
Progressive Era (New York: Oxford university Press, 1968),
213-38; and Who's Who in America, 1923-1924 (Chicago; A. N.
Marquis, 1923), 1676.
5^Hudson Dispatch, Nov. 6, 1926, 6; and Hudson
Dispatch. Nov. 16, 1926, 6.
53ibid., Nov. 26, 1926, 6.
54ibid., Dec. 4, 1926, 6; ibid., Dec. 11,
and ibid., Dec. 18, 1926, 6.

L926, 6 ;
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either body.-0

He reminded readers that any American

delegate to the multinational forums would be chosen by a
"Harding closeted with a Daugherty or a Fall . . .

or by

Galvin Coolidge with the advice and consent of J. P. Morgan
& Co. . . ."

Pinchot's objections went beyond the problem

of selecting a spokesman for the United States.

He argued

that "Leagues and Courts," located in foreign capitals and
closed to public view, were "likely to tighten the hold of
plutocracy on international affairs. . . . 1,58
Differences over domestic issues caused an even wider
rift among the columnists.

The trouble began when Henry

Hunt authored a series of columns in which he praised
organized labor and questioned the wisdom of unfettered
economic competition.5?

Both Pinchot and Record deplored

the tenor of Hunt's remarks.

in private, they concluded

that he had become a s o c i a l i s t . R e c o r d ,

in an cittempt to

combat the ideological contagion, published three successive
installments on the fallacies of socialism.^8

Hunt argued

55For Colby's recommendations, see ibid., Oct. 21,
1926, 6,* and ibid., Oct. 28, 1926, 6.
56Ibid., Oct. 30, 1926, 6.
57Ibid., Oct. 19, 1926, 6; ibid.. Oct. 27, 1926, 6;
ibid., Nov. 2, 1926, 6; ibid., Nov. 9, 1926, 6; and ibid.,
Nov. 23, 1926, 6.
^8George L. Record to Amos Pinchot, Nov. 27, 1926;
and Amos Pinchot to George l . Record, Nov. 30, 1926, both
in Box 49, Pinchot MSS.
^ H u d s o n Dispatch. Nov. 29, 1926, 6; Hudson Dispatch.
Dec. 6, 1926, 6; and Hudson Dispatch. Dec. 13, 1926, 6.
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in n Ini Ila I, but: the debate died prematurely.
1927,

r rt

In January,

a new editor took charge of the Hudson Dispatch, and

the rotating column came to an abrupt end.®'*'
With the collapse of the newspaper venture, Pinchot
turned to more leisurely pursuits.
reform minded

p o l i t i c i a n s .

62

He met occasionally with

por the most part, however, he

developed his ideas in unpublished writings.

During the

summer of 1927, his manuscript output included a paean to
the wisdom of William Graham Sumner.

He argued that the

Yale sociologist had understood the vital need for competitive struggle within society.
Pinchot returned to active politics in 192fi.

In the

Presidential race for that year, he favored Alfred E. Smith,
the Democratic nominee, over Herbert Hoover, the Republican
standard-bearer.

On October 4, Pinchot explained his

preference in an open letter to John J. Raskob, Chairman of
the Democratic National Committee.

He told Raskob that

Smith had candidly faced the issues of the campaign while
Hoover had equivocated.

In the same letter, Pinchot attacked

6®For Hunt's arguments, see ibid.* Dec. 7, 1926, 6?
and ibid., Dec. 14, 1926, 6.
61Ibid., Jan. 8, 1927, 1; and George L. Record to
Amos Pinchot, Jan. 13, 1926 [sic]. Box 49, Pinchot MSS.
®2See Robert F. Wagner to George L. Record. May 5,
1927; and Amos Pinchot to George L. Record, July 3, 1927,
both in Box 50, Pinchot MSS.
® 2See Amos Pinchot, What Sumner Saw, typescript dated
July 22, 1927, Box 213, ibid.
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Hoover as .1 lackey of big business in general and tho public
ul.i.1 itics trust in particular.

f.A

Hoover's subsequent election victory left Pinchot in
a truculent mood.

He lashed out at the President-elect even

before 1928 came to an end.

In an article for Nation, he

predicted that Hoover would soon scuttle the Sherman AntiTrust Act.

The power of monopolies, he added, would then

grow to new heights "beneath the warming rays of Presi
dential approval.

..."

in closing, Pinchot looked four

years hence and saw Hoover being re-elected by "a nation
gone serenely Babbitt.
Pinchot continued to goad Hoover after the onset of
the Great Depression.

In April, 1930, Pinchot was part of a

delegation that went to the White House in order to confer
with the President about rising unemployment.

Hoover,

according to the New Yorker-; treated his visitors imperiously
and informed them that the job crisis had nearly passed.**®
In an article almost a year later, Pinchot recalled the
meeting and asked tauntingly;

"Has the magic of the Great

Engineer lost some of its power and cunning?

Or are

®4Amos Pinchot to John J. Raskob, Oct. 4, 1928, Box
51, ibid. Pinchot contributed a thousand dollars to help
circulate his letter to Raskob in pamphlet form. See Amos
Pinchot to Frederic C. Howe, Oct. 10, 1928, Box 51, ibid.
See Amos Pinchot, "Hoover and the 'Big L i f t , 1"
Nation. CXXVII, No. 3312 (Dec. 26, 1926), 706-708.
S^Amos pinchot to G. B. Parker, Nov. 25, 1930, Box
52, Pinchot MSS.
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'»,000,000 iin‘ft and women looking for work . . . but another
illusion ol tho untrained lay mind?"^?

in a subsequent

essay, Pinchot branded the Chief Executive as a tool of the
public utilities trust,®®

Early in 1932, he publicly

censured the President and both major parties for subser
vience to America's business elite.
Ultimately, Pinchot went beyond the bounds of
journalism in his condemnation of the Hoover government.
During the summer of 1932, a ragged army of unemployed World
War I veterans assembled in Washington.

The ex-soldiers

hoped to encourage early payment of a cash bonus due most of
them in 1945.

The presence of the unkempt lobbyists unnerved

Hoover, and he called in the armed forces,

in July, 1932,

Federal troops routed the Bonus Army from its encampment
along Washington's Anacostia River.78

Pinchot turned play

wright in order to express his disdain for the President's
use of military might.

In General Goober at the Battle of

Anacostia. a mordant satire in two acts, he pictured the
President as a blustering incompetent who swaggered about

®7Amos pinchot, "We Met Mr. Hoover," Nation. CXXXII,
No. 3419 (Jan. 14, 1931), 44.
68Amos Pinchot, "Hoover and Power," Nation. CXXXIII,
Nos. 3448 and 3449 (Aug. 5, and Aug. 12, 1931), 125-28, and
151-53.
Amos pinchot, "captain Hoover: Afloat in a Sieve,"
Nation, CXXXIV, No. 3481 (March 23, 1932), 336-38.
70

See Roger Daniels, The Bonus March: An Episode of
the Great Depression (Westport: Greenwood Publishing com
pany, 1971), 3-210.
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Lh<* Executive Mansion with saber in hand.

Secretary of

State "Blimson," Secretary of War "Whirely," and other
"cabinet officers" helped make up the rest of the seriocomic
cast.71
Pinchot's effort as a playwright typified the diver
sity of his political involvements in the years after 1920.
Over the long travail, he assumed a variety of political
roles.

As a writer, organizer, and campaigner, he stayed

active in politics.

At the same time, his economic and

political beliefs remained unchanged.

In public pronounce

ments, he inveighed against big business and urged reforms
intended to promote competitive free enterprise.

Pinchot

preached the gospel of atomistic capitalism at the cost of
his own political isolation.

His arguments were increasingly

remote from the realities of politics and economics in
America.

71Amos Pinchot, General Goober at the Battle of
Anacostia. Printed copy in Box 130, Pinchot MSS.

Chapter 7
THE LAST DECADE
For Amos Pinchot, American politics from 1932 onward
revolved around Franklin D. Roosevelt.

Pinchot welcomed the

elevation of his fellow New Yorker to the White House, and
he hailed the early steps in the New Deal.
to distrust the President.

Yet he soon grew

He became convinced that Roose

velt and the New Dealers wanted to make drastic changes in
American institutions,

ultimately, Pinchot emerged as a

virulent critic of the Chief Executive.
In 1932, Pinchot eagerly supported Roosevelt's drive
for the Presidency.

During the campaign season, he sent

letters of advice and encouragement to the New York
Governor.^

On election night, he sat with Roosevelt while

news of victory poured in from across the country.^

Shortly

Amos pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Aug. 11,
1932; and Amos pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Nov. 5,
1932, both in Box 53, Pinchot MSS.
N e a r l y eight years later, Pinchot recalled the elec
tion night celebration. Writing to Senator Hiram Johnson in
October, 1940, he said:
As you know there was a time when I believed in
Franklin Roosevelt.
I was with him on the evening
of his first election. And as he sat with the
telephone receiver in his right hand, he was kind
122
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i.hcifaftcr, P.inahot reaffirmed hits luitli in the Pii-s j.don I.eloct.

In a speech delivered on November 13, lie praised

Roosevelt as a reform leader who could steer the United
States between the extremes of socialism and fascism.^
Pinchot knew the exact direction in which he wanted
the new administration to move,

in January, 1933, he out

lined a reform program for an audience at Forest Hills, New
York.

He recommended government ownership of railroads and

natural resources as steps toward the revitalization of
capitalism.

He also endorsed controlled inflatioi as a

stimulant for free enterprise.4
Despite his preconceptions, Pinchot reacted favorably
to the improvisations of the early New Deal.
after Roosevelt's inaugural, he exclaimed:

Just two weeks
"...

its a

wonderful and encouraging thing to see how the country
responds to a brave and honest spirit in the Whitt House."
The rapid acceleration of governmental activity caused

enough to put his left arm around me and say:
'Pinchot, we're going to have a truly liberal
administration.'
Pinchot supplied the emphasis. See Amos Pinchot to Hiram W.
Johnson, Oct. 2, 1940, Box 68, ibid.
3
A printed copy of the speech appears in Box 175,
ibid. For the same text in article form, see Amos Pinchot,
"The American Liberal and His program," Churchman, CXLVII,
No. 10 (April, 1933), 14-15.
4See Amos Pinchot, For Positive Policies, typescript
dated Jan., 1933, in Box 233, Pinchot MSS.
5Amos Pinchot to William P. Eno, March 18, 1933,
Box 5, ibid.
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Pinchot few qualms.

Writing to Allen McCurdy on May 6, he

lauded the "wartime . . . form of government" adopted by the
New Dealers.

At the same time, he described Roosevelt's

"spiritual and mental energy" as "astounding and wholly
admirable."8
personal tragedy soon interrupted Pinchot's celebra
tion of the New Deal.

In August, 1933, George Record

suffered a cerebral hemorrhage.

At first, the venerable

reformer appeared to be capable of a recovery.

7

ny August

27, he was well enough to warn Pinchot that "the loosevelt
experiment" amounted to "pure socialism."8

Yet the signs of

improvement in the Jerseyman's condition proved to be
deceptive.

On September 27, he died at the age of seventy-

four.9
Following Record's death, Pinchot eulogized his old
friend.

In an article for the New Republic, he compared

Record favorably to William Graham Sumner.

Both the

reformer and the sociologist, he contended, had believed
wholeheartedly in individualism.

He went on to praise Record

as a tireless opponent of plutocracy and socialism.

With

reference to his long time colleague, Pinchot concluded:

^Amos Pinchot to Allen McCurdy, May 6, 1933, Box 54,
ibid.
7For a report on Record's illness and his chances for
recovery, see New York Times. Aug. 13, 1933, II, 4.
sGeorge L. Record to Amos Pinchot, Aug. 27, 1933,
Box 54, Pinchot MSS.
%tew York Times. Sept. 28, 1933, 24.
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"Hi; was a devoted friend, and I think the only great man I
have known."1®
The death of his comrade resharpened Pinchct's
ideological consciousness.

When the New Yorker returned to

the political arena, he saw the Roosevelt administration in
a critical light that contrasted vividly with his earlier
optimism.

On October 11, he complained about the potential

for dictatorship that he perceived in the New DeaJ's National
Recovery Administration.11

Less than two weeks later, he

remarked that Roosevelt seemed to be floundering in a
1o
manner reminiscent of Hoover.
Still, Pinchot showed no
immediate inclination to desert the President.
1933, he declared:

In November,

"My personal opinion of the Roosevelt

administration is that it is trying to make . . . reforms
that are absolutely necessary to the continuance of
capitalism.1,13
Pinchot fully expected the capitalist system to
rescue the United States from the Great Depression.

In

January, 1934, he sketched a reform agenda that included
nationalization of banks, natural resources, and public

10Pinchot,

"Record," 329-31.

•^Amos Pinchot to Charles W. Ervin, Oct. 11, 1933,
Box 54, Pinchot MSS.
•^Amos Pinchot to Ernest Gruening, Oct. 23, 1933,
ibid.
13Amos Pinchot to Dr. Lewis Frissell, Nov. 23, 1933,
ibid.
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nt i.l.iL i o n . P r e d ictably, he saw government ownership as a
way to stimulate competitive enterprise.
wrote with reference to the rail network:
old breed of individualists.

On April 11, ho
"I am one of the

I don't want to see the rail

roads taken over as a step to socialism, but as a means of
keeping equal opportunity, Billy Sumner1s 'equal chance'
alive.1,15
Short of a program of limited nationalization,
Pinchot looked to monetary inflation as a stimulart for the
somnolent economy.

In June, 1934, he urged President Roose-

velt to adopt clear-cut inflationary measures.

When no

answer came from the White House, Pinchot tried a different
tack.

On August 8, he sent an open letter to the editors of

two hundred American newspapers.

In his lengthy espistle, he

argued that the time had come for Roosevelt to "reflate" the
dollar to its pre-Depression

size.

Pinchot soon joined forces with other advocates of
planned inflation.

In September, 1934, he helped establish

the Sound Money League.^-®

As its primary demand, the

•*-4ftnos pinchot to Paul U. Kellogg, Jan. 29, 1934, Box
55, ibid.
■^Amos Pinchot to Joseph B. Eastman, April 11, 1934,
ibid.
l^Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 28,
1934, ibid.
■^See Amos Pinchot, Copy of Letter Sent to 200 Editors
For Publication, typescript dated Aug. 8, 1934, ibid. See
also New York Times, Aug. 10, 1934, 6.
~*~8New York Times. Oct. 1, 1934, 6.
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deceptively named League called for the creation of a
Federal Monetary Authority.

The proposed agency would be an

independent government bureau with control over supplies of
credit and currency.

League members generally assumed that

such a body would attack the Depression by increasing the
amount of money in circulation.^^

Pinchot readily endorsed

the concept of an independent Monetary Authority.

Later in

1934, he recommended the establishment of such an office to
both Henry Ford and united States Senator William E.
Borah.

20

In January, 1935, he advanced the same idea in a

radio speech over station WEVD in New York.

01

The Roosevelt administration showed no enthusiasm for
the creation of an independent bureau with power over the
money supply.

Marriner S. Eccles, an ardent New Dealer and

the Governor of the Federal Reserve Board, insisted that his
own agency, if given the resources, could solve the full
range of monetary

p r o b l e m s .

22

February, 1935, New Deal

supporters in Congress introduced legislation designed to
strengthen the hand of the Federal Reserve in monetary

19See Joseph E. Reeve, Monetary Reform Movements; A
Survey of Recent Plans and Panaceas (Washington: American
Council on Public Affairs, 1943), 87, 90, and 326-29.
20Amos Pinchot to Henry Ford, Oct. 9, 1934; and Amos
Pinchot to William E. Borah, Nov. 13, 1934, both in Box r5,
Pinchot MSS.
21

For the text of the radio address, see Amos Pinchot.,
Shall We Have a Central Bank? Printed copy in Box 130, ibid.
22See Marriner S. Eccles, Beckoning Frontiers: Public
and Personal Recollections (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1951), 165-76.
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policymaking.^

The proposed measure received a strong

endorsement from Board Governor

E c c l e s .

24

Pinchot objected strenuously to the New Dealers'
approach to fiscal policy matters.

He considered the

Federal Reserve an all too pliant tool in the hands of the
Chief Executive,

in an open letter issued on March 15, ue

warned of a growing concentration of economic powcsr in the
Executive Branch.25

<phe legislation under review, he

argued, would give the President the ability to numipulat-e
the economy for political purposes.

As an alternative to a

stronger Federal Reserve, he urged the creation oi "a
permanent, non-partisan, and non-political Monetary
Authority.

. . ."26

While Congress debated the banking question, Pinchot
found himself at odds with other aspects of the New

D e a l .

27

2^For a summary of the bill, see New York Times.
Feb. 5, 1935, 1, 20.
24see ibid., Feb. 9, 1935, 23. See also Marriner S.
Eccles, "The Federal Reserve— 1935 Model," Magazine of Wall
Street. LV, No. 12 (March 30, 1935), 666-67, and 696^57.
2^pinchot told a close friend that copies of the
letter went to "all members of congress, [the] Cabinet,
Administration advisers. Presidents of principal banks, and
Editors throughout the country." See Amos Pinchot to Sumner
Gerard, March 14, 1935, Box 57, Pinchot MSS.
26For the text of the letter in printed form, see New
York Times. March 18, 1935, 16.
27in August, 1935, Congress finally passed the Banking
Act. The legislation give the New Dealers the stronger Fed
eral Reserve they wanted. For the text of the Act, see U.S.,
Statutes at Large. XLIX, Part 1, 684-723. For an insightful
commentary on the legislation, see Walter Lippmann, inter
pretations , 1933-1935 (New York: Macmillan Co., 1936),184-95.
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lie conLinuocl to believe tliat capitalism could lift, the
ifni.tod states out of the Depression. 28

in terms cf reform,

he remained committed to a program of limited nationaliza
tion intended to equalize entrepreneurial opportunities.^
The Roosevelt government, he reluctantly concluded, did not
share his politico-economic goals.

On June 19, the New

Yorker complained that he was "fast losing confidence in the
President.

A week later, he groused:

"I'm not so darn

sure that Roosevelt and the brain trust aren't sliding us
into a dictatorship.

. . ."31

Shortly thereafter, Pinchot broke publicly with the
New Deal.

On July 15, he announced his change of allegiance

in an open letter to Felix Frankfurter, a key Roosevelt
adviser.

Pinchot told Frankfurter that the President had

prolonged the Depression by failing to restore business

2®Amos Pinchot to Rev. Charles E. Coughlin, April 19,
1935; and Amos Pinchot to Mrs. Thomas K. Finlettei, May 14,
1935, both in Box 56, Pinchot MSS.
3^ln May, 1935, Pinchot delineated a reform program
for United States Senator Homer T. Bone of Washington.
Pinchot told the Senator:
What we really need, as a start, is to get out
natural resources . . . and also our transportation
system and utilities, out of the hands, so to speak,
of Mr. Morgan and Mr. Mellon. Then there will be
some chance for industrial equality of opportunity,
but not till then.
See Amos Pinchot to Homer T. Bone, May 8, 1935, Box 57,
ibid.
3°Amos Pinchot to Kenneth B. Walton, June 19, 1935,
ibid.
3lAmos Pinchot to Kenneth B. Walton, June '/6, 1935,
ibid.
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miif Lclt'nce.

Labeling Roosevelt "the areal tfncertaLnty, "

Ik ' called on the Chief Executive to choose among capitalism,
socialism, and fascism.

As for himself, Pinchot declared,

that he was "no longer gambler enough to support the New
Deal. "3^
In search of an alternative to Roosevelt, Pinchot
turned to the Republican party.

His attention soon focused

on Idaho's Senator William E. Borah.

An aging veteran of

reform politics, Borah had a strong aversion to the New Deal,
a nationally known reputation as a progressive, and a viable
interest in running for President.33

on August 16, Pinchot

described the Senator as the perfect G.O.P. Presidential
candidate for 1936.*^

A few weeks later, he expressed the

belief that Borah could outpoll Roosevelt in a national
race.35
Pinchot subsequently emerged as an active supporter
of Borah's bid for the White House.

On February 4, 1936,

the Senator announced his intention to seek the Presidency.3®

3^Amos Pinchot to Felix Frankfurter, July 15, 1935,
Box 56, ibid. See also New York Times. July 24, 1935, 18.
•*^See Orde Sorensen Pinckney, "William E. Borah and
the Republican Party, 1932-1940" (unpublished Ph.D disserta
tion, University of California, Berkeley, 1957), 84-114; and
William Hard, "Borah and '36 and Beyond," Harper's Magazine.
CLXXII (April, 1936), 575-83.
3^Amos Pinchot to J. S. Cullinan, Aug. 16, 1935, Box
56, Pinchot MSS.
3®Amos Pinchot to Frank Gannett, Sept. 26, 1935, Box
57, ibid.
3®New York Times. Feb. 5, 1936, 1, 2.
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Within a few days, Pinchot sent Iioran a latter of advice* on
campaign issues.3 ^

in the monLlis that LoJlowed, he offered

tin* Senator policy rocornmendations and words of encourage
ment.-*8

He also publicly endorsed the Idaho politician as a

Presidential aspirant.
vain.

'IQ

Pinchot expended his energy m

Borah never seriously threatened Kansas Governor

Alfred M. Landon in the fight for the G.O.P. nomination.4®
During the autumn election race, Pinchot backed
Landon in preference to Roosevelt.

As his major contribu

tion to the campaign, Pinchot dispatched an open letter to
Harold L. Ickes, Roosevelt's irascible Secretary of Interior.
Writing to Ickes on October 14, he charged that the New
Dealers wanted to impose a socialist regime on the United
States.

In contrast to the administration's key figures,

Landon, he said, offered the voters "character and commonsense."

With reference to the Kansas Governor, Pinchot

concluded:

"He is not as advanced in his views as; I am. But.

he is liberal and open-minded.

...

I see more chance for

37Amos Pinchot to William E. Borah, Feb. 14, 1936,
Box 58, Pinchot MSS.
3®See Amos Pinchot to William E. Borah, March 3,
1936; and Amos Pinchot to William E. Borah, April 17, 1936,
both in ibid.
39Hartford Courant. March 6, 1936. Clipping in Box
231, ibid. See also Amos Pinchot to Chairman of ihe Borah
Meeting, May 8, 1936, Box 59, ibid.
4®Landon won an easy first ballot victory. Roruh
received only nineteen votes from convention delegates. See
New York Times. June 19, 1936, 1.
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progress in an administration headed by him than by M r .
Roosevelt. "41
When the President won re-election by a landslide
margin, Pinchot cast a doleful eye over the returns.

He

assured Landon that the results stemmed from Roosevelt's
"matchless skill in arousing class hatred and class
hopes.

. . ."42

In a second assessment, he denied that the

votes reflected an "outpouring of popular sentiment."

He

attributed the Democratic victory to the efforts of relief
recipients, subsidized farmers, and others who feared that
"their semi-annual cheques would cease if the Little White
Father were not returned to power.
Post-election developments soon brought Pinchot back
into conflict with the New Dealers.

On February 5, 1937,

President Roosevelt asked Congress for an increase in the
size of the Federal Judiciary.

The Chief Executive's primary

goal was to enlarge the United States Supreme court and
thereby make the tribunal more amenable to his reform pro
gram. 44

pinchot viewed Roosevelt's scheme with alarm.

On

41Amos pinchot to Harold L. Ickes, Oct. 14, 1936, Box
59, Pinchot MSS. See also ibid., Oct. 19, 1936, 2.
4 2Amos Pinchot to Alfred M. Landon, Nov. 4, 1936, Box
58, Pinchot MSS.
43Amos Pinchot to Alfred Hawes, Nov. 6,1936, ibid.
44por the text of Roosevelt's message to Congress,
see Cong. Rec., 75 Cong., 1 Sess. (Feb. 5, 1937), 877-79.
See also William E. Leuchtenburg, "The Origins of Franklin
D. Roosevelt's 'Court-Packing' Plan," in Philip B. Kurland
(ed.), The Supreme Court Review. 1966(Chicago: University
ofChicago Press, 1966), 347-400.
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l:h<* evening oi February 5, ho wrote Koy Howard:
is a tremendous occasion.

"...

this

unless Congress defeats this

bill, we are in fascism."4^*
Pinchot‘s sense of urgency propelled him into acuion.
During a telephone conversation on February 6, he asked
newspaper publisher Frank Gannett, a former colleague from
the Borah campaign, to lead the fight against the President's
plan to reorganize the Judiciary.
challenge.

Gannett accepted the

On February 14, the publishing magnate announced

the formation of the National Committee to Uphold Constitu
tional Government.

Founders of the new organization included

Gannett, Pinchot, journalist Lincoln Colcord, and historian
James Truslow Adams.

In the months that followed, the com

mittee fought tenaciously against Roosevelt's "Court
packing" plan and other New Deal innovations.4®
The furor over Judicial reorganization gave Pinchot
ample opportunity to use his polemical skills.

On February

14, he sent a caustically worded letter to all members of
congress.

The President's court plan, he told the legis

lators, constituted "a long and perhaps irrevocable step

4^Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, Feb. 5, 1937, Box 61,
Pinchot MSS.
4^On the origins and activities of the National com
mittee to Uphold Constitutional Government, see Samuel T.
Williamson, Frank Gannett; A Biography (New York: Duell,
Sloane, and Pearce, 1940), 177-203. See also Richard
Polenburg, Reorganizing Roosevelt1s Government; The Contro
versy Over Executive Reorganization. 1936-1939 (Cambridge:
Harvard university Press, 1966), 55-78? hereinafter cited as
Polenburg, Roosevelt1s Government.
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into dictatorship."^

A few weeks later, Pinchot addressed

himself directly to the Chief Executive.
on April 26, he told Roosevelt:

"...

In an open letter
I have watched your

steady and unrelenting drive for more and more power . . .
[and] I am forced to conclude that . . . you want the power
of a dictator without the liability of the name.1,48
While Congress continued debate on the Court ques
tion, pinchot scrutinized other New Deal m e a s u r e s . ^

Along

with Judicial reorganization, Roosevelt had previously gone
on record in favor of restructuring the Executive Branch.
Pinchot regarded Executive reorganization as another scheme

Amos Pinchot to Members of the United States con
gress, Feb. 13, 1937, Box 60, Pinchot MSS. See also New
York Times, Feb. 15, 1937, 3.
Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 26,
1937, Box 234, Pinchot MSS. See also New York Times. April
26, 1937, 7.
^Congress struggled with the Court question until
August, 1937. The legislators finally enacted a compromise
measure that made no change in the size of the Supreme
Court. For the text of the Act, see U. S., Statutes at
Large. L, Part 1, 751-53. For material on the fight in
Congress, see William E. Leuchtenburg, "Franklin D. Roose
velt's Supreme Court 'Packing* Plan," in Harold W. Hollings
worth and William F. Holmes (eds.), Essays on the New Deal
(Austin: Uhiversity of Texas Press, 1969), 69-115.
~*°For Roosevelt's stand on Executive reorganization,
see U. S., Reorganization of the Executive Departments;
Message From the President of the united States Transmitting
a. Report on Reorganization of the Executive Departments of
the Government, Senate Doc. 8, 75 Cong., 1 Sess., 1937,
1-84. See also Louis Brownlow, A Passion For Anonymity:
The Autobiography of Louis Brownlow (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1958), 371-403.
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to increase Presidential power.

Cl

He detected the same

sinister motive behind a minimum wage proposal introduced in
eg

Congress by Senator Hugo L. Black of A l a b a m a . P i n c h o t ,

t

xn

short, saw Roosevelt grasping for additional power at every
turn.

On July 26, the New Yorker renewed his open letter

campaign against the President.

In an angry screed, he once

again charged the Chief Executive with attempting to
establxsh a dxctatorshxp.
Pinchot kept up his one-sided correspondence with
Roosevelt during the first half of 1938.

In an open letter

dated January 29, he urged the President to abandon the
cause of Executive reorganization.

At the same time, he

repeated his contention that Roosevelt wanted dictatorial
p o w e r . i n May, 1938, Pinchot challenged the President

Sixmos Pinchot to F. M. Huntington Wilson, May 4,
1937, Box 62, Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to William
Hard, May
27, 1937, Box 60, Pinchot MSS. See also Polenburg,
Roosevelt1s Government, 66-68.
52For a discussion of Senator Black’s 1937 proposal,
see Paul H. Douglas and Joseph Hackman, "The Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938," Political Science Quarterly, LIII,
No. 4 (Dec., 1938), 493-94. For Pinchot's reaction to the
bill, see Amos Pinchot to Robert P. Scripps, June 28, 1937,
Box 62, Pinchot MSS; and Amos Pinchot to Roy Howard, July 2,
1937, Box
61, Pinchot
MSS.
53Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, July 26,
1937, Box 60, Pinchot MSS. See also New York Times, July
1937, 6.

26,

54Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jun. 29,
1938, Box 64, Pinchot MSS. See also New York Times, Jan.
31, 1938, 3. Congress rejected Executive reorganization in
April, 1938. A ye air later, however, Roosevelt won approval
to make sweeping changes in his governmental household.
See
Polenburg, Roosevelt's Government. 162-68.
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■ilnruj a different. front.

On May 12, the House of Represen-

(atives approved on appropriations bill that called for the
expenditure of three billion dollars on relief and public
works projects.

The proposed legislation gave the Chief

Executive discretionary authority over disbursement of the
money.55

pinchot objected vehemently to the power tenta

tively granted to the President.

In an open letter on May

17, he accused Roosevelt of trying to "Tammanyize” the
United States.

The appropriations measure, he fumed, was a

'plan to buy America on the hoof."56
As an alternative to increased government spending,
Pinchot argued for reliance on free enterprise.
he wrote:

On June 9,

"Depressions cannot be cured by governments.

. . . capital and labor will pull us out . . . if we can be
pulled

o u t . "57

Later in the year, Pinchot offered a similar

argument to labor leader John L. Lewis,

in an open letter

intended for publication on Labor Day, 1938, the New Yorker
assured Lewis that capitalism was "the most productive form

55For House action on the bill, see New York Times,
May 10, 1938, 1? and New York Times, May 13, 1938, 1, 6.
56Anios Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 17,
1938, Box 65, Pinchot MSS. See also ibid., May 18, 1938,
L0. The money bill subsequently passed in the Senate with
the President's authority intact. For the text of the Act,
see U. S., Statutes at Large. LII, 809-20. For an assess
ment of the legislation, see James T. Patterson, Congres
sional Conservatism and the New D e a l : The Growth of the
conservative Coalition in Congress. 1933-1939 (Lexington:
university of Kentucky Press, 1967), 233-42.
57Amos Pinchot to Charles
Box 64, Pinchot MSS.

r

. Eckert, June 9, 1938,
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of economic organization" yet devised.66
Early in 1939, war clouds in Europe and Asia intensi
fied Pinchot's hostility toward the New Dealers.

On February

27, the old reformer wrote:
The present administration is being guided by
radicals who . . . don't believe in either capital
ism or democracy, and who will never change their
political point of view. Nor, I think, will Roose
velt himself. . . . And he will try to keep in power
by every means . . . even if he has to throw the
country into war. . . .59
A few weeks later, Pinchot made the same accusation in
public.

In an open letter on April 18, he charged Roosevelt

with systematically plotting to involve the united States in
another world war.60
After fighting broke out in Europe in September,
1939, Pinchot anxiously looked forward to the Presidential
sweepstakes for 1940.

He hoped for the nomination of a

Republican candidate who could drive Roosevelt out of the
White House.

His first choice was Frank Gannett, but the

publisher lacked the necessary popular appeal.6'*’ Among the
other G.O.P. hopefuls, Pinchot preferred business executive

66Amos Pinchot to John L . Lewis, Sept. 3, 1938, Box
63, ibid. See also New York Times, Sept. 5, 1938, 2.
59Amos Pinchot to John O'Connor, Feb. 27, 1939, Box
66, Pinchot MSS.
60Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, April 18,
1939, Box 67, ibid.
61See Amos pinchot to Frank Gannett, Dec. 28, 1939,
Box 66, ibid.; and Amos pinchot to Randolph Walker, Jan. 26,
1940, ibid.
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Wendell L. Willkie to New York Governor Thomas E. Dewey.62
Still, his immediate concern remained the selection of a
Republican who could defeat Roosevelt.
declared:

In June, 1940, he

". . . 1 would back Judas Iscariot against our

peerless leader in the White

H o u s e .

"63

When the Presidential race narrowed to a battle
between Roosevelt and Willkie, Pinchot eagerly embraced the
latter candidate.

In August, 1940, he urged Willkie to

challenge the New Deal *s "deadly record of failure and
inefficiency.

. . ."64

L ess than two weeks later, he advised

the G.O.P. contender to offer "vigorous and uncompromising
opposition to the President's war drive. . . ."66
of the Willkie campaign pleased Pinchot immensely.

tenor
On

October 15, he remarked to Senator Burton K. Wheeler of

^ W i t h reference to the New York Governor, Pinchot
complained:
Today I tried in vain, as I sat watching Dewey from
the side view, to call to mind someone who could
better fit the description of a bright, smug, scrappy,
smalltown squirt. . . . And I wondered what had happened
to American public life that a man of his ki.nd and
calibre should be thought eligible for the presidency
of the United States.
See Amos Pinchot to Geoffrey parsons, March 14, 1940, Box
67, ibid. In sharp contrast to his description of Dewey,
Pinchot called Willkie a man of "resonant personality . . .
simplicity and sincerity. . . . "
See Amos Pinchot to John
F. Sinclair, June 13, 1940, Box 68, ibid.
63Amos Pinchot to Lincoln Colcord, June 24, 1940, Box
67, ibid.
64Amos pinchot to Wendell L. Willkie, Aug. 14, 1940,
ibid.
65Amos pinchot to Wendell L. Willkie, Sept. 4, 1940,
ibid.
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i4oj>Uiiia:

"Willkic's speeches seem to mo the most powerful

and convincing political speeches I've hoard in my time."
He went on to predict a triumph for Willkie that would bo
"the most significant political victory since

L i n c o l n ' s . " ^

The re-election of Roosevelt to an unprecedented
third term left Pinchot in a dour mood.

He attributed the

Democratic victory to the work of machine politicians and
relief r e c i p i e n t s i n

a post-election letter to his son,

lie insisted that "a great majority of the informed free
minded people" had voted for Willkie.®8
With the election over, Pinchot concentrated his
attention on the problems of American foreign policy.

He

adamantly opposed United States involvement in the war going
on in Europe.

On December 13, he wrote:

I feel that we can be kept out of war. But it is
going to be a hard fight. . . . The country is in an
hysterical condition. . . . The idea has been spread,
and accepted by many, that it is our business to go
far afield righting the wrongs of the whole world,
fighting other nations' battles . . . and doing all
sorts of things which are as much beyond our strength
as beyond our duty. . . .69
In a concurrent letter to Frank Gannett, Pinchot asserted:

®®Amos Pinchot to Burton K. Wheeler, Oct. 15, 1940,
ibid.
®^Amos pinchot to John Sloane, Nov. 7, 1940, ibid.;
and Amos Pinchot to Douglas Johnson, Nov. 7, 1940, Box 60,
ibid.
68Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, II, Nov. 11, 1940,
Box 5 , ibid.
6^Amos Pinchot to R. Douglas Stuart, Jr., Dec. 13,
1940, Box 68 , ibid.
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. . w e must all use our best and most devoted efforts

to

keep this country from getting into the European
conflict."70
Pinchot's anti-war stand soon caused him to clash
with President Roosevelt.

On December 29, the Chief Execu

tive proposed an ambitious program of Lend-Lease aid to
71

nations engaged in fighting Nazi Germany.'
fully opposed the President's plan.

Pinchot force

In January, 1941, he

attacked Lend-Lease in a statement read to the Foreign
Affairs Committee of the House of Representatives.7^

In ^

open letter to Roosevelt on February 9, he termed the aid
proposal ''hysterical madness."7^
After Congress approved Lend-Lease, Pinchot com
plained bitterly about Roosevelt's political machinations.74
On April 2, he wrote Lincoln Colcord:

"It is extraordinary,

7®Amos Pinchot to Frank Gannett, Dec. 13, 1940, Box
67, ibid.
7;LSee New York Times, Dec. 30, 1940, 1, 6 .
7^pinchot became ill before he could address the
Committee. John Burke of the American Defense Society read
the New Yorker's statement into the record. For the text of
the statement, see U. S., Lend-Lease Bills Hearings Before
the committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives,
Seventy Seventh Congress, First Session on H. R. 1776
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1941), 556-58.
7^Amos Pinchot to Franklin D. Roosevelt, Feb. 9, 1941,
Box 69, Pinchot MSS. See also New York Times, Feb. 10,
1941, 10.
74Congress passed the Lend-Lease program in March,
1941. For the text of the legislation, see U. S., Statutes
at Large, LV, Part 1, 31-33.
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iL is incredible, that the people shouldn't have . . .
sensed the duplicity, the broken pledges, and the foxy
manoeuvring of the President.

. . .1,75

In a later report to

his son, Pinchot charged that Roosevelt and a coterie of
"Marxian intellectuals" planned to impose a socialist
dictatorship on ftnerica.7®
When the United States finally went to war in Decem
ber, 1941, Pinchot prepared to defend his most cherished
political and economic values.

Paradoxically, he expected

the decisive battles of the war years to take place on the
homefront.

He foresaw a clash of rival ideologies on the

domestic scene that would determine the future of American
politics.

On December 29, Pinchot declared his intention

to take an active part in the fight "to preserve private
enterprise and rehabilitate the capitalist system in the
eyes of the people."77
Gannett:

A few weeks later, he told Frank

"We should still be able to save the capitalist

system if we can explain what it means clearly enough and
often enough to the country."7®

75Amos Pinchot to Lincoln Colcord, April 2, 1941,
Box 69, Pinchot MSS.
7®Amos Pinchot to Gifford Pinchot, II, Sept. 30, 1941,
Box 5, ibid. For the same accusation in magazine article
form, see Amos pinchot, "The Roosevelt-Laski Scheme,"
Scribner1s Commentator, X, No. 6 (Oct., 1941), 62-68.
77Amos Pinchot to H. Dudley Swim, Dec. 29, 1941, Box
/0, Pinchot MSS.
7®Amos Pinchot to Frank Gannett, Jan. 29, 1942, Box
72, ibid.
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Pinchot did not endure to waq< • the battles that he
anticipated.

In June, 1942, he complained of "severe

insomnia and attendant exhaustion."79
he tried to commit suicide.

Shortly thereafter,

The attempt failed, but Pinchot

never again took part in public life.

on

He died on

February 18, 1944.81
In the last years of his political career, Amos
Pinchot fought with new enemies on behalf of old values.
Initially, the New Yorker supported President Roosevelt and
the New Deal, but he soon grew disenchanted.

By 1935, he

counted himself among the foes of the administration.

As

the 1930's wore on, Pinchot's anti-Roosevelt pronouncements
became increasingly indiscriminate,

in a long series of

open letters, he warned the public that the President wanted
dictatorial power.

At the same time, Pinchot held tenac

iously to the values that had long dominated his commitment
to reform.

He continued to believe in the efficacy of com

petitive capitalism and the need for equal entrepreneurial
opportunities.

With dogged persistence, he advanced atom

istic competition as a reform alternative to the New Deal.
Through the last days of his public life, Pinchot embraced
capitalism as a reform ideology.

79Amos Pinchot to E. S. Webster, June 24, 1942, ibid.
80 On Pinchot's attempted suicide, see New Yor?c Times.
Aug. 7, 1942, 1, 9.
®^Ibid., Feb. 19, 1944, 13.

Chapter 8
THE IDEOLOGUE AND POWER
Ostensibly, Amos Pinchot met all the prerequisites
for membership in the American ruling class.

His family

background, education, and political connections afforded
him easy access to public life.

Once involved in politics,

he became fascinated with the struggle for power.

Yet

Pinchot never occupied a position of significant political
influence.

At an early date, he assumed an ideological

stance that barred him from effective participation in the
governmental elite.
Pinchot formulated his political values during the
years before World War I .

As a Yale undergraduate in th>

1890's, he came to appreciate the arguments of William
Graham Sumner on behalf of capitalism and Social Darwinism.
His subsequent experiences with the Ballinger-Pinchot
controversy and the Progressive party awakened his interest
in reform politics.

in 1913, Pinchot found the capstone for

his political education.

The anti-monopoly credo of George

Record allowed the New Yorker to reconcile his sympathy for
Sumnerian principles with his commitment to reform.
Record, Pinchot learned to see atomistic competitive
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From

capitalism as a reform ideology.
Pinchot's acceptance of the anti-monopoly creed
brought important changes in the tenor of his political
career.

He soon emerged as a doctrinaire proponent of

Record's reform ideas.

At the same time, he found it

increasingly difficult to work with the men who had formerly
commanded his political allegiance.

In governmental affairs,

he gradually drifted away from his brother Gifford.

During

the 1916 Presidential campaign, he broke publicly with
Theodore Roosevelt.

In 1916, Pinchot supported President

Woodrow Wilson, but he did not owe his first loyalty to the
Chief Executive.

Instead, he looked to George Record for

political leadership and ideological instruction.
With American entry into World War I, Pinchot tempo
rarily reordered his reform priorities.

He put aside the

anti-monopoly creed and pursued goals directly related to the
war effort.

Still very much a reformer, he wanted the

United States to champion the cause of democracy throughout
the world,

concommitantly, he insisted that democratic

institutions had to be protected on the homefront.

The

policies actually implemented by the Wilson administration
left Pinchot frustrated and embittered.

He watched in

dismay while government authorities suppressed domestic
criticism of the war.

When the postwar negotiations at

Versailles failed to produce a flowering of democracy, he
turned against President Wilson.
remained in the camp of reform.

Still, the New Yorker
He emerged from the war
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yeara convinced of the need for change in the established
order.
For Pinchot, the return to peacetime politics meant
revival of the anti-monopoly creed.

Along with Record, he

labored to impose the narrow reform program on the Committee
of Forty Eight.

The two zealots were largely successful,

but their efforts helped sabotage plans for a broad third
party coalition.

Unrepentant, Pinchot and Record held

tenaciously to their politico-economic ideas.

As political

organizers and activists, they continued to advance the
anti-monopoly credo.

Working in tandem, they kept their

vision of reform alive throughout the postwar decade.
After the onset of the Great Depression, Pinchot used
his reform ideas as a standard of measure for the New Deal.
Except for a brief period of infatuation, he consistently
opposed the Roosevelt administration.

He deplored the

centralization of power and the air of economic experimenta
tion that characterized the Roosevelt regime.

His own remedy

for the economic crisis centered on the anti-monopoly creed
and its promise of rejuvenated free enterprise.

Pinchot*s

bitter attacks on the New Dealers clearly revealed the sharp
contrast between his views on reform and their commitments
to change.
For more than thirty years, Pinchot stayed on the
periphery of American politics.

His family name, native

abilities, and wide range of activities assured him a place
near the center of power.

Still, he never exerted

significant influence.

Instead, he devoted his best

energies to the advocacy of an increasingly anachronistic
ideology.

While the American ruling class accepted mass

production industries and the beginnings of the welfare
state, Pinchot argued for economic competition and indi
vidualism.

Over the years, his atavistic preachments grew

more and more remote from the realities of American political
and economic life.

Throughout most of his career as a re

former, Pinchot remained a quixotic figure, an ardent
crusader for outworn shibboleths and antiquated ideas.
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